CITIZENSHIP *and* NATIONAL IDENTITY

from colonialism to globalism

EDITOR

T K Oommen

One of the most widely discussed themes in contemporary social science research is the relationship between citizenship and national identity. Analyses of this relationship vary drastically, due primarily to two reasons. First, the content of national identity is perceived to be different in different regions of the world. Second, there is a persisting tendency to fuse citizenship and national identity. These perceptions are, in turn, the outcome of the prevailing conceptual confusions which tend not only to conflate citizenship and national identity, but also nationality and ethnicity, and race and ethnicity.

This important volume not only highlights the fundamental flaws in and inappropriateness of such conceptualizations but provides an entirely fresh perspective utilizing insights from the disciplines of sociology, social anthropology, political science, history and international relations. Combining both Western and non-Western perspectives and drawing upon data from a wide variety of empirical situations, the contributors deftly explore the major problems and issues involved in understanding the relationship between citizenship and national identity in the contemporary context.

Overall, the contributors maintain that the issues relating to citizenship are essentially those of participation and entitlements in the political, economic, cultural and social spheres. Even in democratic politics, the young, the poor, and women do not enjoy equal status as citizens. National identity, they argue, involves affiliation with and internality to a society and raises questions of collective identity which becomes a source of deprivation when it leads to inequality. Thus, according to the contributors, the problematic of the citizenship–nationality linkage is essentially the relationship between identity and equality. And this problematic has become more acute in today's world with its numerous poly-ethnic and multi-national societies, many of which are breaking up.

With its innovative and interdisciplinary approach and its strong theoretical orientation, this volume will interest all social scientists, particularly those in the fields of sociology, politics and history.

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CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

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From Colonialism to Globalism

Editor

T. K. OOMMEN

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TO

James S. Coleman (1926–95), President, American Sociological Association 1991–92, whose invitation to organize a thematic session on 'Citizenship and National Identity' for the ASA annual meeting at Pittsburg, 1992, marks the beginning of this book.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The relationship between citizenship and national identity is one of the most widely discussed themes in contemporary social science. This is but a reflection of the concerned response of social scientists to a persisting societal crisis. Perhaps, the concern got heightened due to the persistence, and in fact the revival, of the crisis in poly-ethnic and multi-national polities and the breaking up of some of them in the recent past.

Social science conceptualization and theorising could not grapple with, let alone anticipate, the crisis. In fact, by and large, social scientists 'predicted' a reverse trend, as indicated by the assertions of the movement from tradition to modernity, from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, the disappearance of the primary group, the eclipse of the community, the melting away of primordial ties, and the emergence of socialist, rational or liberal man. What is, therefore, called for is not simply a fresh look at the changing reality but a recognition of the inadequacies of our theories and concepts; a paradigm shift, if you will. The present theme—the relationship between citizenship and national identity—provides a vantage point for this challenging exercise.

Issues relating to citizenship, in the final analysis, are those of participation and entitlements in the political, economic, cultural and social arenas. And even in democratic polities, the young, the lower class and women are not equal citizens in the context of public participation. In the case of women, the situation is further aggravated because they are overburdened with the 'caring' responsibility. The situation is gradually changing, especially in modern industrial societies with men sharing the caring responsibility. But the quality and extent of participation in public and private spheres vary widely between men and women. Thus, the state–society and system–lifeworld duality persists in all societies.

Be that as it may, I want to suggest that as the idea of citizenship is hinged on the notion of individual equality, those categories

whose *internality* to the society/system is not contested, such as, age-group, gender and class, can achieve full citizenship. In contrast, those collectivities which are believed to be, objectively or subjectively, *external* to the society in question, would have to break basic structural barriers before they can achieve equality in citizenship. When the internality of a collectivity to the society is doubted or questioned, the concept of equality which is anchored in the individual as the unit of analysis is rendered inadequate, nay meaningless. In fact, we need a conceptualization which can account for equality based on groups. This, I submit, is the context which provides for an analysis of the relationship between citizenship and national identity.

The disjuncture between citizenship (membership and participation in a polity) and national identity (affiliation with and internality to a society) produces problems of collective identity. But collective identity becomes a source of deprivation—material or cultural—only when it engenders inequality. Thus, in the final analysis, the problematic of the citizenship–nationality linkage is that of the relationship between identity and equality. The chapters in this volume ought to be viewed in this perspective.

The birth of this volume was when James S. Coleman, President of the American Sociological Association (ASA) during 1991–92, invited me to organize a thematic session on 'Citizenship and National Identity' for the 87th annual meeting of ASA held in August 1992 at Pittsburg. As a thematic session is allotted three hours, I could invite only a limited number of speakers. Invoking the maxim 'minimize the number, maximize the contexts', I invited six scholars from five continents, assuming that the notions of citizenship and national identity have differing connotations in different regions based on the trajectory of their developments.

The scholars were therefore required to present their papers with special reference to specific regions: West Europe, East Europe, North America, Latin America, South Asia and Africa. The idea of publishing a volume based on these papers was mooted by me, as the organizer of the session, and it was unanimously endorsed by the paper presenters.

However, I realized that there were significant gaps in terms of regional representations. For example, Azril's paper (Chapter 10) dealt with Spanish Latin America, but Portuguese Latin America got left out and the entire Middle East (the Arab World) was absent.

Understandably, I started looking for the possibility of filling these gaps, and the opportunity for the same came through two seminars to which I was invited.

While participating in the seminar on 'Nation, Tribe and Citizenship' held under the auspices of the International Forum on Development Problems convened by the Centre for Theoretical Research and Documentation, Rome, in December 1992, I came across the papers by Elisa P. Reis on Brazil (Chapter 9) and Takashi Miyajima's paper on Japan (Chapter 4), both of which aptly filled the existing gaps. Similarly, I found the paper by Bassam Tibbi on the Middle East (Chapter 7) while we were co-participants in a seminar on 'Nation, Nationality and National Identity' organized by the University of California, Berkeley, in September 1992. I thank all the contributors to this volume, as well as the organizers of the seminars, who have made this book possible.

While Chapters 2 to 10 are drawn from three different intellectual events, the 'Introduction' attempts to situate these chapters within the thematic framework of the volume. It is also important to note here that the contributors have been drawn from a variety of disciplines—social anthropology, sociology, political science, history, law and international relations. The diversity of disciplines and empirical situations from which the contributors have been drawn inevitably unfolds the differing orientations of the chapters. And yet, one is struck by the shared commonality of substantive as well as conceptual and theoretical interests across the different contributions. This is eloquent proof of the universality of the theme of this volume.

All the chapters in this volume are being published for the first time, except Chapter 3 by Rogers Brubaker, which is an edited version of a paper published earlier in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23: 47–78, 1994. I thank Kluwer Academic Publishers for their permission to reprint this article in this volume.

T. K. OOMMEN

1

Introduction: Conceptualizing the Linkage between Citizenship and National Identity

T. K. Oommen

The three concepts of citizenship, nationality and ethnicity are crucial to the theme of this book. In trying to keep these concepts clear and concise it is necessary to (*a*) avoid their reciprocal conflations, (*b*) avoid subsumption into or by other concepts, and (*c*) specify the critical minimum elements by which one can distinguish them from other concepts. It is also necessary to identify an appropriate categorization of the polities to which these concepts can be applied unambiguously. I propose to undertake these tasks in this introductory chapter before situating the substantive chapters in the overall schema of the book. The twin concepts which are frequently conflated are state and nation (hence citizenship and nationality), and nation and ethnie (consequently nationality and ethnicity). Increasingly, the tendency to subsume race into ethnicity is also becoming widespread. As ethnicity and nationality are conflated, subsumption of race into ethnicity seriously distorts the analysis of nation and nationality. In fact, it becomes a stepping stone to defining race as nation.

Conflation of State and Nation

The tendency to conflate state and nation is so common that an effort to differentiate them would appear to be a wild goose chase.

This fact that the co-terminality between citizenship and nationality has become a part of everyday life can easily be discerned from statements such as, 'Indian national honoured in Germany', 'British national found dead in San Francisco' and 'Five US nationals trapped in the tragedy' appearing in the press. In all these cases, the reference actually is to citizenship. Similarly, 'nation' in a 'five nation initiative for nuclear disarmament' or the '51 nation meet on European security' and so on, actually refers to the state. The term nationality is invariably invoked to refer to citizenship in UN documents. Similarly, in European Union documents such as the 'Euro-barometer' the term nationals actually refers to citizens.

I give these examples for two reasons. First, the application of the term nationality becomes particularly problematic in all those cases where people of the same national origin belong to several states as citizens, and such cases are on the increase. Second, the documents of the UN and similar organizations are formulated by 'experts' after enormous amounts of discussions and deliberations.

If the tendency to conflate state and nation was confined only to the mass media and the civil servants of interstate organizations, one could have let it pass. But unfortunately it is equally common among academicians. Since state and nation are conflated so frequently, it is neither necessary nor possible to refer to most of them. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a small sample.

Karl Deutsch, a well-known expert on nationalism, maintains (1953) that territory, language, history and social heritage pose problems in defining nation. In a later work (ibid., 1969: 19) he writes:

> The coming together of the state and people makes a modern nation. A nation is a people who have hold of a state or who have developed quasi-governmental capabilities for forming, supporting and enforcing a common will. And a nation-state is a state that has become largely identifiable with one people.

If one applies this definition to the existing states, most of them will not be nations, and since several peoples still aspire to have their own states, they are not yet nation-states. More important is the fact that some nations do not even aspire to or have consciously renounced the aspiration to acquire statehood. Thus, the wide gap between Deutsch's concepts of nation, state and the nation-state

and the reality on the ground makes them ill-suited for any meaningful analysis.

It is true that in Europe the ideal was the nation-state. But even in Europe before 1800 the demand for political autonomy in the name of cultural distinctiveness was confined to two specific contexts. These were (*a*) when empires imposed or tried to impose official religions on dissenting minorities, and (*b*) when empires attempted to increase central control through imperial administration (Tilly, 1994). While in the last two centuries the demands for political autonomy based on cultural specificity have increased, '...only a tiny portion of the world's distinctive religious, linguistic, and cultural groupings have formed their own states, while precious few of the world's existing states have approximated the homogeneity and commitment conjured up by the label "nation-state"' (ibid.: 137). This is in spite of the stupendous efforts at homogenization of state populations.

But even Tilly, an astute sociologist of nationalism who anchors his research firmly in history, does not tell the full story. In the course of his analysis of the European situation over five centuries, he notes that there were several political 'turbulences' in the British states—Scotland and Wales—before they were integrated (see, Tilly, 1993). But Wales and Scotland were joined to England; they were not annexed. Catalonia, the second most industrialized nation of Europe after England in the eighteenth century, did not seek a separate state. The Catalonian elite did not perceive any contradiction between maintaining a certain level of economic, political and cultural autonomy for the Catalonian nation and continuing in the Spanish state (Pi-Sunyer, 1985). Therefore, Tilly's categorization of nationalism into two, state-led and state-seeking, while covering most cases leaves out at least a few.

In the case of state-led nationalism, the rulers demanded that citizens should subordinate all other interests to those of the state, which led to the subsequent emergence of 'nations'. In state-seeking nationalism, leaders sought to create new states which could pursue the interests of distinct populations with a specific cultural identity; nationalism created states. But there were nations and national leadership in Europe which renounced a separate state and preferred a union within a larger polity. Wales, Scotland and Catalonia seem to fit this description. In Indonesia, all the constituent nations, save East Timor, have accepted the union. Most nations in the

Indian union did not ever aspire for sovereign statehood. In the case of the Philippines, except Mindanaos, all the other nations seem to have integrated well. The point is, nations do not always seek their states; some nations may renounce states. Therefore, state-renouncing nationalism is an empirical fact and a conceptual possibility. Hence, Gellner's (1983) apprehension that two large (how large?), politically viable and independence worthy high cultures (who is entitled to make these pronouncements?) cannot cohabit under a single political roof is misplaced.

As for state-led nationalism, most states have not achieved their avowed objective of homogenization of their populations, as Tilly has noted. At any rate, the idea of bartering one's cultural identity for purposes of material equality does not seem to appeal to all nations. At least some nations do not endorse the trade-off; they want to have both identity and equality. But they seem to think that for the preservation of identity one need not have an exclusive sovereign state, as it can as well be maintained within a multinational polity. For example, '...the supreme object of...Welsh national leaders was essentially equality within the United Kingdom and an expanding empire, not severance from it' (Morgan, 1971: 165). According to Smith (1979: 172), a prolific writer on the subject,

> ...the bureaucratic state fulfills for the nation its two primordial needs of stemming the uncontrollable march of time and enclosing a clearly delimited space. To accomplish these and other tasks, the nation today, in a world of nation-states, requires the political might and scientific expertise of [the] bureaucratic state.... When a scientific state has taken 'root' and is regarded by its members as their true defense against external hostility and internal disintegration, which it becomes closely identified with the national history and territory, then it turns into a 'nation-state'....

In a later work Smith (198₁: 18–19) suggested that:

> A nation can be created in various ways and from a variety of bases and circumstances. The two commonest bases are a territorial state or political community and a community of culture...nationalism binds together elites and masses in a single ethnic nation with a single legislative will.

Smith first suggests that the nation cannot survive today without its own state. Here one may ask: how about Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Brittany and several nations in the Indian union? Second, having laid down the teleological track for the nation, he further suggests that in order to maintain the nation, the state should become a bureaucratic and scientific one. The fact that it is the bureaucratization of the state which has triggered off the wrath of a wide variety of social activists in the affluent liberal democracies, and that it is this over-bureaucratization, by ignoring 'national' sentiments in multi-national socialist states, which has eventually resulted in their collapse does not register on him. Third, there is no warrant in history to maintain that only the 'scientific state' can provide true defense to its citizens against external hostility and internal disintegration. Fourth, there is enormous evidence to show that in numerous cases state and nation have not fused into one so as to make nation-states (see, Nielsson, 1985). Finally, it may be noted that legislative will binds together not only the people of a single 'ethnic' nation but also of multi-national (e.g., India) and poly-ethnic (e.g., the US) states.

Smith is right in maintaining that a 'nation' can be created from a variety of bases and in various ways. But each of these bases—common territory, political community or culture—and the modes of establishing the 'nation' would inevitably influence the end product, as is evident from the different chapters on West Europe, East Europe, North America, Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa in this book. History, traditions, relationship with colonial powers, modes of defining and recruiting citizens (descent, immigration) and the like inevitably impinge on the internal milieux of the states in these regions. The co-terminality between nation and state is absent in most cases. Therefore, the conceptualization attempted by Smith (and several others like him) is not helpful.

Some authors, however, claim to distinguish between states and nations. Prominent examples are Barker and Seton-Watson. Barker distinguished between state and nation when he wrote: 'Historically the state precedes the nation. It is not nations which make states; it is states which make nations' (1948: 15). He acknowledges the disjunction between the state and the nation, citing the examples of Poland in the nineteenth century and the Austro-Hungarian state, which was but a congery of nations. And yet he insists that

in light of the historical experiences of Europe since 1815, '...in some form a nation must be a state and a state a nation and a democratic state which is multi-national will fall asunder into as many democracies as there are nationalities...' (ibid.: 15). But confronted by contrary evidence with regard to Britain he concludes: 'State can be both multi-national and a single nation and can teach its citizens at one and the same time to glory both in the name of Scotsmen or Welshmen or Englishmen and in the name of Britons' (ibid.: 17). Barker is conflating state and nation here, and consequently citizenship and nationality. If he remained coherent about his conceptions, as he insisted in the beginning of his book, he would have characterized Britain as a multi-national state, the British people sharing not only a common citizenship identity but also having their specific national identities—English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish.

Seton-Watson is another author who intended to keep the distinction between state and nation but did not quite succeed. He wrote (1977: 1):

> The distinction between states and nations is fundamental... states can exist without a nation, or with several nations, among their subjects, and a nation can be co-terminus with the population of one state or be included together with other nations within one state or be divided between several states.

This is an exceptionally clear statement on the relationship between state and nation. But after four pages, he lists 'a strong disciplined army' as an instrument for spreading 'national consciousness'. And of the three factors listed by him as important for the formation of national consciousness in Israel, state is one (ibid.: 403). When the army is viewed as an instrument of the nation and the state itself is considered as an important factor in the formation and spread of national consciousness, the distinction between state and nation gets obliterated. Further, he refers to the Swiss nation, the Dutch nation, and the like although he finds it difficult to accept the term British nation (ibid.: 487).

Some authors, in the process of making a distinction between nation-states and state-nations have distinguished clearly between states and nations. For example, Rejai and Enloe (1969: 143) have succinctly observed:

> 'state'...is primarily a political-legal concept, whereas 'nation' is primarily psycho-cultural. Nation and state may exist independently of one another, a nation may exist without a state, a state may exist without a nation. When the two coincide, the result is a nation state.

Having said this, the authors argue that developing states are state-nations and suggest that a new nationhood can be established around the new states. However, they also suggest that it is not necessary for the ethnic groups to give up their identities and loyalties in order to be incorporated into the state-nation. This, in effect, amounts to saying that there are two 'national' identities, one proffered by the state and the other by the ethnic groups; state nationalism and ethnic nationalism being two different types of nationalisms. This is confusing.

The only author, as far as I know, who has made the conceptual distinction between the state and the nation and relentlessly stuck to it is Walker Connor. He has rightly castigated those who have indulged in inter-utilization of these terms (1994).

The unstated assumption behind conflating state and nation or the unintended consequence of it is that the population of a state ought to be homogeneous and its citizens should be nationals. If non-national elements exist, they should either shed their cultural identity and assimilate themselves into the state's culture, or leave its territory. Nationalisms which define a nation as a people of common descent have taken forms such as Nazism and fascism, and have resorted to genocide and culturocide. Therefore, the plea to avoid the conflation of state and nation should not be dismissed as a fetish for conceptual purity; it has profound implications for human life.

Conflating Nation and Ethnie

Anthony Smith (1986) lists six characteristics of an ethnie. These are: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. There are two main difficulties with this characterization. First, the sixth characteristic is a product of the

first five features which conjointly produce a sense of solidarity. To invoke the product as a defining feature does not accord well with the rest of the features. The second difficulty is that this characterization equally fits the concept of nation, although Smith may respond by saying that an ethnie becomes a nation only when it acquires its own state. Such a position creates several problems which I have discussed earlier. It will suffice for the present to note that nation and ethnie share all the features listed by Smith, except territory. That is, if and when an ethnie identifies itself with a territory it becomes a nation. An ethnie is a cultural collectivity which lives outside its ancestral territory—actual (e.g., European Jews) or imagined (e.g., gypsies). The settlers of the New World who nurse a sojourner attitude also constitute an ethnie. When they adopt the territory into which they have immigrated as their homeland, they become a nation. However, to become nationals in a territory into which a group immigrates is not simply a matter of that group's choice, but also its acceptance by the earlier inhabitants.

Smith thinks that nationalism emerges from common bonds of religion, language, customs, shared history and common myths of origin; '...in a word, from common ethnicity and common culture' (1979: 43). In a later work he refers to modern ethnic revivals taking the form of nationalism and defines '..."ethnie" or ethnic community as a social group whose members share a sense of common origin, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity' (Smith, 1981: 66). Is it that there is no distinction between nation and ethnie and hence nationality and ethnicity? Not quite. Ethnie is a passive nation and nationality is active ethnicity because ethnic revival is '...the transformation of passive, often isolated and politically excluded communities into potential and actual nations, active, participant and self-conscious in their historic identities' (ibid.: 24). Thus, nations often grow out of and are constructed from ethnic materials. Notwithstanding important differences of both kind and degree between nationalism and ethnic sentiment, there is also considerable overlap between them, '...which is reflected in the lack of clarity surrounding the concepts themselves' (ibid.: 85). My contention is that in spite of overlaps between these concepts, there is a crucial difference between them which can be located in the territorial dimension.

The hyphenated term nation-state is coined out of the limited West European experience. Hyphenated terms such as 'ethno-nationalism' have also been in circulation for quite some time (see, for example, Richmond, 1987; Connor, 1994) to refer to nationalisms based on primordial loyalties. Similarly, Worsley (1984: 247) writes:

> Nationalism is also a form of ethnicity but it is a specific form. It is the institutionalisation of one particular ethnic identity by attaching it to the state. Ethnic groups do not necessarily act together except when they have special interest to secure. When those interests are to obtain a state of its own (or part of a State) the group becomes a nationality.

This conceptualization too suffers from several difficulties. First, it attributes a specificity to ethnic groups which in fact is common to all groups. No group action, whatsoever may be the basis of constituting it, takes place unless it has a special interest to pursue. Second, it shares with other conceptualizations the false assumption that the linkage between nation and state is axiomatic. Third, while it recognizes instrumental ethnicity, it denies symbolic ethnicity. It seems to me that it is the combination of instrumental ethnicity emanating out of material deprivation and symbolic ethnicity based on the anxiety to preserve one's cultural identity which gives birth to the motive force for state formation. Deprivations emanating out of inequality or denial of identity in isolation will not lead to the crystallization of the demand for a separate state. However, such a demand is plausible only if the ethnic group can constitute itself into a nation, the pre-requisites of which are common territory and language.

As Smith links nations and states, it is understandable, although not acceptable, that he considers ethnie as an isolated and politically excluded community. But Connor, who unambiguously distinguishes between state and nation, also considers ethnicity as passive nationalism, thereby leaving nation without any anchorage. Connor (1994: 40–43) writes:

> ...self differentiating ethnic groups are...nations, loyalty to the ethnic group, therefore should logically be called nationalism. We can describe the nation as a self differentiating ethnic

> group.... It is therefore the self-view of one's group, rather than the 'tangible' characteristics that is the essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation.

The failure to distinguish between nation and ethnie by Connor and several others may be located in the manner in which nation and nationalism are defined. A nation is defined merely or mainly in psychological and emotional terms rather than in terms of any tangible characteristics. There are many others who have taken to this mode of defining nation. A short sample follows. Seton-Watson feels that no 'scientific definition' of a nation is possible and all that one can say is: 'A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one' (ibid., 1977: 5). He recognizes that it is not possible to prescribe this number. However, what is relevant is that people should consider themselves and believe that they constitute a nation. Emerson too characterizes the nation in a similar vein: 'The nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future' (ibid., 1962: 95). And 'the simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation' (ibid.: 104). According to these authors, if a group of people feel that they are a nation, they make one. The difficulty is that a wide variety of groups—religious, linguistic, caste, racial, regional, tribal, and so on may feel that they are nations. But one has to specify the crucial element which provides for their feeling so as to make them a nation. This is left unspecified.

Eriksen rightly sees the distinction between nationals and ethnies as that between insiders and outsiders. But, as he attests the familiar position that a successful nation should have its own state, he is constrained to view unsuccessful nationalisms as ethnicities. 'Many of the ethnies condemned to such a fate eventually vanish through migration, extermination or cultural assimilation' (ibid., 1991: 265). That is, ethnic groups can survive only if they succeed in establishing their own states. This is simply not true in the case of the New World, where a multiplicity of ethnic groups co-exist in one state.

The ambiguity of Eriksen's conceptualization is evident from the cases he has presented to clinch his argument. The Saami

(Lappish) minority, the first nation of northern Norway, simply because it does not have a state of its own becomes an ethnie. So do the Trinidad-Indians, the immigrants from the Indian sub-continent to Trinidad. But there is a basic difference between the two peoples under reference—the Saamis occupy their ancestral homeland; the Trinidad-Indians are in their adopted homeland. In the first case, the homeland has been intruded into by an outsider in the Saami perspective; in the second case, the Trinidad-Indians constitute the outsider. Nobody contests the nativity of the Saamis, but the native Trinidadians consider the Indians as an ethnie. That different ethnies can nationalize themselves and co-exist as co-nationals without shedding their cultural identities is illustrated by the Mauritian case presented by Eriksen. The point here again is that it is not state which is the crucial element in distinguishing nation and ethnie, but the nature of attachment to the territory and its legitimacy.

Connor (1994) not only defines nation largely in psychological terms but he castigates those scholars who focus on objective factors. 'Failure on the part of the scholars to appreciate the psychological well-springs of the nation most certainly contributes to the tendency to undervalue the potency of nationalism' (ibid.: 204). On the other hand, he commends the political leaders for their capacity to fathom the psychological depth of national sentiments. And he is absolutely right in that nationalist ideologues and political leaders have plumbed the emotional attachment of people to mobilize them into collective actions.

It is, however, necessary to caution against manipulating emotional sentiments in the rising tide of nationalism. Nazism and fascism in Europe, and linguistic, religious, racial and tribal chauvinisms both inside and outside Europe have crystallized precisely because the nation is defined predominantly in emotional terms. Let me recall just one example here. In his *Biography of a Nation: A Short History of Britain*, Enoch Powell, the British New Right leader, writes:

> There is no objective definition of what constitutes a nation. It is that which thinks it is a nation.... Self-consciousness is the essence of nationhood.... This phenomenon of national consciousness remains almost as mysterious as that of life in the individual organism.... This living thing, mysterious in its ori-

> gins and nature, is perhpas the most difficult subject of purely human enquiry... (cited in Nairn, 1981: 270).

The definitions of Emerson, Connor and Powell are perilously similar and one should note the implications of this way of defining nation. First is the possibility of extreme intolerance towards co-nationals, even though they may have co-existed for several decades or even centuries in the same ancestral or adopted homeland, because they belong to another race, religion, tribe or language. This is what is happening in Bosnia, the Kashmir Valley and Rwanda. Second, the tendency to consider as co-nationals those who have left the ancestral homeland for centuries, although they may not share any common 'national' characteristics with those who stayed back, as in the case of returnees to Germany, Italy or Japan. Third, such a conceptualization cannot adequately distinguish between those who continue to live in their homeland (the Germans in Germany, the Japanese in Japan) and those who have migrated (the Germans in the US and the Japanese in Peru) and have become settlers.

Subsuming Race into Ethnicity

The third item on the agenda of this chapter is to discuss the tendency to subsume race into ethnicity. Once again this has become so common that it is neither necessary nor possible to refer to most of the authors. Early instances of this subsumption are Gordon (1964), and Montagu (1964); an oft quoted one is Glazer and Moynihan (1975).

I shall refer to only two authors here as they subsume not only race but several other identities into ethnicity. Horowitz (1985) prefers an inclusive concept of ethnicity which encompasses differences based on colour, appearance, language, religion, common origin and their permutations and combinations. He writes: '...ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers "tribes", "races", "nationalities" and "castes"' (ibid.: 53). Horowitz defends at length the justification for including colour/race in ethnicity. Similarly, Bulmer (1986: 54) writes:

> An ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past

> and cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the groups' identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance.

These authors absorb not only race but several other identities into ethnicity, thereby making the concept very ambiguous. They also conflate ethnicity and nationality, or treat nationality as a dimension of ethnicity, a theme which has already been discussed. To continue our discussion we need to ask and answer two questions: Which factors prompted the subsumption of race into ethnicity? Why should these notions be kept apart? But before I attempt to answer these questions, I would like to refer to one author who attempted to keep the distinction between race and ethnicity.

Van den Berghe (1978) notes the growing tendency in the American social sciences to treat race as a special case of ethnicity and warns against this: 'Precisely because a racial phenotypical definition of group membership is far more stigmatizing than an ethnic definition and typically gives rise to far more rigid social hierarchies, it is important to keep the analytical distinction clear' (ibid.: xv). Further, to abandon a stigmatizing label like race in favour of ethnicity will not do away with racism; it may in effect camouflage it to the advantage of the privileged group.

Berghe's clarification is a useful first step. However, he characterizes both racial and ethnic groups in terms of common territory. '...such groups are concentrated in a substantial piece of contiguous territory which they see as their collective homeland' (1978: xvii). Such a characterization creates problems in distinguishing between nation and ethnic. A racial group may acquire nationhood not because of its phenotypical features but due to its claim to a common homeland. Pursuantly, two or more races with a common homeland can make a nation. With these clarifications let me turn to answering the two questions posed earlier.

Races have a long history but racism emerged only after different races came into contact, usually in a colonial context. Before the geographical explorations of the sixteenth century, there was a rough co-terminality between territory and race—Black Africa, White Europe, Yellow Southeast Asia, Brown South Asia. But with the emergence of the New World and largely due to colonization and immigration this pattern got disturbed and multi-racial polities emerged. In the beginning, inter-racial interaction was limited and

restrained, creating 'plural' societies in the colonies wherein different races lived in the same polity, transacted goods and services in the marketplace but neither legitimately transfused any blood nor transmuted their cultures (Furnivall, 1948). In contrast, inter-ethnic interactions have always existed within the same geographical region, as natives and migrants of the same phenotype who professed different religious faiths and/or spoke different languages intermingled.

If race is a biological fact, racism is an ideology and practice based on the assumed superiority of certain races—traditionally only the White but latterly also the Yellow races. The content of ethnicity is essentially cultural and to be culturally different does not imply superiority or inferiority. And yet, it is not unusual for certain cultural collectivities to define themselves as superior and perceive the culture of others as inferior. The term ethnicism is proposed by some writers to refer to discrimination based on ethnic differences (see, Bacal, 1991). In contrast, ethnicity is increasingly being viewed as positive, as an identity marker, as a search for roots. Thus the two terms ethnicity and ethnicism ought to be used to refer to the positive and negative aspects of ethnic groups.

The distinction between racism and ethnicism may be illustrated by an example. In the USA, there were about 70 million Americans of Irish, southern or Eastern European origin, and of these some 50 million were Catholics. The White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP) earlier held the older generations of this group in 'collective contempt or at best in cold condescension' (Seton-Watson, 1977: 218). But by the 1970s, the descendants of this group were treated by the liberal establishment as 'reactionaries' or 'fascists' (ibid.). The treatment meted out to the Blacks and Amerindians was vastly different and harsher. That is, the distinction between White ethnics and racial groups did exist. Therefore, inter-ethnic discrimination should be designated as ethnicism and oppression of the coloured as racism. When a collectivity is subjected to both ethnicism and racism, the discrimination becomes cumulatively oppressive.

While racism is universally condemned as negative, to take pride in one's race as an affirmation of collective self-hood without necessarily disparaging other races, can be viewed as positive. But we do not have a term to refer to this positive dimension of race. I have suggested the term 'racity' for this purpose (Oommen, 1994).

Racity refers to the tendency on the part of those belonging to a distinct physical type (race, colour) coming together and interacting so as to provide mutual support and succour to sustain themselves, particularly when confronted by an oppressive force. The mechanisms usually resorted to for this purpose would be formation of primary groups, voluntary associations and political parties to provide emotional support and to fight inequality. Thus, if racism is an instrument of oppression and stigmatization, racity could be an instrument to cope with the situation of domination and inequality, and to develop and nurture self-esteem. What I mean by racity is well illustrated by W. E. B. Du Bois, the US Black leader:

> We are that people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American music, its only American fairy tales, its only touch of pathos and humour amid its mad money getting plutocracy. As such, it is our duty to conserve our physical power, our intellectual endowments, our spiritual ideals; as a race we must strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity to the realization of that broader humanity which freely recognizes differences in men, but sternly deprecates inequality in their opportunities of development (cited in Essien-Udom, 1962: 29).

With the near collapse of European colonialism and after the universal condemnation of Nazism and fascism, belief in the superiority of races cannot be sustained any more. 'By contrast, ethnicity has become legitimate—people can openly claim some ethnic identity without lessened esteem, they can even show they are proud of it and in many cases actively seek redress from perceived inequalities in terms of such identities, without being officially banned' (Bjorklund, 1987: 23). That is, ethnic identity is often the result of collective self-definitions and the search for roots, and hence is viewed as legitimate. But the tendency to subsume race into ethnicity has actually camouflaged the oppression specific to race. This is an important reason why the distinction between race and ethnicity should be maintained.

Contextualizing the Concepts

So far my effort was to tease out the concepts of state, nation, ethnie and race (pursuantly citizenship, nationality, ethnicity and racity)

so that the current ambiguities associated with them are done away with. However, before I propose new conceptualizations, it is necessary to understand the contexts to which these notions can be applied.

Social science concepts emanate out of particular historical situations. But unless they capture and mirror the nature of reality in a wide variety of situations, they will not be viewed as durable analytic tools. On the other hand, the property of the situation substantially conditions the applicability of concepts. In what follows, I propose to suggest that categorization of the social world and the phenomena within it is purposive; one categorization may not be suited for all purposes.

The categorization of the world into three—the First, the Second and the Third—has been in wide currency and was useful to understand the differences in the levels of development and patterns of political arrangements. But the categorization has serious limitations when situating the concepts of citizenship, nationality and ethnicity. This is not so because of the recent momentous transformations leading to the virtual eclipse of the Second World. In fact, some of the states (e.g., China and Cuba) are still in that category because they are not yet multi-party democracies.

The tripartite division of the world is not a useful one for situating the concepts of nationality and ethnicity precisely because the ideas of nations and nationality cannot be unequivocally applied to the New World—the Americas, Australia and New Zealand—at any rate in the sense in which these concepts are applicable to the Old World. In my reckoning, the Old World is not confined to Europe alone but also includes Asia and Africa. The three worlds include parts of the Old and New Worlds. The difference between the old societies and the new settler-majority countries is fundamental, particularly for the applicability of the notions of nationality and ethnicity, and even for citizenship. Therefore, the categorization into old societies and settler countries is more appropriate for empirically anchoring the discussion of these concepts. Ignoring this vital distinction, enormous amounts of research have been done and the results published under headings such as 'Nationalism in the Third World', 'Ethnicity in the First World' and 'Citizenship in the Second World'. By using the blanket term First World (that is the West) while referring to the developed countries drawn from West Europe, North America, Australia, New

Zealand, etc. (parts of the Old and New Worlds), the Third World which again includes the New (Latin America) and Old Worlds (Asia and Africa), and Second World which also includes both New (Cuba) and Old (East Europe) Worlds, aspects of reality significant to our understanding of nationality, ethnicity and citizenship have been swept under the carpet. Further, the West–non-West dichotomy has led to facile generalizations on both. 'The fundamental framework for non-Western politics is a communal one, and all political behaviour is strongly colored by considerations of communal identification', wrote Pye in the late fifties (1958: 469). The same idea is echoed in a volume edited by Geertz (1963). Although Diamant (1959) argued that there is nothing like a specific non-Western political process, it largely went unnoticed.

Three broad geographical regions, whose total population makes for the majority of humanity, together make up the entity designated as the Third World. But they are racially and culturally different. The first is Latin America, which is racially and culturally close to the First World. Predominantly Christian and Catholic, most Latin American states have a European language—Spanish or Portuguese—as their official language. At its core, Latin America is an extension and a cultural reproduction of what used to be the European periphery (Spain and Portugal). Most Latin American countries today are settler-majority countries. Second is Africa, which is racially distinct or mixed (e.g., South Africa) and consists of countries with a cultural amalgam of natives and the alien, colonial West. Of the 50 African states, 80 per cent have one of the European languages (English, French or Portuguese) as their official language and the dominant religions—Islam and Christianity—have been transplanted through conquest and colonization. There is no settler-majority country, including South Africa, in the African continent. The third is Asia, the region which is the homeland of two major civilizations: Chinese and Indian. Of the 40 states in Asia, only one is predominantly Christian (the Philippines) and, except for Hong Kong, the small port state, none has a European language as its official language. There is no country in Asia with a substantial presence of an 'alien' race. That is, the three regions put together and labelled as the Third World have hardly anything in common in their socio-cultural milieu except Western influence. And this common factor of Western derivation, admittedly, is colonialism.

However, all Third World countries have not experienced colonialism and all ex-colonial countries have not remained in the Third World. In fact, there are two types of ex-colonial countries: those which not only got incorporated into the First World (e.g., the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) but surpassed and even assumed leadership over their erstwhile masters. Further, some of the countries located in the regions traditionally identified with the Third World are very affluent today. Japan heads the list of developed countries and the development ratings of Singapore, Korea and Taiwan are quite high (UNDP, 1991). The other type of ex-colonial countries are those which were thickly populated and older (Asia and Africa). Therefore, a distinction between transplantive or replicative colonialism (which reproduced the culture, society, polity and economy of the imperial power in the colony) and intrusive and oppressive colonialism (which dominated the colony but led to the withdrawal of the imperial power) ought to be made. The cultural baggage these two types of colonialism left behind is radically different. Ignoring the basic difference between the two types of colonialism, it is argued that the Asian and African leaders '...who once castigated European domination as violative of self-determination are not now prepared to recognize such a right on the part of their own minorities' (Connor, 1994: 161). Such sentiments were articulated by others too. It is further suggested that the colonial political–administrative divisions were kept intact by the post-colonial governments (Emerson, 1964).

Two points may be noted here. There was nothing like political–administrative units in the modern sense of the word in the New World before colonialism; they needed to be created. In Asia and Africa, however, there did exist such units and divisions based on kinship and kingship. As for the resistance to the principle of self-determination, the qualitative difference between the pre-colonial and post-colonial situations is often ignored. The colonial Europeans were distant outsiders; they had no moral claim on the land and could not instantaneously constitute into nations in thickly populated Asia and Africa. In fact, what is happening in these continents is precisely what had happened and continues to happen in West Europe today as illustrated by the cases of Brittany, Basqueland, Ireland and numerous others. Therefore, the refusal to concede the right of self-determination to smaller and weaker nations within multi-national states is common to Asia, Africa and

Europe, and the situation is drastically different from that of the New World settler countries. The point I want to make at this juncture is that the categorization of the world into Three Worlds is not a useful distinction when one has to deal with issues of identity and culture or that of self-determination.

I have argued here that the tripartite division of the world and the nationality–ethnicity distinction do not hinge well together. But even in the case of citizenship rights, the categorization is of doubtful value. Marshall's (1965) civil rights consist of liberty of person; freedom of speech, thought and faith; right to own property; right to conclude valid contracts and right to justice. Political rights are mainly the right of franchise and the right of access to public office. Social rights, which are actually economic in content (Giddens, 1985), consist of the right to a modicum of economic welfare and social security, right to fully share the social heritage and the right to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.

Even in First World democracies, perceptions regarding the content of citizenship vary immensely. As Fraser and Gordon (1994) note, Americans rarely speak of social citizenship, because it implies rights and entitlements embedded in a contract and not charity entrapped in doles. Social rights which imply respect and equality rarely figure in public debates. Welfare is stigmatized but work is sacralized; the public domain is demonized but the private is sanctified. Unemployment is viewed as a private predilection and not as a manifestation of social policy or economic pathology. In contrast, civil citizenship is highly valued. The hero of civil society, created by civil rights, is the property-owning individual; civil society is exemplified by 'possessive individualism', to recall the seductive phrase of Macpherson (1974). In fact, as civil society is possessed by individualism, it is very difficult to liberate the body (civil society) of the spirit (individualism).

> ...the cultural mythology of civil citizenship stands in a tense, often obstructing relationship to social citizenship. This is nowhere more true than in the US, where the dominant understanding of civil citizenship remains strongly infected by the notions of 'contract' and 'independence' while social provision has been constructed to connote 'charity' and 'dependence' (Fraser and Gordon, 1994: 104).

An empirical analysis attempted by Conover and his colleagues confirms the differing emphases with regard to citizenship rights in the US and UK; the American respondents focus on civil rights whereas British respondents focus on social rights. With regard to citizens' duties, the Americans focus on political responsibility but the British responses 'contained relatively more communitarian elements' (Conover et al., 1990: 12). The central elements in the identity of citizenship in the US are freedom and individualism; in the UK these are a sense of belonging to the land, a shared heritage and a national identity (ibid., 1990). That is, the conceptions of citizenship vary drastically between the UK and the US. It is important to recall here that these two 'nations', the 'first nation' and the 'first new nation' of the world are widely believed to have common values and institutions; the latter is regarded as a replica of the former. I suggest that the motives for their differences should be traced to the fact that they are drawn from different contexts—the Old and the New Worlds—and the consequent variations in their making and modes of incorporating citizens.

Generally speaking, the difference between the First and the Second Worlds was striking with regard to citizenship rights in that civil rights and political rights were almost completely absent in the latter. The fact that individual ownership of property was abolished and the socialist state became the owner of property rendered civil rights largely irrelevant. Similarly, the moment for political rights disappeared because of the one party system and the installation of the nomenclature which totally dominated the system. On the other hand, while substantial weightage was given to the welfare component of social rights, the right to social heritage of small nations was effectively blocked by the 'great national chauvinism' in the multi-national socialist states. That is to say, for the individuals of relatively homogeneous socialist states, the possibility of maintaining social heritage was substantial. This was also true of individuals who belonged to the dominant nations of multi-national states. But the right to social heritage was denied to the weaker and smaller nations within the multi-national socialist states.

In the case of the Third World, the situation is more complex and mixed. The only thing more or less common to all of them is the absence of a citizen's right to even a modicum of economic welfare and social security. This is so not because of any ideological

resistance from any section of the population (this was so at least until recently) but because of the gross inadequacy of material resources at the command of Third World states. As for civil and political rights, some Third World countries have exemplary records while the performance of others is as tainted as that of the Second World. The point again is that the states in the Third World cannot be put into the same basket while considering citizenship entitlements. The inescapable conclusion one reaches is that the tripartite division of the world does not reflect the differences in and conceptions of citizen rights. In fact, differences within each of these worlds are as numerous as the differences across them.

Towards a Reformulation

I am now in a position to advance some definitional proposals of nation/nationality, state/citizenship and ethnie/ethnicity. The nation is a territorial entity to which the people have an emotional attachment and in which they invest a moral meaning; it is a homeland—ancestral or adopted. Nationality is the collective identity which the people of the nation acquire by identifying with the nation. For a nation to be sustained, the people should be in a position to communicate with one another, that is, they should have a common language. This language need not be their ancestral language; it can be an alien tongue (e.g., Bhasa Indonesia). On the other hand, all those who communicate in the same language do not make a nation. Languages like English, French, Spanish and Chinese are used by people inhabiting different territories in different parts of the world. It is the combination, the fusion of territory and language which makes a nation; a nation is a community in communication in its homeland.

The state is a legally constituted entity which provides its residents protection from internal insecurity and external aggression. Territory is common to the nation and the state. But there is a crucial difference between national territory and state territory; the former is a moral entity and the latter a legal entity. A welfare or socialist state also provides for the social well-being of its residents. A democratic state is a community of people who participate directly or indirectly in the governance of the state. If the state

and the nation are co-terminus, we have a nation-state. But most states today are multi-national, poly-ethnic, or a combination of the two; these states are communities of citizens.

It is not possible to extend measures of social well-being and the right of political participation to all residents of a state because they are of two types—citizens and non-citizens. All citizens by definition are entitled to welfare and participation. Therefore, a polity ought to be a community of full-fledged citizens, although often this is not the case. That is why we frequently encounter the phrase 'second class citizens'. Residents who are nationals are invariably citizens. Non-national residents—the ethnics—can also be citizens, although they encounter several problems in acquiring citizenship. Thus, one may speak of full-fledged citizens, nominal citizens and non-citizens.

I have noted earlier that a common homeland is the critical minimum for a nation to firm up; the dissociation between a people (or a segment of that people) and their homeland denationalizes them; they become an ethnie. Just as territory is common to the state and the nation (with a crucial difference in its meaning), culture is common to nation and ethnie. In the case of the former, culture and territory are in union; while in the case of the latter, the two are dissociated. That is, ethnicity is a product of dissociation between territory and culture, a process which takes a variety of forms and should be designated as ethnification.

The ethnie may or may not retain its 'original' culture. But what is important is whether an ethnie identifies with the new territory, that is, whether it adopts the territory as a new homeland; if it does, it becomes a nation. It may or may not continue with its old language or culture. The Spaniards, the Portuguese and the English did retain their language and most of the institutions in the New World. But an ethnie may also abandon its ancestral language and acquire a new one, like the Germans or the Swiss did when they migrated to the New World. However, the ancestral language may not be retained even when a nation has not become an ethnie, as the retention of the ancestral language is not a necessary condition for the maintenance of nationhood, but attachment to the homeland is. The Scots abandoned their written language in the seventeenth century and began to write standard English; yet, they retained their homeland. Thus, a common homeland and a common language (ancestral or adopted) are the critical minimum markers of

a nation and national identity. Therefore, the currently fashionable notion of long distance nationalism (Anderson, 1992) conflates and confuses between the nation and ethnie.

All the three concepts that I have discussed connote identities, but there is a crucial difference between them. While nationality and ethnicity as identities are exclusionary and could be inequality generating, citizenship can essentially be inclusionary and equality oriented. Identities will not wither away; if old ones disappear or recede new ones will be invented and constructed. Human beings are identity-seeking animals, both as individuals and as collectivities. But there is an equally forceful quest which pervades the contemporary world—the pursuit of equality. The pursuit of equality and identity co-exists and competes, and the real issue is how to reconcile the two. The problem is rendered further vexatious not only because the three identities pull in two different directions in terms of their value orientations, but also because the two units to which they are anchored vary. If nationality and ethnicity are essentially group identities, citizenship is an individual identity. But very often group identities (race, caste, religion, language, region) are invoked as the basis for acquiring citizenship identity. Reconciling these competing perspectives—the individual and group bases of citizenship—poses a durable challenge in the contemporary world.

Situating the Chapters

It is against the backdrop of the foregoing discussion that the chapters which follow ought to be viewed. For three centuries, since the Treaty of Westphalia concluded in 1648, the world has been electrified by the notion of the nation-state. The driving force behind the notion has been the doctrine of homogenization. Two points should be noted here.

First, the bases of attempted homogenization varied enormously in different parts of the world. Broadly speaking, it was language in Europe, religion and/or language in Asia and tribe in Africa. In effect, this meant that those who did not belong to the mainstream niche of the nation had to assimilate or acquiesce. If they resisted, they were subjected to genocide and/or culturocide, although the

modus operandi and intensity varied across continents and in the regions within them. The Old World states attempted to fuse citizenship and nationality, which in turn created segments of population whose internality to the polity was questioned; the ethnies of the Old World thus emerged.

Second, in the case of the New World the story of state formation started with the ethnification of the original inhabitants following the immigration of different cultural and racial groups (ethnies). However, the process of incorporation of these ethnies varied drastically. If the 'superior races' came as voluntary immigrants, the 'inferior races' were imported as slaves or indentured labour. But the immigrant categories had no legitimate claim over the territory of the New World to start with. Therefore, the European solution, namely, the right to self-determination of nations, did not suit the New World.

From the perspective of the European settlers, conceding the right to self-determination to the indigenous peoples would have permanently marred the prospects of their becoming settlers and establishing dominion over the new territory. This provided the rationale behind the shift from the right to self-determination of nations (the principle in Europe) to the right to non-discrimination of individuals (in the New World). Consequently, citizenship entitlements could not be legitimized on the basis of national identity anchored to language, religion or tribe. It had to be anchored to individual merit; citizenship and national identity had to be de-linked.

Viewed in terms of the linkages between citizenship, national identity, ethnicity and race, several permutations and combinations emerge, as I have noted elsewhere (Oommen, 1989): (*a*) one nation, one state, wherein fusion between citizenship and national identity is pursued as a goal. Typical examples of this are found in West Europe and Southeast Asia (see Chapters 2 and 4); (*b*) one state, several identity groups—nations, tribes, religious collectivities—as exemplified in the cases of East Europe, South Asia and Africa (see Chapters 3, 5 and 6); (*c*) one nation, two or more states, as in the cases of Germany before unification, the two Koreas and the Middle East (the Arab 'nation' being divided into several states [see Chapter 7]); (*d*) one state, several ethnic and racial groups, as in the case of the New World (see Chapters 8, 9 and 10); (*e*) parts of different nations coming together to constitute a state

as in the case of Belgium or Switzerland; (*f*) part of a nation constituted into one state and the remaining part attached to or affiliated to another state (e.g., Bangladesh and West Bengal in India); and (*g*) a nation divided between two or more states and constituting parts of them along with other nations (e.g., the Punjab, the Kurds). This book directly deals with cases from the first four situations. But the nature of the relationship between citizenship and national identity in situations *e*, *f* and *g* are covered in discussions on situations *b* and *c*.

Of the remaining nine chapters in this book, six discuss the situation in the Old World and three within the New World. Chapter 2, by Alfonso Alfonsi, focuses on West Europe. He argues that the content of citizenship in West Europe has gone beyond the conventional elements of civil, political and social rights as adumbrated by Marshall (1965). It has become a diffuse phenomenon invested with new social meanings and endowing people with the capacity to be involved in social actions. This change in the meaning of citizenship has been characterized by (*a*) an increase in the subjectivity and freedom of individuals in mass societies, and (*b*) the incapacity of states to satisfy the increasing instrumental needs and aspirations of their citizens. These two factors in combination have prompted a series of social actions by active citizens. And the production of the social meaning of citizenship tends to take place independent of national identity. To complicate matters, the emergence of the European Union has added ambiguity to the meanings of citizenship and national identity.

However, the issue of the relationship between citizenship, national identity and ethnicity remains far from resolved in West Europe. First, the co-terminality between citizenship and nationality remains largely an assumption and not an accomplished fact; the process of creating nations through common educational and legal systems is far from complete. The differing modes of linking citizenship and nationality (e.g., common blood in Germany and Italy, common state territory in the United Kingdom and common language in France) point to this. Second, the persisting tension between citizenship and national identity is evident in the cases of several states in West Europe—Belgium, France, Spain, United Kingdom. Third, ethnicism and racism have become salient with an increase in the number of immigrants drawn from different backgrounds—race, religion and language. Finally, even when the

'citizens' of the European Union cross their respective cultural borders they face discrimination (e.g., the Greeks in Germany and the Italians in the United Kingdom) or are handicapped due to cultural 'incompetence' (e.g., Portuguese or Germans in France).

Nations without states in the European Union (e.g., the people of Brittany and Scotland) are affirming their collective identity either *within* existing state boundaries or beyond it, within the Union. That is, the building blocks within the European Union could be (*a*) nation-states (e.g., Portugal), (*b*) multi-national states (e.g., the United Kingdom), (*c*) nations without states (e.g., the Basques or the Welsh), and (*d*) 'nation groups' which are distributed across two or more state territories (e.g., the French and the Germans). Thus, all the European Union citizens are not nationals in the entirety of its geographical area; they are nationals only in their ancestral/cultural homelands but ethnies outside of it, even as they are within their legal homeland, namely, the territory of the European Union. This is a new development. On the other hand, a migrant who crosses the existing state boundary could still be within his cultural homeland (e.g., a French Basque who enters the Spanish Basque territory). Conversely, even when one migrates to another cultural region (e.g., a Scot migrating to Wales) one could be within one's legal territory, but an ethnie. Such situations arise because certain nations are divided across different state boundaries or two or more nations exist within the same state territory. The point is that even in West Europe the fusion between citizenship and nationality has scarcely occurred. The situation is rendered further vexatious because of the presence of immigrants, particularly non-White and/or non-Christian immigrants.

If fusing of citizenship and nationality was an ideal in West Europe, although not accomplished, in East Europe not only was it not attempted, but multi-national states were consciously constructed and nurtured. The ideal of a nation-state, not even a Russian nation-state, was pursued by the Soviet Union. Chapter 3 by Rogers Brubaker focuses on the situation in the former Soviet Union, wherein the conceptual distinction between citizenship (in the Soviet Union) and nationality (of the Republics) was clearly made and maintained. And yet, contends Brubaker, the dual manner in which 'nationhood' was conceptualized—territorial and political on the one hand, and personal and ethno-cultural on the other—carried with it the seeds of the destruction of the Soviet Union.

There was indeed formal equality between all the citizens of the Soviet Union, and yet the dominance by the Russian nationality, the 'great nation chauvinism', was clear and loud. The situation got further exacerbated because of state-sponsored migration, which is to be distinguished from voluntary migration motivated by the forces of social mobility and demands of the market. The latter possibility did not exist in the Soviet Union because of the very restricted freedom of movement across the Republics. Thus, the Soviet Republics were composed of both nationals and ethnies.

Migration across Republics, that is, nations within the Soviet Union, necessarily created a rupture between nationals and ethnies, because the latter were perceived by the former as outsiders used by the state to control and browbeat them. The rupture was ignored because Soviet conceptualization did not admit any difference between those who lived and worked in one's own nation (Republic) and those who migrated from other Republics for residence and work. This was so because of a false assumption that the Soviet citizen would become a 'socialist man', shedding his primordial attachments; culture, politics and administration could be national in form but would become socialist in content. The fact, however, was that while Soviet citizens shared common citizenship, they differed in their national identities. The natives of the Republics were nationals; the migrants were ethnies. In 1989, 73 million Soviet citizens (nearly 25 per cent of the total population) lived outside their homeland; of these, 25 million were Russians. And the disenchantment between nationals and ethnies (that is insiders and outsiders) became very clear during the unrest and violence that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union. While quite a few returned to their ancestral homeland after the break-up of the Union, a substantial proportion did not.

Had the ethnic status of those who lived outside their nations/ancestral homeland been recognized, the requisite mechanisms of acculturating/assimilitating them could have been introduced step-by-step (e.g., learning of the local language by the migrants). Conversely, the ethnies while continuing to be Soviet citizens could have been oriented to the status of sojourners if they did not want to become settlers. But instead of grappling with the problem squarely, it was wished away by taking recourse to two unwarranted assumptions: (*a*) that the national attachments of the 'socialist man' would wither away, and (*b*) that every Soviet citizen would eventually accept and learn the Russian language and culture.

The two chapters on Asia are based on two drastically different cases: Japan, widely believed to be a homogeneous nation, and India, certainly the most culturally heterogeneous polity in the contemporary world. Takashi Miyajima notes in Chapter 4 that even if one ignores the migrant population, Japan is not entirely homogeneous, due to the presence of two stigmatized minority groups—the *Ainu* and the *Burakumin*. However, the internality of these groups to the Japanese nation was never questioned; they are not ethnies. Thus, Japan pursued the Western European ideal of the nation-state based on language and spared no effort to fuse nationality and citizenship. But with the arrival of Koreans by the early twentieth century, the wedge between nationals and ethnies, which in the Japanese case also meant citizens and non-citizens, gradually crystallized. The Japanese policy was one of assimilation by encouraging the Koreans to learn the language of the nation and take to the national lifestyle. (The fact that Japanese and Koreans are drawn from the same physical stock, one may assume, would have facilitated the process of assimilation.) Those Koreans who accepted the policy and became permanent residents became nationals (as they came to consider Japan as their homeland and learnt the Japanese language); those who resented it remained an ethnie.

However, recent immigrations into Japan have led to an elaboration of the status hierarchy of ethnic groups. The descendents of Japanese migrants (*Nikkeijin*) who have returned (mainly from Peru and Brazil) to Japan are given the right to temporary residence and work without much restriction. These returnees are treated as people of the same blood, and in this respect the Japanese policy is similar to that of Germany and Italy. The next layer of ethnic groups is constituted by refugees and legally employed workers. The illegal workers who enter as tourists on short-term visas but stay on to work, and who get deported if and when detected, constitute the lowest rung in the ethnic status hierarchy. While none of the ethnic groups, including the descendents of those Koreans who are not assimilated, is given the right to vote in national elections, all legal migrant workers are entitled to limited welfare benefits. That is, limited social citizenship (in Marshall's sense) is conceded to legal migrants, but they are denied civil and political citizenship. Illegal workers, although they may reside for several years, are not entitled to any welfare benefits; they are

denied even social citizenship. Thus, one may speak of three categories in the population of Japan: nationals, who are full-fledged citizens; ethnies, who are nominal citizens; and illegal migrants, who are ethnies and non-citizens.

T. K. Oommen discusses in Chapter 5 the case of India, the most complex of the contemporary polities moulded by a long and tortuous history of 5,000 years. He problematizes the relationship between citizenship and national identities from the vantage point of competing constructions of national identities in contemporary India. The three salient bases of these constructions are religion, language and tribe, which stand in a relationship of continuous tension with the statist conception of national identity which purports to promote harmony among all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities, as hoped by the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution.

When a religion is invoked as the basis of national identity, those who do not belong to that religion are subjected to a process of ethnification. This means even those who are nationals (i.e., those who identify with one or another national territory as their homeland and speak the language of that nation) will be defined as outsiders. This tendency which undercuts the very foundation of Indian polity is prevalent among Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 'nationalists' in contemporary India. While the Hindu militants see the whole of India as their exclusive homeland, Sikh and Muslim militants view parts of India thus.

Although language and tribe are not accorded any legitimacy by the Indian state for defining national identity, they are accepted as the bases for politico-administrative units. This results in two basic contradictions. First, it militates against the notion of single citizenship, as domiciliary requirements are often prescribed by these units for availing some of the civil and social citizenship entitlements. Second, such prescriptions often render those who do not share the relevant linguistic and tribal identities outsiders to these units. Thus, a second category of ethnies emerge—those who are nationals in their respective homeland (e.g., Maharashtrians in Maharashtra and Nagas in Nagaland) but ethnies elsewhere in the territory of the Indian state. Full citizenship entitlements to all members of the polity irrespective of their spatial locations can partly moderate the tensions and conflicts between nationals and ethnies.

Caste is not a factor which produces contradictions between citizenship entitlements and national identity in India. This is because neither the internality of 'lower' castes is questioned by the 'superior' castes nor formal citizenship entitlements are denied to them by the state. But, in practice, discrimination based on caste is widely prevalent and practised. While entitlements of political citizenship are available to them, civil citizenship is not very relevant as most of them do not own any property. As for social citizenship, the state does not have adequate resources to provide the requisite entitlements. And, even the meagre provisions available through the policy of protective discrimination are being contested lately by a section of the entrenched elite.

In concluding the discussion, I advocate (*a*) the delegitimizing of religion as the basis of national identity, (*b*) legitimizing language and tribe as the bases of national identity, and (*c*) keeping a balance between equality and identity in extending citizenship entitlements.

The salient element in the 'national' identity of Africa is 'tribe'. But European colonizers in general not only denied that African tribes were nations, dismissing them as peoples without history, but artificially and mechanically joined several of them into administrative and/or political units. This artificial division and grouping of African tribes has played havoc in post-colonial Africa. African nationalists and intellectuals have not accepted this, although the artificial political boundaries created by the colonial administration are continued by African political leaders for reasons of expediency. And the question posed by King Mutesa II of Baganda remains unanswered and pertinent even today.

> I have never been able to pin down precisely the difference between a tribe and a nation and see why one is thought so despicable and the other is so admired. Whichever we are, the Baganda have a common language, tradition, history and cast of mind. While we stood alone, we were accepted as the most civilized and powerful of the kingdoms. Does this justify our being totally dominated by our neighbours, unnaturally yoked to us as they were by Britain? (Mutesa, 1967: 78–79).

This means, all tribes may not be nations, but some could be. On the other hand, the aggregation of tribes into one administrative

unit or polity will not make a nation. And this is precisely what Awolowo, an important political leader of Nigeria, meant when he wrote: 'Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere political expression. There are no "Nigerians" in the sense that there are "English", "Welsh" or "French"' (1947: 47–48). Thus viewed, most contemporary African states are multi-national or multi-tribal. But the vivisection of the same tribe into two or more administrative or political units has further complicated matters. This is so precisely because people have a strong sense of attachment to their homeland and pursuantly those who intrude into it are invariably viewed as ethnies—that is, outsiders.

In Chapter 6, Olasope O. Oyelaran and Michael Olu Adediran deal with the African situation largely from a legal perspective. They contend that national identity and citizenship are not mutually exclusive, nor does one pre-suppose the other. The reason for the non-applicability of Western concepts of citizenship and nationality to the African situation is to be located in the process of state formation in colonial Africa, as I have noted earlier.

The 55 countries of Africa were apportioned between the European imperial states in the Berlin Conferences of 1884 and 1885 without any consideration for their cultural boundaries. The citizens were defined on the basis of shared experiences of subjecthood in particular colonial states. That is, peoples of different nations were invested with common citizenship if they were subjects of the same colonial state. It also meant that the same nation could be vivisected across state territories, and in the same state tribes speaking a multiplicity of languages were grouped together. Further, the language of the colonial ruler serves as the official language in African states. Consequently, language creates a big divide between the elites and the masses: the latter languish and their mobility is blocked because of their inadequate knowledge of the language of education and administration.

This multi-lingual situation calls for a policy which can help preserve one's cultural/linguistic identity and foster political participation, which unfortunately has not been formulated. Therefore, African states cannot be characterized as nation-states of the Western European type. In fact, colonialism thwarted the natural development of statehood and citizenship in Africa. Africans were variously characterized as citizens, 'protected persons' or 'aliens' in their own homelands by the European powers during the colonial era.

This legacy has not been completely transcended. And yet, citizenship is a matter of legal entitlements, and territory and language are important components of national identity in contemporary Africa.

Chapter 7 entitled 'Religious Fundamentalism, Ethnicity and the Nation-State in the Middle East' by Bassam Tibi posits that the notion of nation-state is a Western importation into the Middle East. That is, while the concept of state is not alien either to Islam or to the Middle East, those of nation and nationalism are. Islamic fundamentalists prescribe political Islam as a substitute for nation-state. Political Islam is not anti-modern; it accepts modern science and technology, although it rejects the notion of secular sovereignty. Islam postulates a universal community (*Ummah*) and God (Allah) alone can have sovereignty over it. Therefore, the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East, according to Tibi may be traced to (*a*) the idea of territorial nationalism and (*b*) the type of political regimes which act as agents of Westernization.

Tibi characterizes the situation in the Middle East as follows. Although Middle Eastern states are legitimized in the international political order, they lack domestic legitimacy and are quasi-states. In the absence of a civil society, citizenship in the Middle East is a formal political identity devoid of any substance. A nation-state pre-supposes the equal sharing of sovereignty by all citizens who belong to the civil society. And, to the extent one collectivity dominates over other collectivities, it is not a full-fledged nation-state. That is, nation-state is conceptualized not in terms of its composition but in terms of its mode of functioning.

There are two difficulties with this characterization. First, one cannot distinguish between multi-national and mono-national democratic polities; both are 'nation-states'. Second, even those polities which are hailed as highly successful democracies cannot be considered as nation-states because domination of one collectivity over others is a common phenomenon in multi-national and poly-ethnic states. The dominant position of the English nation in the UK and that of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants in the USA is widely known and well documented.

In the case of the Middle Eastern states, there are several levels and contexts of identities. Although Islam is visualized as a source of universal identity and it is hoped that it will be a solvent of all

'lower-level' identities, in essence Arab–Sunni identity remains the core identity. Other identities, such as Arab–non-Sunni, Muslim–non-Arab, Arab–non-Muslim and non-Arab–non-Muslim are ethnic and often minority identities. Islam is intended to perform the same role in the Middle East as socialism in East Europe.

The core of ethnicity, according to Tibi, lies in the socially produced and ever-changing quartet of myths, memories, values and symbols. Thus defined, the only way to distinguish ethnicity from nationalism is to view the latter essentially as a political phenomenon. Understandably, he conflates state and nation. The point of substance for the present purpose is to note that when concepts developed in one context are applied without modification to social situations which are quite different, there will exist a rupture between concept and reality.

The shift from the Old World to the New World is accompanied by a dramatic change in the conceptions of national identity and ethnicity, and concomitantly in the conception of citizenship. Citizenship is the most salient collective identity which glues the people of the New World together, as they are drawn from different ethnies, and the idea of national identity, in the sense in which it is used in the Old World, is still not rooted. This point comes out clearly in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 which discuss the settler-majority polities. James N. Rosenau examines the different value-orientations of citizenship in the United States of America in Chapter 8. He identifies four types of value-orientations—self-centred, apathetic or alienated, ideological or altruistic, and democratic—based on the mix of self- versus collectivity-orientation.

Being a settler-majority country, drawing its population from a wide variety of backgrounds, the US is not a nation, whether one invokes language (although there is only one official language in the US as of today) or religion as the basis of nationality. Although the earlier waves of migrants, mainly from Western Europe, came to be identified with the symbols and institutions of the US, the US has not become a nation-state of the European type. After a period of euphoria when the US was visualized as a 'melting pot' recognizing the persistence of ethnicity based on a wide variety of factors, American unity is perceived today in terms of a common civil religion.

Whichever way one views US society, its basic thrust is citizenship based on individual equality. That is, assertion of the rights

of non-discrimination against individuals is the essence of US ethos. This emphasis is necessitated by the fact that there are no readymade socio-cultural blocks which can stake a moral claim over either the whole or parts of US territory as their exclusive ancestral homeland. Consequently, the notion of collective self-determination, the basis of formation of the nation-state in Europe, has been rendered redundant. And such collectivities which did exist (the native Americans) were either physically exterminated and/or culturally marginalized. US 'society' could not have been multi-national, only poly-ethnic.

To complicate matters, since the process of immigration into the US continues as a legitimate and a legal process, the immigrants cannot be viewed as intruders or outsiders as in Europe; they are future citizens. But there are several types of citizens in the US, given their ethnic status identities. First are the early settlers, mainly White Christians, who have successfully captured the dominant position in the polity. Second are the native Americans, reckoned as a separate racial group by the state and who perceive themselves, not without justification, as second class citizens. Third are the Blacks, who were brought as slaves but became settlers and gradually staked their claim as citizens through a long and tortuous struggle, although a substantial proportion among them define themselves either as Afro-Americans (thereby unfolding an ambivalence vis-à-vis the US as their homeland) and/or as second class citizens. Fourth are those who are citizens and settlers, yet are ambivalent about their sense of belonging to the US, as in the case of a substantial section of Asians (who are also racially distinct from the Whites and the Blacks). Fifth are those who are citizens but remain sojourners in that they still do not consider the US as their ancestral homeland, as exemplified by a section of the Jews. Sixth are those who are 'residents' but not citizens, and are clearly ambivalent about their attachment to the US and hope to return to their ancestral homeland some day. Seventh are those who are not yet residents or citizens but eagerly await to be incorporated into the system with appropriate legal entitlements.

The New World, however, does not represent a uniform situation. If collective identities within the US are in a flux, thanks to the continuing flow of population into its territory, the situation in this regard is relatively stable in Latin America. The more important reasons for this are the following: (*a*) there has been very little

immigration into Latin America in the last few decades; (*b*) the indigenous people were not subjected to genocide and/or culturocide to the same extent as in North America, and hence their presence is more visible, although the situation varies across different regions and states within Latin America; and (*c*) the policy of encouraging sexual unions, legitimate or otherwise, between European settlers and the indigenous people or African immigrants. Thus, one may speak of four basic racial-ethnic identities in Latin America: indigenous people, European settlers, Blacks and mixed bloods.

Chapters 9 and 10 by Elisa P. Reis and Azril Bacal respectively deal with the Portuguese and Spanish situations in Latin America. The European settlers of Latin America are mainly of Spanish and Portuguese origin. While most Latin American states are predominantly populated by Spanish people, the biggest Latin American state, both in terms of physical area and population size, namely, Brazil, is predominantly of Portuguese origin.

Defining citizenship as a 'politicized social identity', Reis explores the interactions between patterns of nation-building and models of citizenship. Invoking two key concepts of authority and solidarity, the author demonstrates that the problematic of developing authentic citizenship lies in the tension between them. This problematic is examined with reference to the ongoing process of democratization now experienced by erstwhile authoritarian regimes in Latin America. To be sure, the challenge of democratization varies across different Latin American states depending upon the historical patterns of political incorporation, the current trends with regard to market reforms, the nature of authority, and the scope and meaning of social solidarity in them. The most important threat to consolidation of democracy, according to Reis, stems from the prevalent and indeed increasing patterns of social inequality. Although the discussion is pursued with reference to Latin America as a whole, the focus is often on Brazil.

Brazil is an extremely exciting case when examining the interrelations between citizenship, national identity and ethnicity. While citizenship is a common identity shared by all Brazilians, the differences surface in terms of nationality/ethnicity. The White-Catholic Portuguese colonizers and the Black-African slave settlers were both ethnies to begin with, and the indigenous people constituted the nationals. The fact that the ethnies (settlers) and nationals (natives) were drawn from different racial categories further

complicated the situation. It is important to highlight this point because the ethnically different (e.g., Italian Jews or French Catholics) could get assimilated into and accepted by the Brazilian mainstream, which is constituted by the people of Portuguese origin. But the racially different could not be easily absorbed even though miscegenation was consciously pursued as an ideology by the state to create a 'racial paradise'; it only led to an elaboration of physical types. Further, 'racial democracy' did not lead to the reduction of racial inequalities. Thus, only a few Blacks and indigenous people are in the upper echelons of Brazilian society. (This is also true of the US, although it did not pursue a policy of racial inter-mixture.) When inequality exists along clearly demarcated racial and ethnic lines, the process of democratization is stunted as particular racial/ethnic collectivities are bound to remain second class citizens. In fact, inequality anchored to these ascriptive bases gives birth to the crystallization of strong collective identities. Therefore, inter-group equality is a pre-requisite for the realization of full-fledged citizenship.

In Chapter 10, Azril Bacal begins with a historical account of the Latin American situation. During the initial period of colonialism, the distinction between the European conquerors (Spaniards and Portuguese) and the native Amerindians was defined in terms of race and articulated through racism. But miscegenation produced categories such as the Mestizo, Mulatto and Zambo, and distinctions based on race became ambiguous. However, the concepts of state and nation were invoked in the context of the liberation struggles against the mother countries, and collective identities based on citizenship and nationality gradually became salient. In spite of this Bacal contends that race and ethnicity prevail as crucial collective identity markers in Latin America precisely because of the close correlation between them and socio-economic status.

Bacal identifies five perspectives associated with five collective identities in Latin American studies. Of these, three—the Hispanic, the indigenous and the Mestizo—consider race as the crucial variable, and the remaining two—the Indian and the multi-cultural—regard ethnicity as the salient variable. The Hispanics, with their privileged status, advocate a modernistic European perspective in the integration of Latin America; this is an assimilationist perspective of the mainstream. The indigenous vision is latched on to a pre-Hispanic version of race and civilization. It is essentially

revivalist in its orientation. The Mestizo, being a product of race-mixture, envision a single unified race and culture for Latin America. In contrast to these race-centred perspectives, the Indian and multi-cultural perspectives are culture-centred. The Indian perspective advocates ethnicity as the central concept and insists on celebrating cultural diversity and multiplicity. Finally, the multi-culturalists argue for a 'multi-national' Latin America, even as they consider 'ethnicity' as the central marker of identity. Admittedly, the existential conditions of collectivities mould the modes of conceptualizing their collective identities.

The idea of a nation-state as conceived and practised in West Europe is not conducive to the conditions prevalent in Latin America. And yet, the tendency to conflate state and nation, and nationality and ethnicity is not absent. This is evident from the fact that when racial and ethnic minorities mobilize for political autonomy and secession, they instantly become 'national' minorities. Thus, the 'nation' is viewed essentially as a political, and not a cultural, entity. Given the ground realities, Latin American politics have to be multi-racial and multi-cultural. Further, the ethnies, having become settlers, view Latin America as their homeland; they have become fellow-nationals of the Amerindians and the indigenous people. The integration process can only be accelerated through equality of citizenship and by recognizing collective identities based on cultural specificities.

It is clear from this brief survey of the nine chapters in this volume that nation-state as an entity which fused state and nation had not been realized anywhere, including West Europe. Further, the content of 'national identity' varies across continents; language, religion, tribe and race or their combinations make for it. And wherever the polity has more than one identity group, the possibility of the dominant collectivity defining itself as the nation and cognizing others as ethnies is perennially present. This tendency can be partly curbed by (*a*) reconceptualizing nation as all those who have a common homeland and language—ancestral or adopted, and (*b*) using citizenship as an instrument of moderating the hegemony of the dominant nation within states. Precisely for this reason, citizenship should be delinked from national identity.

Creation of clear concepts is a pre-requisite for theory building. And if concepts and theories are rooted in and isomorphic to the life-world of the people, their potentiality to avoid human misery

will also be substantial. I consider this combination as the real task and promise of social science. This volume is conceived as a step in that direction.

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2

Citizenship and National Identity: The Emerging Stirrings in Western Europe

Alfonso Alfonsi

The concepts of *citizenship* and *nation* and the problems related to their interpretation have resurfaced with new vigour in Western Europe at a time when one might have been tempted to set them aside as something definitely overcome by European culture and politics.

In my view, it is not only necessary to stress that citizenship (belonging to a political collectivity) and nationality (inclusion in a cultural community) are not co-terminus, but also to underline that they have undergone a profound evolution in the wake of Europe's historical and political vicissitudes. Today, citizenship and nationality have acquired a new meaning precisely in the light of the radical changes that are taking place everywhere in the world.

Western Europe was the place where most of the cultural and ideological conceptions regarding citizenship and nationality, some erroneous assumptions regarding their co-terminality (Oommen, 1994) and/or models for their integration had been formulated and adopted for the first time. These conceptions, although representing in some cases only the points of view of the dominant elites, nevertheless have had a strong impact on the ways in which citizenship and nationality have always been seen as synonymous

in the empirical reality of the European countries. This is true despite the numerous and frequent discrepancies in the proclaimed and actual performance of governments. In fact, most of these discrepancies demonstrate the inherent limits of the theoretical and ideological models of citizenship and nationality, and cannot be dismissed as exceptions. In this chapter, I will therefore try to demonstrate how and why the two concepts under scrutiny and their related models still have relevance in Western Europe, as well as point out some of their outstanding limitations. I will then make a few suggestions for further in-depth research on the relationship between citizenship and national identity.

Citizenship

The question of citizenship has of late moved to the centre-stage of European politics, perhaps more forcefully than might have been expected, after having long remained in the background. It is hence pertinent at this stage to ask ourselves what we mean by the term citizenship and what is the model of citizenship that has been traditionally formulated in Europe. I also intend to analyze some of the positive aspects of citizenship as understood in political science and those of its important variations which are rooted in European cultural and political traditions.

A Dual Model

It is a well-known fact of history that a dual model of citizenship had developed in Europe, that is, the Lockean-liberal model and the Aristotelian-republican one (Bendix, 1964; Walzer, 1988; Habermas, 1991; Zincone, 1992). The model that evolved from the liberal tradition of natural law ushered in by Locke held citizenship to be equivalent to a cell or external component of an organization (the state) in which it based and legitimized its juridical status. In this version, individuals remained external to the state, contributing to it in terms of certain rights and obligations (taxes, voting) in return for certain other rights and obligations of an organizational nature. The state was, in its turn, to guarantee individual rights and

equal treatment to all its citizens. The power of the citizen lay in his knowing how to use these rights for his own welfare and how to exercise influence on those who made decisions. This model of citizenship was the one that inspired the neo-liberals of the eighties in Europe and elsewhere (Thatcher, Kohl, Reagan), even though they tried to integrate this model with a more active and participatory role—that of active citizenship.

The Aristotelian-republican model, instead, was based on the concept of the Greek *polis*. Aristotle stated in the third book of *Politics* that a citizen is one who either takes, or is subject to, decisions. For Aristotle, citizens must be integrated into the political collectivity, so much so that they can develop their own personal identity only within the framework of common traditions and recognized political institutions. They, therefore, have a role to play in the formation of consensus towards government.

It is important to note here that while in the first model citizenship is external to the state, in the second it is of the 'associative' type. To be a citizen, according to Aristotle, means to 'associate' oneself with the state, to share its purpose. More fully developed during the French Revolution, this latter Aristotelian model of citizenship was to find its most literal application in the communist state. Appropriated successively by the European Left, it provided, as Habermas (1991) noted, an all-encompassing framework into which citizens were totally incorporated. The associative form of citizenship, or 'organized democracy' as it is commonly referred to, was achieved through the association with and participation in activities of the party and of state agencies.

Octroyee and Juridical Citizenship

I must, however, underline two common features which both models possess. Citizenship is in both cases *octroyee*, that is, conceded—first by the elites as a result of pressures from the people and then by the democratic state to its members (Rokkan, 1970; Therborn, 1977; Thane, 1986). Citizenship in both cases is also mainly juridical. This concessional and abstractly juridical aspect of citizenship is currently at the root of most of the problems in Europe. There is no doubt that the broadening of citizenship

and of the rights of citizens (universal suffrage, the welfare state, etc.) have allowed the inclusion in the state of ever greater numbers of people who had previously been excluded from participation (for example, those belonging to the working class).

At present, however, the question is no longer just the familiar one of the disparity between those who have the means to exercise the rights they are entitled to and those who do not. According to Janowitz (1980), for example, the rights of citizenship are invoked only in the event of their violation, and this entails defining a series of obligations and duties. In the welfare state, the expectations of citizens have changed as has the significance of the duties of the state, since the latter is linked not only to performance but also to the *type* of performance and to the state's compliance with these new expectations. Barbalet (1988) notes that citizenship developed not just as a response to popular pressure but also as a consequence of regulation by the state of the standards of living of the people and of the expectations that emerged in time. In addition, modern citizenship came to be articulated not as a definite and cohesive body of rights but one often containing conflicts and contradictions.

In all European countries there is general dissatisfaction with the status of citizenship, specially when the people are defined as sovereign by their constitutions but where a few hours spent in a hospital or a police station would be sufficient to realize that they are indeed subjects.

Citizenship, Competence and Activism

Both the Lockean-liberal model and the Aristotelian-republican model provide, in addition to the concessional and juridical aspects of citizenship, particular models regarding the status of citizens. Regardless of his ability to know how to influence those who make decisions (Model 1) or know his duty to participate in the life of the political community (Model 2), a citizen must possess certain capabilities and be thoroughly familiar with the issues he wants to have an impact on. The concept of citizen thus merges into that of 'public opinion' (Sartori, 1987), or is brought closer to that of 'civic virtue' or 'competent citizen' (Dahl, 1989). Such a definition of citizen automatically presumes that this is a role for which

eligibility will be necessarily limited to those sections of the population who do not ordinarily constitute more than 10 per cent of the total citizenry in any society due to the growing complexity of decision-making mechanisms.

Contemporary sociological and political science research, however, reveals the existence of a number of 'significant political acts', to recall the phrase of Verba (1992: 201–23), performed by citizens even though they may not be 'competent' or have the 'capabilities' in the earlier-stated sense. The type of 'activism' envisaged by the reductive definition of both models of citizenship (the vote, protest, joining associations, and so on) therefore does not seem to coincide empirically with the effective/actual activism of the citizenry vis-à-vis community work, contacting officials, and so on.

Crisis of the Two Models and the Protection of Rights

We might say that at least in European societies there is a dual trend regarding citizenship. In one we notice the conceptual, moral and cultural marginalization of the state, as expressed in the crisis of the welfare system, forms of de-legalization, mass a-legality, the crisis of the party system, and the birth of ethnic and national subjectivities. The loss of monopoly on social initiative by traditional agents, such as political parties, is also part of this marginalization. In the other, we witness the evolution of a new role of citizenship, different in its anthropological content from both the European and the American one because it is less oriented towards civil and religious values; this new role expresses itself in myriad autonomous initiatives to protect, or to institutionalize the protection of, political, civil and social rights. The duty to defend one's own and the other's rights is not merely a technical option or a sign of the refined juridical sensibility of citizens; on the contrary, it is increasingly becoming a mass choice, almost an emerging collective identity that tends to substitute the old identities that are now in crisis. 'Active citizenry' adds new elements to the concept of European citizenship, pre-figuring a model of citizenship that is active and acquired rather than passive and conceded by the state.

But it is not just the impossibility of fully implementing welfare rights that renders problematic citizenship as traditionally formulated in Europe. This traditional role of the citizen has undergone a crisis in all advanced countries due to the more general distress in which contemporary states find themselves when it comes to their functioning and legitimacy. Even the evolutionist model of citizenship theorized by Marshall (1950) has undergone a profound crisis in the wake of the crisis of the socialist states and that of 'social citizenship', and more generally of the crisis of the policies of social democratic states.

One tangible consequence of such a crisis is that individuals cannot protect, and may even find it difficult to defend, the rights which make up citizenship. There are certain problems which are at this point so diffuse and complex as to be entirely beyond the control of those traditional structures which were designed to fulfill the rights of citizens. To mention just a few examples of the current problems afflicting Italy, there is the problem of the disposal of urban and industrial waste, that of maintaining public order in the suburbs of large cities, the spread of forms of organized crime and of political corruption, as well as the collapse of the judicial apparatus and the consequent obstruction in the speedy resolution of civil cases. The old, evolutionist model of citizenship is certainly inadequate to explain all this.

How do the inhabitants of advanced societies react when faced with this failure? Paradoxically, they seem to turn precisely to their rights as citizens in the hope that this would allow them to overcome the chaos of ungovernability. Individuals, potentially reduced to the status of 'subjects' by the state in crisis, are using the last resource left to them as citizens. Consequently, citizenship today means, above all, connecting with one another, a coming together, a search for collective points of reference to protect individual rights in certain important areas like health, social services, transport, the environment and public order. Citizenship is, therefore, increasingly taking on the characteristics of an emerging mass identity.

The classic analysis by Marshall (1950) of the evolutionary nature of political, civil and social rights refers above all to a collection of juridical abstractions and to the status that derives from them. Even in the plans for the construction of European unity there is a lack of any reference, if not in purely rhetorical

terms, to the social dimensions of citizenship. In the treaties of Rome and of Maastricht, reference is made to five rights of the marketplace, but there is no definition of citizenship or any reference to the rights it entails in the so-called European social space, except when referring to worker-citizens. And yet, for European citizens, there is a widening gap between being involved and being a participant. An ever greater number of citizens are affected by a growing number of supranational laws while they have no hope of influencing European choices, since the role of a citizen is institutionalized only within the confines of the nation-state.

The rights of citizenship therefore are not solely concerned with identifying what new phases must emerge after the ones indicated by Marshall (1950), that is, they are not solely concerned with the evolution of the status of citizenship in keeping with the times, but also with the existing content of the rights and duties that this status endows. The general crisis of the state, even the neo-liberal state, brings up the problem of how to protect political, civil and social rights, that is, the need for 'ratio' or order in areas where the state is no longer able to guarantee effectiveness, efficiency, equality and justice in its performance (Quaranta, 1989).

Nation: A Disputed Concept

At a moment when the process of unification is underway in Europe, we cannot help but wonder about the relevance of the concept of nation for this area. It is no doubt a much disputed concept, as will be evident from the vast historical, sociological and anthropological literature that it has inspired. I will refer here to only some select formulations of what constitutes a nation as defined by Smith (1986). Smith identifies three basic ways of defining nation, which he terms as primordialist, modernist and symbolist.

The *primordialist* views the nation as a sort of natural entity, a timeless human association based on the identification of one or more shared characteristics of a given population, such as common ancestry, race, language, religion and territory. These characteristics, and hence nations, must have always existed; the nation, in this sense, is therefore a pre-existent reality as compared to the modern nation-state, and quite distinct from it.

The limits of this position have been pointed out by many authors, for example Oommen (1994), who have provided many examples to demonstrate the lack of correspondence between the theoretical characteristics attributed to nationhood and the concrete ones applicable to ethnic groups which have from time to time been identified (or which may have identified themselves) with the term.

The *modernist* maintains that nationhood is, above all, a consequence of the European industrial revolution, which is a relatively recent phenomenon (of the eighteenth century) and is linked to the development of capitalism, bureaucracy, technology and, most importantly, to the birth of the modern nation-state. The nation has sustained the constitution of the modern state and also furnished it the legitimation for its consolidation (Anderson, 1983; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1991; Gellner, 1992).

The *symbolist* delineates the continuity between traditional and modern epochs as well as recognizes the importance of changes in the definition of nation as a consequence of modernity. The symbolist underlines the central role of myths, memories, values and symbols in the constitution of a national identity (Smith, 1986).

Common to the second and third positions is the importance attributed to subjective elements as against the objective ones. In order for the nation to be considered as such, a necessary—but not sufficient—condition is that its members recognize that they are a part of it. In fact, for me, it is precisely this subjective and symbolic component that is central to the issue of national identity.

Western Europe: The Rise and Fall of the Concept of Nation

The modernist's position just discussed best illustrates the emergence of nation-states in Europe, even if its extension to other contexts may undoubtedly lead to confusion. The modernist's definition identifies certain characteristics of nationhood which can be directly traced to West European traditions as 'discourse', that is, even prior to their having become reality. As discourse, some of the elements that characterized the building of modern nation-states in Western Europe from the eighteenth century onwards were:

1. The nation exists in as much as it possesses an ideal outlet—the nation-state.
2. The nation is not a natural entity but a political scheme which may refer to ascribed characteristics but which, at any rate, is based above all on the conscience and will of the population.
3. The construction of a nation is a fundamentally consolidating process and not a fragmentative one.
4. The concept of nation is strictly tied to other elements typical of 'modern' ideology, such as the evolutionist notion of progress and the idealistic one of *geist* (reality of the spirit).

These are, to put it briefly, the elements that have characterized the building of modern nation-states in Western Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. The main thing is to see how the principle of 'nationality' was interpreted by those political and intellectual liberals among the elite who had activated the construction of a state in which the masses had little influence. It was the elite, and not the population in general, which made the co-terminality between citizenship (in the sense of belonging to a state) and nationality axiomatic. Intense efforts had to be made by this elite to transform such assumptions into reality. This was done by encouraging—and sometimes imposing—one language from the many spoken, one religion among the many followed, one set of myths and symbols among the many produced and 'consumed' by the popular masses, and so on. When referring to Italy, Antonio Gramsci had observed that the 'national' sentiment had never been 'popular' in Italy, but had existed as a form of conviction among the 'intellectuals' only for the continuity of *their* group and *their* history—a unique group which could boast an uninterrupted history (Gramsci, 1971 [1949]).

Indeed, the criteria according to which the principle of nationality was applied did not exactly match the empirical reality of the different communities living in the European continent. In fact, all the cultural collectivities were not even considered eligible for establishing states. A sort of 'minimum size principle' was in force in this respect (Hobsbawm, 1991). In cases where there was economic and cultural self-sufficiency, political independence was not even claimed by the liberals of the eighteenth century.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was also marked by a novelty, that is, the emergence of mass society with its instances

of subjectivity on the one hand, and the new needs of the state to have a more capillary administrative presence throughout its territory and to be more effective in its control over the masses on the other. These new needs induced the state apparatus to implement forms of 'nationalization' of the masses (Mosse, 1974) with the help of rituals and symbols. The general population instead was led into nationalistic types of movements that would later support, as we know, interventionism in the First World War. Such movements were exploited by Nazi and fascist dictatorships in the first half of the twentieth century. For example, in the writings of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile known for his ties with the fascist regime, the totalitarian state is presented as an efficacious instrument for the construction of the nation, which is conceived as 'a reality of the spirit' (*geist*).

According to Hobsbawm (1991), the nationalistic movement at the end of the nineteenth century should be considered one among the great mass movements of its time (together with the Socialist and Catholic ones) and, in particular, one that directly involved the middle classes. It was only in the late nineteenth century that ethnic, linguistic and racial homogeneity became truly determinant in discriminating between a national 'us' and the rest of humanity, and when nationalism became xenophobic, chauvinistic and right wing. It was precisely at this moment that the theses of Gobineau on the superiority of the Aryan race and that of Chamberlain on the war between the races began to be transformed into political and cultural agendas.

These two movements—that of the state for the nationalization of the masses and the one with a popular, nationalistic component—were to later come together, but not without occasional friction, especially on the question of those minorities which had been left out of the national unification project. Indeed, the nation as identified by the state elites did not always coincide by territory or population with the nation as envisaged by the masses. We have seen this in relation to the post-Second World War period when, despite attempts to apply the Wilsonian principle of the coincidence of state territory with nationality, incidences of irredentism and ethnic nationalism continued to surface.

Although historians like Hobsbawm (1991) recognize the presence of nationalist leanings in the struggles for anti-Fascist liberation, we must say, at least when talking about post-War Italy, that

the concept of nation here was banned from the political culture (except for its instrumental use by certain groups of the extreme right) and is barely mentioned in the constitution, where the term nation is hardly ever used and where the substitute terminology instead is 'the people'. The process of cultural homogenization that took place in Italy after the War was not undertaken in the name of national identity but through the mediation of political parties and popular movements which assumed a 'national' function (Gramsci, 1971 [1949]; Vacca, 1991) and which also relied on values, symbols and myths, but ones that were different from those typical to nationalism.

At the end of this historical sketch some relevant differences in dealing with the rupture between citizenship and nationality in different countries can be pointed out. The first example we will take up is that of France, where the co-terminality between nation and state is implied, but by interpreting nationality in a very broad sense. According to a law approved in 1889, all those who resided within the territory of the state and accepted integration into the cultural community of France, for instance by adopting the French language, were given French citizenship.

In the case of Germany though, full citizenship coincided with nationality, and there was no attempt to achieve a fusion between the German nation and the population living within the territory of the German state. In fact, in Germany, nation has been defined on the basis of a very restricted criterion, that is, common blood. In the 1913 law, the *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) principle can be clearly identified, as the law establishes that foreigners who reside in the German state will not be recognized as citizens despite many years of residence while those living abroad who can demonstrate that they descend from Germans (*Auslandduetshe*) may enjoy the privileges of naturalization.

In Great Britain to the contrary citizenship was kept distinct from nationality and was granted on the basis of the so-called right of the soil (*jus soli*). In the imperial law of 1913 it was stated that all those who were residents of the Commonwealth countries were British citizens, with ethnic belonging being regarded as extraneous to the issue.

These different methods of conjugating citizenship and nationality still persist in the legal systems of these countries despite some amendments. In Germany, the *grundgesetz* envisages the

figure of the *statusdeutsch*, that is, the German residing abroad who does not belong to the state but can obtain German citizenship without difficulty after having returned to the Federal Republic of Germany. In Britain, some distinctions have been introduced between the earlier Commonwealth residents and the new Commonwealth residents, the latter being deprived of free access to the country; but once allowed to settle, those who reside on the territory of the state are entitled to all the political rights.

The 'Revenge of Nations': Ethnic Neonationalism

In the light of the historical–cultural background I have traced so far, the answer to the question of whether the concept of nation in Western Europe has cultural relevance or not would seem to be negative. The upheavals underway in Eastern Europe and the conflicts in the south of the planet make the upheavals taking place in the western part of Europe seem ludicrous. And yet, judging from the current debate between experts and political analysts, this issue today seems more than ever relevant. What are the reasons for this revival of interest in the nation in Western Europe? I believe that, broadly speaking, we may identify four reasons: (*a*) the geographical and cultural proximity with the East; (*b*) the increase in the immigration from developing countries; (*c*) the problems associated with the unification of Europe; and (*d*) the phenomenon of ethnic revival.

As regards the first point, we can say that the events that took place after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, apart from their purely emotional impact on West Europeans (consider the shock of seeing in a country like Yugoslavia, so close to Europe and one which had always been considered 'northern' even if governed by a different political system, scenes of war which Europeans have come to associate with the Middle East or Central America), also triggered an unexpected revival of nationalistic sentiments in some states. Thus, in Germany, the prospect of the reunification of the nation led to an unexpected consensus among the population, though not without giving rise to some alarm in other countries.

On the second point, the hostility of the governments and populations of many European countries towards immigrants from

developing countries has made it imperative to again discuss the link, too often taken for granted, between citizenship and national identity. Today, in sociological circles, as for example in the recent conference of the Association Internationales des Sociologues de Langue Francaise (see, AISLF, 1992), there is constant discussion on the consequences of attempts to attribute citizenship founded on the 'right of blood' (as in Germany) as against the 'right of territory' or soil (as in Great Britain) in view of the impending European unification.

On the third point, the resistance to European integration exemplified in the position of those states which were either traditionally hostile to the idea, such as Great Britain, or the ones which more recently 'defected' from it, like Denmark (whose population voted against conforming to the treaty of Maastricht), even when constituting a minority position on the continent remind us that forms of nationalistic pride are not altogether dormant.

As regards the fourth point, it should be noted that in Western Europe there have been whispered references, especially in the last three decades, to the emergence of the phenomenon of 'ethnic' neonationalism (Nairn, 1977; Smith, 1981). In such a context where the 'civic' and territorial models of nation have always prevailed and the ethnic model up to now has been linked mainly to racist and xenophobic degenerations of fascism and Nazism, to interpret nationalism in terms of a phenomenon of ethnic revival is to touch a raw nerve, which also explains the reactions and controversies. For example, an eminent historian like Eric Hobsbawm published a book (1991) in which he maintained that the idea of nation has no currency, leave alone validity. Even Touraine (1991: 23–40) has spoken of nations 'as a shadow of an idea that once was'. All the same, the size and persistence of the phenomenon discussed earlier have induced other intellectuals to liberally assign the title of nation to new ethnic movements which have sprung up within European states. For example, Minc wrote in 1990 that even if it appeared as though the nation had become old hat, to the extent of being relegated to the storeroom of modern, post-modern and other societies, now we are witnessing what he calls the 'revenge of nations'.

It should be noticed that the increase in immigration from developing countries and the phenomenon of ethnic revival have much to do with exposing the inadequacies of the vision which

makes citizenship and nationality co-terminous. So one might solve the apparent contradiction between the decline of the credibility of nation and, yet, its persistent relevance in Western Europe by making it clear at the outset that it is the co-terminality mentioned here that is outmoded, while nationalistic claims in themselves are not disappearing at all.

In sum, though nationality and nationalism are a ghost erased from the intellectual conscience of Western Europe, yet, it is increasingly difficult to deny the existence of nationalism, albeit of a new type, in the ethnic movements that have come into being in Western Europe, more so as this has happened in such a measure as to belie the expectations of liberals and rationalists (Smith, 1981).

An inventory carried out by Smith in 1981 counted, among the more important movements of ethnic revival, the Scots, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Corsicans, the Basques, the Flemings, the Tirolese, the Andalusians, the Faroese, the Normans, the Frisians, the Walloons, the Sardinians, the Sicilians, the Slovenians, the Alsatians, the Occitanians, the French Basques and the Bavarians, as well as the inhabitants of the Jura (also included were the autonomist pressures of lesser intensity that emerged among the Gallicians), of Cornwall, Gelderland and Ulster, of the Isle of Man, of the Pharaohs and of the Shetlands.

Recent events in Italy would have us add to this list the autonomous movements in the country's northern regions, especially in Lombardy and Veneto, called the 'Leagues' which have had tremendous success in the last elections. It must be stressed that all these examples of fragmentation of the identity of European countries are a clear sign of the failure of the project of fusion between nationality and citizenship: as and when the political elites have attempted to implement this project, the number of cultural collectivities have always exceeded the number of states created.

What I have said thus far concerning ethnic revival refers mainly to the sentiments of minorities, even if they are often significant ones within the European states. But what of the national identity of the majorities, that is, of citizens who belong to hegemonic nationalities? On this issue experts generally refer to the weakening of national pride, especially in recent generations. For example, the results of the Euro-barometer surveys, commented on by Inglehart (1990), revealed that in five European countries (Luxembourg, Italy, France, Holland and West Germany) between 1970

and 1985 there was a decline of 17 per cent to 24 per cent of those persons who considered themselves 'very proud' of their nationality. In Belgium, another European country, this decline was 44 per cent (ibid.). Unfortunately, we lack data on other countries.

The phenomena of racism and xenophobia noted in various European countries are generally attributed to causes other than nationalism. It is rather difficult to understand the rationale that is at work here. Simply because the intellectuals have exorcised the notion of nation from their consciousness, the assumption that national revival amongst European populations will not occur is untenable.

In general we should note that rise of neonationalistic, ethnic or regional phenomena as well as the decline of the nationalistic spirit in Western European countries are strictly tied to the crisis of those states which once had used nationalism to ground their own legitimacy. The incapacity to make the administrative apparatus work, the rights of citizens who have become more aware and educated, as well as the 'surplus' intelligentsia that often leads nationalistic movements (Smith, 1981) have had in fact considerable impact on the proliferation of phenomena of this type. In some measure, the crisis of ideologies has also contributed to this, not only in Eastern Europe where the collapse of communism undermined the 'charismatic' quality (Eisenstadt, 1992) of the state parties, but even in the West where the 'welfarist' ideology has suffered a substantial decline in the last decade.

The state no longer seems to be furnishing a collective identity (but no agency seems to be capable of doing so today), and in those countries where this prerogative has been exercised most forcefully (for example, in East European countries), it has now failed completely. We should thus seriously ask ourselves how we can define the minimum shared values necessary to hold society together (Genov, 1992). Here, we must make clear that the kind of operation of the 'nationalization' of the masses that was carried out by governments between 1800 and 1900 is becoming less and less practicable today.

Finally, we should not minimize the impact of phenomena such as the globalization of social and economic processes and of the tendency among many societies towards local reductionism. These two phenomena are both contemporary and at the same time

antithetical. They constitute a sort of double-edged sword that renders the existence of the state itself uncertain and this, in turn, undermines its effectiveness as an instrument of political governance of societies.

In the face of this vast 'market' of concepts and phenomena, we should ask ourselves not so much what means to adopt to reduce complexity—in Luhmannian terms—as much as how to explain and interpret them. I would propose three research paths, each founded on concepts that contain explicative as well as dynamic-interpretative elements. In reality, what is being suggested is the use of a strategy which involves the legitimization of sociological theory and concepts in a reality which is guided, even if unconsciously, by 'operating communities' (politicians, leaders, etc.) or else by disciplines that do not give much importance to the social, cultural and anthropological dimensions when dealing with political reality. This approach, even as it pursues phenomena and concepts such as interdependence and development adopts a critical attitude to the classical theories of modernization and convergence without, however, overlooking sociological processes.

The first path I intend to propose is that of putting both the question of citizenship and national identity in juxtaposition or direct confrontation with each other. Just such an approach has been articulated by two eminent experts who are regarded as the representatives of European sociological culture, that is, Anthony D. Smith and Juergen Habermas. Confronting the two positions expounded by them will allow us to understand what kind of relationship (whether of exchange, equilibrium or deficit) can exist between citizenship and national identity. Answers to the questions on these two unresolved positions can only come after a series of inquiries in the field.

The second research path concerns the complex dialectics that exist between the emancipatory model of citizenship and the stabilizing model of nation, specially when we are trying to understand phenomenon such as the crisis of the state. In this case, the typology of political and social forms has turned out to be limited in the face of empirical data. The need has been felt for timely research on at least four as yet unresolved issues which seek to establish the relationship between: (*a*) emancipation and marginalization, (*b*) immigration and emancipation, (*c*) environmental

protection movements, and (*d*) movements for protecting civil rights.

The third research path could try to apply certain Weberian categories such as social action and collective action to tribe, citizenship, nation and ethnie with the aim of utilizing concepts from general sociology, such as symbolic interaction, value, purpose, socialization and action for the study of political phenomena.

Citizenship and National Identity

On the topic of the relationship between national identity and citizenship in Europe, the opinions have been widely divergent. The two most important contemporary authors whose works embody the two conflicting interpretations of this relationship within the European context are the Englishman, Anthony Smith, and the German, Juergen Habermas. Even if there has not yet been a direct confrontation of views between the two authors, there is great disagreement between their views on what has actually been accepted and transmitted in the European tradition. Is it a model of citizenship that overlooks the particulars, even the national ones, and which is referred to as the 'patriotism of the constitution' or *Vertragspatriotismus* (Habermas, 1991: 123–46)? Or is it the ethnic model, which is transmitted through mythic-symbolic elements and which emerges either as a reaction to the consolidation of a state or in the revival and resurgence of those ethnic groups which the nation-states wished to incorporate into a single ethnic base (Smith, 1986)?

According to Habermas, in Western Europe, historically speaking, it is citizenship that has prevailed (the very concept of nation adapts itself gradually to the affirmation of citizenship). In particular, he has pointed out that:

1. Between citizenship, as it manifested itself in the European tradition, and national identity there was no conceptual link; only one of circumstances. Indeed, national autonomy has been traditionally founded on a collective freedom (self-affirmation with regard to foreign nations), something which is quite distinct from political freedom as sanctioned by the rights of citizenship.

2. Again, in Western Europe, from the eighteenth century onwards the meaning of 'nation', which initially implied a pre-political dimension, simply reduced itself to a label around which the political identity of citizens in a democratic collectivity defined itself. This process was consolidated towards the end of the nineteenth century, so much so that Ernest Renan rejected the demand of the German empire to annex Alsace because he considered the Alsatian population to be of French 'nationality' since he himself conceived of 'nation' as a community of *citizens* and not as a community sharing the same ancestors (on the growth of the concept of 'nation of citizens', cf. Palmer, 1940).
3. At the end of the nineteenth century, nationalism was an instrument for the affirmation of the role of the citizen as it had emerged since the French Revolution. Such a role demanded a high level of personal commitment, with the willingness to fight and die for the country, a national consciousness and republican sentiments, all adopted in equal measure. However, the connection between republicanism (citizenship) and nationalism was a social–psychological one and not a conceptual one.
4. Democratic citizenship, then, need not necessarily be rooted in a people's national identity; setting aside the multiplicity of cultural patterns of life, democratic citizenship rather requires the socialization of all citizens into a common political culture.
5. In European unification we may therefore envisage a separation between common political culture and national traditions (along the lines of the experience of Switzerland where several nationalities share the same democratic tradition). It is this political culture (for the construction of which the cultural elite and the mass media are destined to play an important role) that will be vital for the future of the 'old continent', and not a search extending back to the Middle Ages for the common origin of Europeans.

Anthony Smith (1986), instead, seems to believe that national identity is not yet completely absorbed or overcome by citizenship and thus is still intrinsically present in ethnic consciousness. Indeed, he maintains that:

1. The processes of nation-building in the modern world prove that all nations bear the imprint of principles and components that are both territorial and ethnic, and they also reveal the troubled confluence between the two models of social and cultural organization—the 'civic' model, which is more recent, and the 'genealogical' model, which is older.
2. The original Western nations could take for granted their ethnic elements and, therefore, their nationalism emphasized the territorial models (or 'civic' models). Subsequently, internal divisions and external pressures forced both England and France to reconsider their ethnic bases. Smith interprets the French protestations with regard to the Prussian annexation of Alsace Lorraine in exactly the opposite manner as Habermas, that is, as an indigenous and anti-Semitic ethnic movement that tried to redefine 'France' as an ethnic nation.

The dualism contained in the concept of nation (the civic and the genealogic or ethnic model) has inevitably created a profound ambiguity in the current relations between ethnic groups and the states into which they are so often incorporated. This is mirrored in the dual affiliations of political unity to the state expressed in terms of the rights and obligations of the citizenry on the one hand and, on the other, to the ethnic community in which citizens' families were born and into which they got socialized (the 'vicarious nationalisms').

In general, citizenship and ethnic solidarity operate in separate spheres, that is, in public and private, in political and cultural, and thus tensions between them are rare. But there are situations in which confrontations are inevitable. The plan to constitute culturally homogeneous states through creating a political culture tied to citizenship remains, however, unfulfilled when we note the persistence of the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism.

These two different interpretations of the consequences of interaction between citizenship and national identity as seen in European history both contain some elements of truth. It cannot be denied that ethnie has been amply transcended by nation (a political project), even as we cannot fail to see the shortcomings of such a project since it superimposed itself on the mythic and symbolic ties that existed in European societies.

The vicissitudes of citizenship and those of national identity, however, remain central to the crisis of states. This directly links up with the emergence of social subjectivity at the level of the masses. The incapacity of the state to guarantee the fulfilment of the rights of citizenship, on the one hand, and ethno-nationalistic revival, on the other, are both in some ways aspects of this crisis.

We should ask ourselves, furthermore, what will be the result of the project of European unity in terms of citizenship and trans-national identity? The two authors view this project from two different perspectives: for Habermas (1991), such a project is possible if we take for granted the affirmation of citizenship, or of a 'constitutional patriotism', in a cosmopolitan context for which the citizen has been or will be educated; for Smith (1986), European unity remains an abstraction and merely a plan as long as it fails to reckon with the mythical-symbolic power of ethnie, since a common European culture and myth are lacking.

Citizenship and National Identity: Between Emancipation and Stabilization

In the beginning, I mentioned the two historical models around which citizenship had consolidated itself in Europe: the Lockean-liberal one in which the individuals were outside the state and the Aristotelian-republican one founded on the participation of citizens. As Giovanna Zincone (1992) suggests, these two models have been historically affirmed through the work of state elites in four different ways:

1. The tendency of the state to either project itself on civil society (state-centred models) or, conversely, the tendency of civil society—always in a mediated form—to project itself on the state (societal models).
2. The preservation or the modification of the existing social order. We thus have a type of citizenship that aims at subverting and changing the existing social relationships (emancipatory models) or one instead directed at the preservation and restoration of traditional social relationships (stabilizing models).

Each of these options can be juxtaposed (emancipatory or stabilizing, state-centred or societal models) and are useful in explaining the way in which citizenship and national identity evolved in the West European context. We can then note how in each case all projects for the construction of citizenship promoted by states have arrived at a point where they radically undermine the emancipatory and stabilizing characteristics that were the cause of their affirmation.

State-centred citizenship aims at directly integrating the masses into the state by taking power away and delegitimizing the interlocutory organizations in civil society. This stabilizing model—which can be traced to Bismarck's Germany and Taafee's Austria in 1880, and to which even the model adopted by Denmark as well as, in part, the one adopted by Italy in Crispi's time refer—promoted both the state and stabilizing citizenship through the following methods: (*a*) the generalized concession of political rights—universal suffrage was granted in 1867 in Prussia and in 1871 in the Reich—but this was in a weakened state where the executive branch was not responsible to parliament and which could govern without a majority; (*b*) by conceding social rights, which were subsidized by the state (Germany in 1883 and Austria in 1880) as a way of taking power away from the nascent organizations of the subordinate classes; and (*c*) the accentuation of national identity as against that of social identity with the promotion of the crown as the *super partes* organ in response to vigorous international hostility.

The emancipatory state, instead, is the type of state that came after the French Revolution. It aimed at directly managing the change in social relationships by: (*a*) the generalized concession of political rights through the rewriting of the 'rules of the game', and (*b*) by introducing new constitutions that made a break with the past. This generalized concession of political rights extended to the point of conceding citizenship even to foreigners who had fought for the Revolution. However, universal suffrage introduced by the French Constitution of 1793 was reduced successively by (*a*) the progressive separation or delinking of the executive branch from the electorate; (*b*) the monopolization by the state of implementation and protection of social rights (education, constitution of 'state workshops') as well as the prohibition (1791) on the formation of workers' unions; and (*c*) the accentuation of national

identity with an emphasis on 'siege' mentality and the project for an expansionist foreign policy (Napoleon).

Societal citizenship implies considering civil society as a resource to be integrated through the mediation of the state. In the stabilizing version exemplified in Britain in the 1800s, this was achieved by the following means: (*a*) granting a minimal extension of political rights (those having the right to vote in liberal regimes ranged from 1 to 8 per cent of the population at the beginning of the century), but with greater effectiveness. Illuminating in this context is the practice engendered by Disraeli in 1867 of resignation in the event of electoral defeat; (*b*) the refusal of a command-type intervention by the state in which the delegation of the management of social rights was seen as an 'associative solution' arrived at between state and civic society, that is, 'the birth of friendly societies' (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1983). Where there was state intervention in favour of the weak segments, for example by the construction of workhouses for the poor, it was not seen in the overall context of the rights of citizenship, since he who benefited from public assistance was presumed to lose all political rights because the citizen was deemed to be one who was an economically independent person; and (*c*) a 'national' identity that did not entail renunciation of social (or ethnic) identities. Here, as in the emancipatory model and as Eisenstadt (1992) and Rokkan (1970) have also emphasized, the capacity to absorb the lower classes before they became politically active derived from having resolved the problems of legitimization and national unity at a time when no significant wars took place, so that there was no conflict between the rights of the nation and those of individuals or classes.

After the corrective state-led phase of welfare though, following the Second World War and with the introduction of public and national laws on assistance (Lord Beveridge), this British model of the 1800s faced a crisis because of its non-adherence to traditional 'spontaneous' principles of civil society. In its most contemporary and liberal versions (Dahrendorf, 1989), the stabilizing societal model is based on mistrust of the rational acts of the state and reposes faith in the spontaneity of law, the economy (Hayeck, 1973–79) and of civil society, with an emphasis on active citizenship. It is also based on the need for the elimination of intermediary organizations between society and its spontaneous mechanisms (for example, the reduction of the role of trade unions or of parliament during the Thatcher government).

Between the twenties and the thirties, the Scandinavian countries adopted emancipatory societarianism, that is, a solid assimilation of citizenship and society to the state. Political rights and universal suffrage emerged side by side with the birth and affirmation of the Socialist Party and, later, of the Social Democratic Party. The hegemony of these parties and of workers organizations on public policies entailed a system of generalized social rights (in countries moreover characterized by a demographic density far inferior to that of Germany, England, France and Italy) founded on the increase in public expenditure and employment which were delinked from problems of a balanced budget, and which entrusted social security to workers organizations. The associations themselves were spontaneous in nature, but they were registered with the state consequent to their formation. This model, which has been an ideal prototype of citizenship for the Left in Europe for years, is also in crisis, partly due to international economic competitiveness and partly due to a crisis of identity among the citizens who no longer identify so completely with the worker-state. This crisis has resulted in the return to power of neo-liberal governments and neo-liberal policies in these states.

The Crisis of State-centred Projects of Construction of Citizenship and National Identity

Citizenship and national identity are subject to processes of wear and tear, and true crisis has been noted by several experts (Offe, 1977; Luhmann, 1979; Smith, 1981; Habermas, 1991; Eisenstadt, 1992). The crisis occurs, among other things, because all four models of citizenship (the state-centred stabilizing one, the state-centred emancipatory one, the societal stabilizing one and the societal emancipatory one) have been integrated and have shown a strong tendency to converge towards a single model. Not only have the models propagated by the state had to increasingly integrate societal elements (alternatives springing from the society), but even the more society-oriented models have had to appropriate obligatory stabilizing elements (such as those tied to welfarist ideology). However, both have lost their emancipatory and stabilizing forces on account of the crisis of efficiency and legitimacy of the state.

Efficiency and legitimacy were the principal characteristics of the state to which citizenship and national identity had so far been linked. Now, after the crisis of the greatest state-centred and emancipatory project—communism—and after the crisis of all the systems of welfare and the delegitimation of the bureaucratic systems, any kind of state-defined citizenship is unthinkable, be it of the emancipatory model or the stabilizing one. Even societal citizenship, which requires a strong national identity as the framework within which the 'spontaneous energy' of civil society can develop, is facing a crisis due to the phenomenon of 'dual loyalty' (nationalisms, ethnic revival, religious revival, fundamentalism, familial forms, criminality, etc.) and due to the growing tendencies towards material and moral subjectivity.

The crisis of the European emancipatory and stabilizing models can be seen in the inability of the states to resolve the question of citizenship and of national identity in the face of two dilemmas: (*a*) the dilemma of the well-off majority versus the marginalized minority, and of immigration; and (*b*) the dilemma of the appearance of non-traditional political subjects who are tied to a new form of emancipation and protection of rights which do not coincide with state and societal models.

Emancipation and the 'Glotz Theorem'

The first signs of a crisis in the role of citizenship (both in the emancipatory version as well as in the stabilizing version of statehood) were noticed in Europe in the early eighties when the main supporters of the emancipatory model—the social democracies and, more generally, the Left—had come to terms with the 'perverse effects' of the welfare state they had fought for and supported. This travail, which is not merely ideological, is well illustrated in the study by the German social democrat, Peter Glotz, who coined the well-known expression 'the two-thirds society'. According to Glotz, the social and economic changes of recent years facilitated a new alliance between the big capitalists, the elite middle classes, skilled labour and the vast majority of the people (that is, the two-thirds), who came within the purview of the welfare systems, but which excluded, instead, the unemployed, the handicapped and

the retired. For Glotz, and also in the thinking of the European Left in the eighties, it was no longer possible to identify the social subject of the welfare system (whether it was meant to be the working class or all workers), and this in turn entailed the possible defeat of these systems, which in many cases took place even at the hustings precisely because of the inability of the Left to resolve the problem of who should benefit from emancipatory policies. Examples of such electoral defeats are those of the Social Democrats of Sweden and Germany, the Communists of France and Italy and the Labour Party of England.

The stabilizing models themselves (which surfaced in their neo-liberalist garb after the electoral defeat of the emancipatory type of state due to popular reaction to an excessively bureaucratized form of social and public services) have had to reckon with the reality that a majority of citizens are not yet inclined to give up the benefits of welfare conquered after years of struggle. They have also had to come to terms with an increased material and moral subjectivity.

In those states which were built on the stabilizing model, the state lost the capacity to intervene effectively in order to consolidate traditional relationships. In the meantime, in Europe in the eighties, together with the dismantling of welfare and reduction in the importance of trade unions, there also occurred the disintegration of the traditional family set-up, an increase in single-parent families, growth in forms of fiscal evasion and mass a-legality. In addition, vast networks of self-help organizations blossomed all over, taking over the management of alternate public services while also providing an outlet for forms of rebellion and unbridled self-protection.

Emancipation and Immigration

The second question that remains unresolved is immigration. Both the stabilizing and emancipatory models of citizenship as well as national state identity have foundered on this question. Migration between European countries has always existed, but at present the phenomenon has assumed the characteristics and dimensions of a mass movement. Indeed, at present it is estimated that there are

approximately 12 million immigrants in Western Europe, of which 8 million come from countries which are members of the EC (Eurostat, 1987).

Statistics indicate that approximately 1.5 million illegal immigrants have arrived in Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (Appleyard, 1991). It has also been calculated that immigrants from East European countries alone will amount to 20 to 30 million in the next few years. On the one hand, policies tied to the stabilizing and emancipatory models of citizenship clash with the incapacity of states to place effective barriers, both at the borders of states as well as within them, while on the other hand, states are also unable to impose policies of demographic control on 'naturalized' immigrants. The existing conflicts between 'natural' citizens and citizens 'on paper' or citizens 'despite themselves' (that is, those who acquire nationality automatically), exacerbated by the political formations of the Right and the phenomenon of xenophobia, have disrupted the assumptions of the binomial of citizenship–national identity, even as regards the emancipatory models which are unable to resolve the question of whether immigrants are subjects to be emancipated or not.

In the eighties, countries with substantial extra-Community immigration (France, England, Germany, Belgium, and lately even Italy) have seen the growth of political and cultural movements of immigrants of the 'second generation', which have begun to demand effective citizenship based on participation in the life of the neighbourhood, socialization through schools and integration into daily life—a demand which necessarily implies the identity of citizenship extending beyond a national identity.

The Environmentalist Movement

The third element of crisis in official models of citizenship and national identity consists of the growth in all European countries of subjects who are not party oriented. This has upset the model of citizenship tied to the idea of the natural evolution of rights. The environmentalist movement which has grown in European countries has not only imposed itself in the political arena with substantial electoral support, but has also been able to mobilize a

large number of people on unusual issues (according to calculations, environmental groups and associations can be numbered in hundreds of thousands, with millions of members worldwide, cf., Worldwatch Institute, 1991, 1992). In many European countries, environmental movements (between 3 and 5 per cent) surpass political parties in sheer numbers of adherents. In England, for example, the better-known environmentalist organizations alone have a membership of 2.5 million, compared with the 1.4 million members of the Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democratic Parties put together (Patten, 1990). In Italy, environmentalist organizations at the national level alone have over 2,600,000 members (Istituto di Ricerche Educative e Formative, 1990), while the political parties altogether have 3,900,000 members (Centro Studi e Investimenti Sociali, 1991).

The environmentalist movement has posed a new problem for the definition of citizenship. Environmental problems coincide less with national borders, so that rights and movements linked to the environment are increasingly tied simultaneously to global and local events (Hettne, 1990). This limits, to a significant extent, the power and right of the state to intervene in issues related to the environment.

The Movement for the Protection of Rights

In addition to 'environmental citizenship', or to the type of problems that ecological issues pose for state-sponsored models of citizenship, we should note the growth of autonomous organizations aimed at concretely protecting the rights of citizenship which have been constitutionally guaranteed in the abstract. Beyond the traditional advocacy or defense of weak sectors, cross-continental surveys, such as those by Verba (1992), have documented the existence of a high rate of activism of the non-electoral and non-protest type as exemplified in community work, contacting officials, etc., which has as its aim the protection of the rights of citizens. According to statistics, the percentage of people involved in these activities is approximately 26 per cent in Austria, 29 per cent in Holland, 28 per cent in England and 25 per cent in Germany (Verba, 1992). As regards Italy, as far as public opinion polls

reveal, I would say that approximately 12 per cent of the citizens (or 4,821,000 persons) are involved with associations or voluntary groups (Istituto di Ricerche Educative e Formative, 1990). However, if non-party and non-trade union political participation has grown in the face of the oft-mentioned crisis of the 'great collective identities', it should be emphasized that it is no longer oriented, as it was in the sixties and seventies, towards protesting against the state for better laws or services, but instead is adopted as a 'practice', as the only way to make applicable the political, civil and social rights spelled out in the constitutions.

Social Action and Collective Action: Ethnie, Nation, Citizenship and Tribe

One of the main problems one encounters in research on these subjects is the ambiguous use of concepts. Oommen (1994) has pointed out the erroneous conclusions and contradictions that characterize the current utilization of concepts such as state, nation, tribe and ethnie, and has proposed the establishment among them of a processual linkage and not one of co-terminality or of mutual implication.

I have already stated my views on the concepts of citizenship and nation. As regards the concept of ethnie, I propose to adopt Smith's definition: an ethnie is a human population designated by a name that shares myths or ancestry, history and culture and which is associated with a specific territory and has a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1986). Referring to the tribe, I would like to highlight a metaphorical use of this concept that is finding increasing acceptance among scholars (Walzer, 1991; Touraine, 1991). In response to the definition of tribe as a secondary and reactive formation, as proposed in British social anthropology (Fried, 1967), one could consider the tribe as an organization which can also emerge on an ethnic basis (but not necessarily), with the objective of protecting its members against impositions coming from the state and in particular against that homogenization which is a constitutive element of nation-building. It can hence act as a quasi-government in those areas where the actual government does not succeed in exercising its power. The emergence of tribes as defined here is

the most important outcome of the failure of the projects of fusion between citizenship and national identity.

In line with this thought I would like to make a proposal which, more than anything else, is indicative of some new areas of research. It refers to the contribution that two sociological concepts, that is, social action and collective action, can make to bring a bit of order to this babble.

By social action I mean action endowed with meaning for the subjects concerned. Therefore, I use here the Weberian meaning of the concept. By collective action I mean action performed by a more or less organized group composed of persons who mobilize to attain common objectives. In Weberian terms, collective action is generally oriented towards a purpose.

An action endowed with meaning for the actors involved need not be oriented towards a purpose of which they are aware; however, an action oriented towards a collective end is certainly endowed with meaning. We might envisage a continuum from a minimum to a maximum of awareness in which social action is tendentially closer to one extreme and collective action closer to the other. We could, therefore, attempt to apply the distinction (which, however, as we have seen is not rigid enough to constitute a dichotomy) between social action and collective action to the four concepts of citizenship, nation, ethnie and tribe in the following manner.

For the existence of ethnie, social action is sufficient; indeed, ethnie is a context in which actors understand each other on the meaning of their actions, communications and affirmations (because they share the same language, the same past, the same myths and symbols, etc.).

The tribe constitutes an ethnie endowed with greater self-awareness, and is therefore tied to collective action. This of course is only true if the tribe is conceived not as an aggregation founded on kinship but as a secondary or reactive organization.

The nation too is characterized by collective action. Indeed, unless we accept a naturalist, primordialist or objectivist type of definition for it (in this case it would coincide with ethnie and therefore with mere social action), a nation begins to exist when there is a project oriented towards its affirmation. The purpose of collective action can be the constitution of a state (and often it is), but not necessarily; indeed, it can also be for the recognition of a

cultural, political or economic autonomy of a nation; or more simply, it can be the affirmation of a national identity itself.

Citizenship, in its more legalistic and passive interpretation, could be considered the result of collective action on the part of state elites to induce virtue and civic sense in the population. In its more active meaning though, when referring to what the citizenry (the physical totality of citizens) does to protect its own rights, citizenship could be said to be constituted prevalently by social action when referring to actions of widespread protection of the rights of individual citizens or small groups, and of collective action when it is incarnated in movements of organized citizens aware of having common objectives.

I do not know to what extent this application of the two concepts of social and collective action can help unravel this puzzle. Indeed, it pre-supposes established conventions regarding what is meant by ethnie, tribe, citizenship and nation. But I feel it is important to mention this dimension also along which the four concepts can be positioned, with some advantage in the clarification of their meaning. One way of distinguishing between the terms nation, tribe or ethnie would be to see to what extent their actions/aims entail collective and/or social action.

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3

Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account

Rogers Brubaker

The vast reconfiguration of the East European and Eurasian political landscape, marked by the emergence of some 20 nationally defined successor states in place of the multi-national Soviet and Yugoslav states and bi-national Czechoslovakia, has radically transformed, yet signally failed to solve, the region's long-refractory 'national question'. In some areas—notably Transcaucasia, Moldova, and most of the former Yugoslavia—national struggles have dramatically intensified with the collapse of supranational political authority. Elsewhere, even in the absence of militarized national conflict, the national question remains at the centre of politics, albeit in a new form.

This chapter explores this new phase and form of the national question. Its geographic focus is on the Soviet Union and its successor states; its analytical focus is on institutionalized definitions of nationhood and their political consequences. The institutional crystallizations of nationhood and nationality in the Soviet Union were by no means empty forms or legal fictions, although this was how they were viewed by most Sovietologists. Institutionalized definitions of nationhood, I argue, not only played a major

role in the disintegration of the Soviet state, but continue to shape and structure the national question in the incipient successor states.

This chapter is in two parts. The first part discusses the dual legacy inherited by the successor states from the Soviet encounter with the national question. It focuses on the two very different modes in which nationhood and nationality were institutionalized in the Soviet Union—territorial and political on the one hand, ethno-cultural and personal on the other. The second part discusses the way in which this dual legacy has begun to shape the national question in the successor states.

The argument shares the broad analytic orientations of the 'new institutionalism' in sociology. All social-science institutionalisms, old and new, oppose de-contextualized, atomistic accounts of action; all theorize about 'how social choices are shaped, mediated, and channeled by institutional arrangements' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 2). But by moving beyond a concern with the *institutional contexts of and constraints on interested action to emphasize the institutional constitution of both interests and actors*, the new institutionalism in sociology diverges from the older sociological institutionalism as well as from the new rational-choice institutionalisms of economics and political science (Meyer, 1987; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

It is this emphasis on the constitutive rather than merely constraining role of institutions that informs the present analysis. The Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality comprised a pervasive system of social classification; an organizing 'principle of vision and division' of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990a: 134); a standardized scheme of social accounting, an interpretative grid for public discussion; a set of boundary-markers; a legitimate form for public and private identities; and, when political space expanded under Gorbachev, a readymade template for claims to sovereignty. Institutional definitions of nationhood did not so much constrain action as constitute basic categories of political understanding, central parameters of political rhetoric, specific types of political interest and fundamental forms of political identity. As political space expanded, they made specific types of political action conceivable, plausible, even compelling, transforming the collapse of a regime into the disintegration of a state. And they continue to constitute elementary forms of political understanding and political action in the successor states.

Two caveats may be added here to forestall misunderstanding. First, my argument is about nationhood and nationality as institutionalized cultural and political forms, not about nations as concrete collectivities. To assert and explore the centrality of institutionalized definitions of nationhood to Soviet collapse and successor state politics is not to treat 'nations'—taken as 'real', solidary, internally homogeneous, externally sharply bounded social groups—as the chief protagonist of the Soviet collapse or successor state politics. It is not to reify nations; it is not to treat them as fixed and given; it is not even to pre-suppose that they exist.[1] Soviet and post-Soviet 'national struggles' were and are not the struggles of nations, but the struggles of institutionally constituted national elites, that is, elites institutionally defined as national, and aspiring counter-elites.[2] This paper seeks to show how these struggles were and remain crucially framed, mediated, indeed constituted, by institutionalized definitions of nationhood and nationality.

Second, my argument is about the enduring consequences of Soviet institutional definitions of nationhood, particularly those consequences that have survived the regime itself; it is not about the intentions that guided the architects of Soviet nationality policies. Those policies were intended to do two things: first, to harness, contain, channel and control the potentially disruptive political expressions of nationality by creating national–territorial administrative structures and by cultivating, co-opting and (when they threatened to get out of line) repressing national elites (see, among others, Pipes, 1964; Massell, 1976; Lapidus, 1984; Smith, 1985; Kagedan, 1990; Roeder, 1991), and second, to drain nationality of its content even while legitimating it as a form and thereby promoting the long-term withering away of nationality as a vital component of social life (see, Connor, 1984). The annals of unintended consequences are rich indeed, but seldom have intention and consequence diverged as spectacularly as they have in this case.[3]

The Soviet Legacy

Institutionalized Multi-nationality

The Soviet Union has collapsed, but the contradictory legacy of its unique accommodation to ethno-national heterogeneity lives on.

That accommodation pivoted on *institutionalized multi-nationality*. The Soviet Union was a multi-national state, not only in *ethno-demographic* terms (in terms of the extraordinary ethnic heterogeneity of its population) but, more fundamentally, in *institutional* terms. The Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized the existence of multiple nations and nationalities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry. It codified nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories, sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship.

It is worth underscoring the unprecedented and unparalleled nature of this thorough state-sponsored institutionalization of nationality on a sub-state level. Most of the world's states are ethnically heterogeneous.[4] In some of these states, ethnicity is subjectively experienced and publicly articulated as *nationality*, and ethnic heterogeneity as *national* heterogeneity. In such cases, at least some of the ethnic groups comprising the population (besides the dominant ethnic or national group) understand themselves, or are understood by others, as belonging to distinct nations, nationalities or national groups.[5] This was true, for example, albeit to a limited extent, of the Romanov Empire in its last half-century.

It is not this subjective understanding of ethnicity as nationality that distinguishes the Soviet case from its Romanov predecessor or from other poly-ethnic states. What is distinctive, rather, is the official, objectified codification[6] of ethnic heterogeneity as national heterogeneity. More precisely, it is a *thorough state-sponsored codification and institutionalization of nationhood and nationality exclusively on a sub-state rather than a state-wide level.*[7]

In other cases, where sub-state ethnicity is subjectively experienced as nationhood, the state may refuse to acknowledge, let alone positively institutionalize, this subjective definition, insisting that while the minority group in question may differ in language or religion, it nonetheless belongs fundamentally to the dominant nation (whether this is conceived as an ethnic nation or a state-nation embracing the entire citizenry). This was the case, for example, of the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire after 1867. Although Hungarian speakers comprised only about half of the population, ruling elites insisted—against the increasingly vigorous protests of Romanians, Serbs and (to a lesser extent) Slovaks—that Hungary contained a single nation—the Hungarian nation—with which all citizens, whatever their native language or ethnic origins, were

expected to identify and to which all were expected, eventually, to assimilate (Jaszi, 1929; Seton-Watson, 1977).

In a second variant, the state may acknowledge the subjective claim to sub-state nationhood of a component ethnic group or groups; yet at the same time seek to uphold and institutionalize a more encompassing state-wide sense of nationhood—a definition of the state-wide citizenry as a nation. Thus, while French Canadians or Scots may be acknowledged as members of distinct sub-state nations, their respective states seek to sustain a wider sense of Canadian and British nationhood as well.

In a third variant, the state may accept, more or less grudgingly, the self-designation of a minority ethnic group as a national minority, without seeking, as in the second variant, to define that group as part of a more encompassing state-nation as well. But in this case, the state is usually identified very closely with the dominant nation. It is conceived as a nation-state in the strong sense, that is, as the state of and for a particular nation—and this is despite the fact that its citizenry includes, besides members of that state-bearing, state-legitimating nation, members of national minorities as well. This was the case, for example, of Germans in inter-War Poland and of Hungarians in inter-War Romania. They were recognized as national minorities (as were several other minorities in the 'new Europe' that emerged from the settlement of the First World War), and they were accorded certain specific and limited cultural rights in that capacity by domestic law and international treaties (Macartney, 1934). But ruling elites of the states in which they lived defined those states as nation-states in the strong sense—as the states of and for the Polish and Romanian nations respectively.

The Soviet nationality regime was quite different. To begin with, the Soviet Union was not conceived or institutionalized as a nation-state. This was not the inevitable and automatic consequence of the *degree* of ethnic heterogeneity: many highly polyethnic states—including most post-colonial states of Asia and Africa—claim to be, or aspire to become, nation-states (see, for instance, Young 1976, Chapter 3; Smith, 1983, 1986). It rather resulted from the *form* in which ethnic heterogeneity was institutionalized and the manner in which ethnic nationality was aligned with the organization of public life.

Soviet elites might have sought to organize the same territories and peoples as a nation-state—as a Soviet nation-state, founded on an emergent Soviet nation, or as a Russian nation-state. But they did neither. On the one hand, Soviet rulers never elaborated the idea of a *Soviet* nation. To be sure, they did seek to inculcate a state-wide Soviet identity, and in the sixties and seventies they developed the doctrine of the 'Soviet People' (*sovetskii narod*) as a 'new historical community'. But this emergent entity was explicitly conceived as supranational, not national.[8] The supranational Soviet people were consistently distinguished from the individual sub-state Soviet nations. Nationhood remained the prerogative of sub-state ethno-national groups; it was never predicated of the state-wide citizenry.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was never organized, in theory or in practice, as a *Russian* nation-state. Russians were indeed the dominant nationality, effectively controlling key party and state institutions, and Russian was promoted by the state as its lingua franca (see, Motyl, 1987). But this did not make the state a Russian nation-state any more than the dominance of Germans and the use of German as a lingua franca made the Austrian half of the Habsburg Empire a German nation-state. A whole series of features of the Soviet nationality regime—some of which are discussed in greater detail later—were radically incompatible with the organizational model of the nation-state. These included the Soviet system of ethno-territorial federalism; the elaborate codification of, and pervasive significance attached to, personal nationality; the cultivation of a large number of distinct national intelligentsias; the cultivation of distinct national cadres allowed, for the most part, to live and work in 'their own' national territories (see, Roeder, 1991); the deliberate policy of nation-building aimed at the consolidation of non-Russian nations pursued in the twenties and early thirties (Simon, 1991, Chapters 2 and 3); the cultivation and codification of a large number of national languages; and the development of an elaborate system of schooling, including higher education, in non-Russian languages (Pool, 1978).

Thus, the Soviet Union was neither conceived in theory nor organized in practice as a nation-state. Yet, while it did not define the state or citizenry as a *whole* in national terms, it did define component *parts* of the state and the citizenry in national terms. Herein lies the distinctiveness of the Soviet nationality regime—its

unprecedented displacement of nationhood and nationality as organizing principles of the social and political order from the state-wide to the sub-state level. No other state has gone so far in sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing, even (in some cases) inventing nationhood and nationality at the sub-state level while at the same time doing nothing to institutionalize them at the level of the state as a whole.[9]

Ethno-territorial Federalism and Personal Nationality

This institutionalization of nationhood and nationality had two independent aspects. One concerned the territorial organization of politics and administration; the other concerned the classification of persons. The Soviet system of ethno-territorial federalism divided the territory of the state into a complex, four-tiered set of national territories endowed with varying degrees of autonomy, and correspondingly more or less elaborate political and administrative institutions.

At the top level of the ethno-territorial hierarchy, which concerns us here, were the 15 union republics, each bearing the name of a particular national group[10] (and corresponding to today's independent successor states).[11] Constitutionally characterized as sovereign, the union republics enjoyed, on paper, a broad set of powers including the right to secede from the union, the right to enter into relations with foreign states, and the authority to coordinate and control production and administration in their territory.

In practice, of course, centralized party and ministerial control sharply, although variably, limited the sphere of effective republic autonomy. But the significance of the republics as institutional crystallizations of nationhood lay less in the constitutional fictions of sovereignty, statehood and autonomy—symbolically potent and self-actualizing though they proved to be under Gorbachev—than in the durable institutional frame the republics provided for the long-term cultivation and consolidation of national administrative cadres and intelligentsias (periodic purges notwithstanding), and for the long-term protection and cultivation of national languages and cultures (the promotion of Russian as a lingua franca notwithstanding).

Complementing and cross-cutting this elaborate and distinctive system of ethno-territorial federalism was an equally elaborate and

distinctive system of personal nationality. While the former divided the territory of the state into a set of national jurisdictions, the latter divided the population of the state into an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of national groups, over a 100 in all, 22 with more than a million members. Ethnic nationality (*national 'nost'*) was not only a *statistical category* (a fundamental unit of social accounting employed in censuses and other social surveys), it was, more distinctively, an obligatory and mainly ascriptive *legal category* (a key element of an individual's legal status). As such, it was registered in internal passports and other personal documents, transmitted by descent, and recorded in almost all bureaucratic encounters and official transactions.[12] In some contexts, notably admission to higher education and application for certain types of employment, legal nationality significantly shaped life chances, both negatively (especially for Jews)[13] and positively (for 'titular' nationalities[14] in the non-Russian republics who benefited from mainly tacit 'affirmative action' or preferential treatment policies).

This dual—and unprecedentedly thorough—institutionalization of nationhood and nationality at the sub-state level was effected through state action. Yet, it was not intended by state actors. It resulted rather from the unforeseen and unintended persistence over time of a set of institutional arrangements cobbled together in an ad hoc fashion as tactical responses to urgent situational imperatives (Gleason, 1990). Lenin, long opposed to ethno-territorial federalism (or any other kind) on principle, embraced it as expedient in the aftermath of the Bolshevik seizure of power, believing it a necessary and effective means of reconstituting shattered state authority and cementing political loyalty in the ethnic borderlands, and expecting it to be a temporary transitional arrangement.[15] In his belief he was correct; in expectation, mistaken.

Still less was it intended or foreseen that personal legal nationality would become an enduring ascribed status or an important determinant of life chances. Nationality as an official component of personal status was introduced in 1932 as one of a number of elements contained in the newly instituted system of internal passports. That system was central to the neo-feudal ties that bound the coercively recruited labour force of the new collective farms to the land; more generally, it was central to the control and regulation of migration (see, Zaslavsky and Luryi, 1979). But it was the passport system as such, and not the legal nationality

encoded on it along with other information, that was crucial for this purpose. Indeed, the passport based regulation and coercive control of labour supply and internal migration could have been effected just as easily without the encoding of nationality. The later uses of official nationality were unrelated to the original purposes for which internal passports were created.

It was thus through an irony of history, through the unintended consequences of a variety of ad hoc regime policies, that nationality became and remained a basic institutional building block of the avowedly internationalist, supranationalist and anti-nationalist Soviet state, with land partitioned into a set of bounded national territories, the polity comprising in part of a set of formally sovereign national republics and the citizenry divided into a set of legally codified nationalities.

Territorial and Ethno-cultural Models of Nationhood

The dual scheme of ethno-territorial federalism and personal nationality employed the same set of national categories. That is, the same categories were attached to territorial polities and to personal nationalities. There were, to be sure, far more of the latter, for the national classification of the citizenry included numerous small nationalities to whom no separate national territory was assigned.[16] But of the 53 national territories, almost all bore the names of one or more of the nationalities into which the Soviet citizenry had been divided. There was thus a correspondence, usually one-to-one, between particular national territorial jurisdictions and particular nationalities, that is, between Ukraine as a national territory and Ukrainian as a personal nationality, between Estonia as a territory and Estonian as a nationality, and so on.

Yet, while the national–territorial jurisdictions *corresponded* with the nationalities for which they were named, the two were neither legally nor spatially nor even conceptually *congruent*. The jurisdiction of the national republics was territorially, not personally, circumscribed. They had jurisdiction over certain matters occurring in their bounded territories, regardless of the nationality of the persons living in those territories. On the other hand, the nationality of persons did not depend on their place of residence. Personal nationality was an autonomous classification scheme,

based on descent, not residence. It had no territorial component whatsoever. Moreover, vast and largely state-sponsored migrations, some ethno-demographically arbitrary administrative boundaries and the sheer impossibility of constructing ethno-demographically 'clean' frontiers in areas of historically mixed settlement (Birch, 1987) combined to engender a major mismatch between the frontiers of national territories and the spatial distribution of nationalities.[17] A substantial fraction of the population of most national territories belonged to 'non-titular', that is, conceptually 'external' nationalities; conversely, a substantial fraction of the population of most national groups lived outside 'their own' national territories.

The Soviet scheme of institutionalized multi-nationality was characterized not only by a legal incongruence and spatial mismatch between its two components—national territories and personal nationalities—but also by a fundamental tension, at once conceptual and political, between two independent, even incompatible, definitions of nationhood: one territorial and political, the other personal and ethno-cultural. This tension is an old one, long familiar to students of comparative nationalism (see, Kohn, 1944; Szucs, 1974; Schieder, 1985; Smith, 1986). Usually, however, these opposed understandings of nationhood are associated with differing countries or regions. What is interesting, and distinctive, about the Soviet nationality regime was the simultaneous institutionalization of both conventionally opposed definitions of nationhood.

By one definition, the nation is a territorially bounded and self-governing collectivity, a collectivity pervasively shaped, indeed *constituted*, by its territorial and political frame. Nationhood, in this view, is both conceptually and causally dependent on political territory. Not every territorial polity is a nation; but nationhood, at least its full realization, requires the form and frame of a territorial polity. Nationhood—at least fully realized nationhood—is an emergent property of certain territorial polities.

This understanding of nationhood captured well the historical experience of Western European state-nations incubating and emerging within the protective and powerfully shaping territorial and institutional frame of large, yet culturally relatively homogeneous, territorial states. But in its stronger version—according to which political territory is essential not simply for the full realization but for the mere existence of nationhood—it did not capture well the historical experience of Central and Eastern Europe.

There, political units were either much smaller than cultural units—as in the dense, urban belts of statelets, principalities, city-states and free cities along trans-Alpine medieval trade routes from the Mediterranean to the Rhine (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983)—or much larger than cultural units, as in the great multi-national empires of the Ottomans, Habsburgs and Romanovs. In the context of this radical discrepancy of scale between political authority and cultural commonality, a different conception of nationhood emerged. By this alternative view, the nation is neither conceptually nor causally dependent on political territory. The nation is an ethno-cultural community, typically a community of language. It might span several political units (as in the case of pre-unification Germany or Italy), or it might be contained in a much larger political structure (as in the case of the 'non-historic' ethno-linguistic nations—for example, Slovaks and Slovenes—within the Hapsburg Empire).[18]

The gap between the territorial–political and ethno-cultural models of nationhood, to be sure, is not unbridgeable (Smith, 1986, Chapter 6). Under the standardizing, homogenizing influence of the modern 'citizen-mobilizing and citizen-influencing' state (Hobsbawm, 1990: 83), territorial polities may shape their citizenries into relatively homogenous cultural communities. And from a very different starting point, state-spanning or intrastate ethno-cultural nations may attain statehood, or at least territorial political autonomy within a wider state, and thus acquire a territorial and institutional frame.

In regions with highly inter-mixed ethno-cultural communities, however, where political borders cannot be drawn to coincide with ethno-cultural frontiers, the territorial–political and ethno-cultural models of nationhood are not so easily reconciled. Widely dispersed ethno-cultural nations, as well as those that overlap with other ethno-cultural nations in inextricable inter-mixed frontier 'shatter zones', cannot be neatly 'territorialized', cannot easily acquire their own territorial states. And territorial polities that include substantial and self-conscious national minorities cannot, in the age of nationalism, be easily 'nationalized', that is, nationally homogenized. Thus, in both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, ethnically mixed populations, increasingly resistant to assimilation by the late nineteenth century, prevented a full convergence of the territorial–political and ethno-cultural models of

nationhood. A persisting tension between the two and between corresponding proposals for national autonomy is evident in the history of the national question in both empires (Kann, 1950, Vol. 2; Pipes, 1964, Chapter 1).

The Duality of Soviet Nationhood

Tensions and Contradictions: The Soviet nationality regime institutionalized both models of nationhood, as well as the tension between them. Nations, as we have seen, were defined simultaneously in territorial and political terms (as national republics) and in extra-territorial, cultural terms (as nationalities). Had the nationalities lived exclusively in 'their own' national republics, the two definitions would have been congruent. But this was far from being the case when the system of ethno-territorial federalism was established, and even less so after the massive state-sponsored and state-imposed migrations associated with industrialization, collectivization and war.[19] At the time of the 1989 Census, more than 73 million Soviet citizens, a quarter of the total Soviet population, lived outside 'their own' national territory (or belonged to small nationalities without a national territory of their own). To give just a few examples: 17 per cent of all Russians—25 million in all—lived outside the Russian Republic; another 12 million lived in non-Russian national territories inside the Russian Republic. One-third of all Armenians lived outside Armenia, while nearly three-fourths of all Tatars—nearly 5 million in all—lived outside the Tatar Autonomous Republic (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Statistike, 1991; Lewis, 1992).

The tensions arising from this dual and non-congruent institutionalization of nationhood were attenuated by the strict limits the Soviet regime placed on nationalism. Nations were to be seen but not heard; culture (and, one might add, politics and administration as well) was to be 'national in form but socialist in content'.[20] The more purely formal the national categories—that is, the smaller their substantive social significance—the less the lack of congruence between the territorial frame and the personal substrate of nationhood would matter. In extreme cases, it would not matter at all whether, and to what degree, Soviet citizens lived in 'their own' national republics or elsewhere, for the republics would be national in name only: what was nominally 'their own' national republic would in fact be no more 'their own' than any other.

For many, perhaps most, Sovietologists, this hypothetical limiting case came close to describing Soviet reality. Dominant currents within Sovietology either ignored nationality altogether or dismissed it as an ideological facade bearing little or no relation to 'real' social and political structures. Yet, as more perspicuous analysts recognized even well before the Gorbachev era, nationality was not a purely formal construct, an ideological fig leaf, existing only on paper. It *was* of course a formal construct, an institutional form, and as such it powerfully shaped Soviet society. The repression of political nationalism was compatible with the pervasive institutionalization of nationhood and nationality as fundamental social categories. Nationalists' complaints—and Stalin's murderous policies—notwithstanding, the regime had no systematic policy of 'nation-destroying'.[21] It might have abolished national republics and ethno-territorial federalism;[22] it might have abolished the legal category of personal nationality;[23] it might have ruthlessly Russified the Soviet educational system; and it might have forcibly uprooted peripheral elites and prevented them from making careers in 'their own' republics;[24] yet, it did none of these. The repression of nationalism went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of nationhood and nationality.[25]

The tensions arising from the dual institutionalization of nationality and from the non-congruence between national territories and ethno-cultural nations were indeed attenuated by the repression of nationalism. The problem of irredentism, for example, which might have been nourished by the mismatch between territorial and ethno-cultural frontiers did not arise; popular demands for such ethno-nationally rectificatory border changes were excluded from the universe of legitimate political discourse.[26] But tensions associated with the dual definition of nationhood, although attenuated, were not eliminated.

The institution of national republics, for example defined as the states of and for particular nations, legitimated the preferential treatment of members of the 'titular', nominally state-bearing nationalities, especially in higher education and employment. While such preferential treatment, under the name of *korenizatsia* or 'nativization', was an explicit policy of the Soviet centre only in the twenties and early thirties, local patterns of preferential treatment for titular nationalities persisted and were generally tolerated by the centre. Definition of the republics as national states also

legitimated the promotion of the language of the titular nationality —not at the expense of Russian, which the Soviet regime vigorously promoted as a union-wide lingua franca, but at the expense of the other non-Russian languages spoken by non-titulars living in a republic.

Despite their favoured access to positions defined by the regime as 'strategic' or 'sensitive', and despite the privileges they enjoyed as a result of the special union-wide status of the Russian language, the Russian (and, more broadly, Russophone) residents of non-Russian republics resented the affirmative action programmes designed to further the educational and professional chances of titular nationalities (see, for instance, Karklins, 1986). At the same time, the titular nationalities resented the key positions reserved for Russian (and Russophone) immigrants and the key role accorded to the Russian language.

These mutual resentments stemmed from the dual definition of nationhood—territorial–political and cultural–personal—and from two corresponding conceptions of national autonomy. Here we can extend and enrich the characterization given earlier by linking conceptions of nationhood to conceptions of national autonomy. In one view, the fundamental parameters of nationhood are territorial. Political territory provides the frame of the nation, fixes the arena of its autonomy and defines the domain of its dominance. The subject of autonomy, in this view, is a unit of territorial administration. Autonomy means that the territorial units 'belong' to the nations whose names they bear. They can legitimately be 'filled up' with a particular national language and culture. In effect, an updated version of the formula *cuius regio, eius religio* applies. That formula, which dates from the era of religious wars in post-Reformation Central Europe, permitted the rulers of principalities or territorial states (a great profusion of which existed in Central Europe) to determine the religion of their own territories to 'fill up' their territories with a particular religion. Persons of another confession could convert or emigrate. Religious pluralism was thus institutionalized in Central Europe, but religious monism was institutionalized within each territorial unit. Religion, in effect, was territorialized. Similarly, in the territorial view of nationhood, national–cultural pluralism finds legitimate expression in the differences between territorial polities, but national–cultural homogeneity should prevail within each territorial polity. The telos of the

national territories is to become fully nationalized, that is, filled up with a homogeneous national culture. The welter of national cultures adjusts to fit the fixed frame of territorial polities. Culture and territory eventually converge (see, Gellner, 1983).

In an alternative view, nations cannot be adequately encapsulated or defined by the fixed and more or less arbitrarily drawn frontiers of ostensibly national territories. Even if territorial frontiers could be 'correctly' drawn at a given moment, the momentary match between the division of territory and the distribution of persons would not endure; for nations are inherently mobile and dynamic, and their spatial configuration changes over time with the migration of their members. Nations are fundamentally groups of persons, not stretches of territory. The proper subject of national autonomy is not a nominally national–territorial polity but the nation itself, that is, a particular group of persons. Nationality is carried by persons, not inscribed in a territory; it is consequently portable, not territorially fixed. National autonomy requires not the convergence of territorial administration and national culture, but their independence; it requires cultural rights—in the spheres of education, cultural facilities and the language of public life—for members of nations wherever they live.[27]

Elements of both models, as we have seen, were institutionalized in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the land of the state was divided into national polities that were permitted, to some extent, to 'fill up' their territories with a particular national culture. On the other hand, the population was divided into non-territorial national groups, whose nationality was independent of their place of residence. But neither model was realized in full. Territorial autonomy was not carried through because of the special role reserved by the centre for Russians and the Russian language. Extra-territorial cultural autonomy was not carried through (except for Russians) because of the leeway afforded to national republics to 'nationalize' their territories (with the exception noted for Russians and the Russian language).

Moreover, neither principle could have been more fully realized without violating the other. To have instituted cultural autonomy for non-Russians living in republics other than 'their own' would have alienated the titular elites of those republics and further infringed their ability to 'fill up' their territories with their particular national culture. To have increased the territorial autonomy of

the republics, allowing them to more fully 'nationalize' their territories, would have eroded the extra-territorial cultural autonomy enjoyed throughout the union by Russians. Tensions between territorial and ethno-cultural nationhood, and between territorial and extra-territorial national autonomy, were endemic to the Soviet nationality regime.

The Successor States

Soviet Disintegration: From Break-down to Break-up

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the legacy of its dual institutional crystallization of nationhood and nationality passed to the successor states. The break-up itself, it should be emphasized, was shaped by the territorial–political crystallization of nationhood, not by the ethno-cultural definition. The key actors in the drama of disintegration—besides the fragmented political and military elites at the centre—were the institutionally empowered elites of the national republics, including, crucially from late 1990 onwards, those of the Russian Republic (see Roeder, 1991; Lapidus, 1992). Disintegration occurred through intensifying jurisdictional struggles between the centre and the national republics,[28] in which the latter were increasingly emboldened by the deepening divisions within and immobilization of the former.

Not only the gradual break-down of effective Soviet statehood, but also the final break-up of the state into 15 incipient, internationally recognized successor states was crucially framed and structured by the territorial–political crystallization of nationhood in the form of national republics. That this paradigmatically massive state could disappear in so comparatively orderly a fashion, ceasing to exist as a subject of international law and withering away as a unit of administration was possible chiefly because the successor units already existed as internal quasi-nation-states, with fixed territories, names, legislatures, administrative staff, cultural and political elites and, not least, the constitutionally enshrined right to secede from the Soviet Union (it is one of the many ironies of the Soviet break-up that it was decisively facilitated by what regime leaders and Western commentators alike had long dismissed as constitutional fiction).

The dual role played by the Russian Republic in the break-up is worth underscoring. On the one hand, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was one national republic among others, formally co-ordinate with them and allied with them in their jurisdictional struggles against the centre. That alliance—dramatized by Yelstin's trip to Tallinn in January 1991, immediately after the military crackdown in Vilnius, to condemn the attack and to appeal to Russian soldiers to refuse to fire on civilians—strengthened the position of the republics. On the other hand, because of its preponderant size and (by comparison with other national republics) its much weaker spatial, ethno-cultural and institutional differentiation from the Soviet centre, the RSFSR represented (as the other national republics did not) a potential alternative centre rather than simply a peripheral contender for autonomy from the centre. The high degree of overlap between the RSFSR and the union—the fact that the great majority of key union facilities and institutions were located on Russian territory (if not formally subject to Russian jurisdiction) and the fact that Soviet elites, in their great majority, were either Russian by nationality or long-standing residents of the RSFSR or both—made it relatively easy for central Soviet military and bureaucratic elites to reorient themselves to the RSFSR at pivotal moments, especially during and immediately after the coup attempt. The jurisdictional struggles of the RSFSR against the Soviet centre were therefore two-sided, oriented on the one hand to *weakening* the centre and distributing its powers to the national republics, and on the other hand to *capturing* the centre and taking over its powers (Report on the USSR, 1991, Vol. 3[4]: 28–29; Kionka, 1991; Rahr, 1991; Foye, 1992).

Contrasting sharply with the central role played by the elites of the territorial–political nations—that is, the national republics—in the break-up of the Soviet state was the marginal role played by actors representing ethno-cultural nations or nation-fragments. The centre made some efforts to mobilize them—especially the Russians living in the non-Russian republics—by emphasizing the ethno-political dangers of independence for those living outside 'their own' national territory. Yet, while the ethno-cultural groups to whom such appeals were addressed were institutionally defined in national terms (by the legal institution of extra-territorial personal nationality, and the associated social practices and cultural

attitudes), they were not institutionally organized or empowered. As a result, although some action (for example, strikes protesting republican language laws) occurred in the name of ethno-national communities, they were not capable of the kind of sustained, organized, institutionally framed and legitimated action that the national republics could undertake; and they remained marginal to the jurisdictional struggles that pitted elites of the republics—including, crucially, the Russian Republic—against those of decaying central institutions.

Yet, while the ethno-cultural crystallization of nationhood, unlike the territorial–political crystallization, did not figure centrally in the jurisdictional struggles through which pre-defined, deeply institutionalized national territorial polities asserted claims to progressively higher degrees of 'stateness' against a divided and immobilized centre, the ethno-cultural definition of nationhood—and the associated tangle of issues that I call the 'ethno-national complex'—will figure centrally, indeed already is figuring centrally, as the successor states move towards consolidating the formally independent statehood to which they so suddenly acceded.

The National Question in the Successor States

The successor states to the Soviet Union—and to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as well—were at the time of writing this paper merely *emergent* or *incipient* states. Their juridical independence had been widely recognized, but their sociological 'stateness' remained to be established. The form of their statehood, even the fact of their durable statehood, was not yet settled. They were states-in-the-making.

Questions of citizenship and nationhood, broadly understood, are among the core aspects of statehood that remain unsettled and vigorously contested. Among the still unsettled, and unsettling, questions are the following: Who 'belongs', by formal citizenship or in some other sense or status, to the state? What circle of persons comprises, or should comprise, the citizenry of the state? To what extent should citizenship depend on, and coincide with, ethno-cultural nationality? Are there others, outside the circle of formal citizens—for example, co-ethnics in other states—who have special claims on the state, and in whose fate the state will take a special

interest? Conversely, are there some inside the circle of formal citizens who are not full members or citizens in a substantive sense? And what *kind* of citizenship will the state institutionalize? Will citizenship be held individually or will it be mediated, in some form, by ethnic or national group membership? Will the rights of citizenship consist solely of individual rights or will they include group or collective rights as well?

A similar set of unsettled questions clusters around the issue of nationhood or nationality. In what sense is the new state to be a nation-state or a national state? If the state is understood as the state of and for a particular nation, how is the nation in question defined? Is it understood as a civic nation, defined and delimited by the legal and political status of citizenship and consisting of the sum of the citizens of the state? Or is it understood as an ethno-cultural nation, defined independently of the state and not necessarily co-extensive with its citizenry? In the latter case, how will the principle of nationality or national self-determination, on which the successor states base their claims to legitimacy, be reconciled with the practices of democratic citizenship, to the idea of which successor state elites make uniform obeisance?

A comprehensive exploration of these questions would far exceed the scope of this chapter.[29] My discussion here will focus on the way in which the legacy of the dual Soviet institutional crystallization of nationality is likely to shape the national question—and notably the questions of citizenship and nationhood enumerated earlier—in the emerging successor states. To keep the discussion manageable, I consider here only one aspect of the national question, albeit one that is central to its overall configuration in post-Soviet Eurasia. This is the pervasive tension between incipient national states harbouring substantial national minorities and the external 'homeland' states to which these minorities 'belong' by ethno-national affiliation but not legal citizenship. Actually, this pervasive tension involves not two but three parties: (*a*) a set of new states, ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees and in varying manners) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation; (*b*) the substantial, self-conscious and (in varying degrees) organized and politically alienated national minorities in those states, whose leaders demand cultural and territorial

autonomy and resist actual or perceived policies or processes of assimilation or discrimination; and (*c*) the external national 'homelands' of these minorities, whose elites (again to varying degrees) closely monitor the situation of their co-ethnics in the new states, vigorously protest alleged violations of their rights and assert the right, even the obligation, to defend their interests.

This triangular relationship between incipient nation-state, national minority and external national homeland is replicated in varying configurations throughout post-Soviet Eurasia. For reasons of space though, I will consider only one class of cases: those involving Russian minorities (and Russia as the external national homeland). This class includes almost all the successor states, for all except Armenia have, or have had, substantial Russian minorities (more than 5 per cent of their population in 1989). There are evident reasons for focusing on Russia and the Russians. Represented by contenders for power as an unjustly truncated, humiliated great power, Russia is a potentially revisionist state. While other successor states too are potentially revisionist, and may be more likely than Russia to be drawn into wars with their neighbours, the presence of nearly 25 million Russians in non-Russian successor states, the enormous military power of Russia and the uniquely radical decline in status experienced both by the new Russian minorities and by key segments of Russian elites in Russia would make a revisionist Russia potentially a much graver threat than the other successor states to regional and even global security.

In the dynamic inter-play between these three elements—the newly nationalizing non-Russian successor states, their large Russian minorities and the Russian state—the contingency inherent in political action, especially when the 'very parameters of political action are in flux' (O'Donell and Schmitter, 1986: 4) will play a key role.[30] Yet, without adopting a determinist stance, I want to specify the way in which the broad contours of this inter-play will be structured by the institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality regime.

Consider first the situation of the newly nationalizing successor states—ethnically heterogeneous, yet conceiving themselves as nation-states. Clearly, their prior institutional incarnation as Soviet republics laid the foundations not only for their independent statehood but also for their self-understanding as specifically *national* states. Their explicit *raison d'être* in the Soviet scheme was to

serve as the institutional vehicles for national self-determination. They were explicitly defined as the republics *of* and *for* the nations for whom they were named.

Thus, despite their ethnic heterogeneity—extreme by comparison to Western European national states—the Soviet republics understood themselves, and were supposed to understand themselves, as national polities. But national in what sense? Here we can extend and refine the argument that the Soviet regime institutionalized both territorial–political and personal–ethno-cultural models of nationhood as well as the tensions between them. The Soviet territorial–political definition of nationhood not only—as I argued earlier—stood in *tension* with the personal–ethno-cultural definition, but *pre-supposed* that alternative definition. The relation between the two institutional crystallizations was asymmetrical. Ethno-cultural nationhood did not depend on the existence of national republics; but the national republics did depend on—indeed their very existence was predicated on—the existence of ethno-cultural nations.

The republics were defined as the polities of and for particular nations; these nations were explicitly understood as prior to and independent of the polities whose creation they legitimated. The national republics did not (as the strong territorial–political model of nationhood requires) *constitute* 'their' nations; rather, independently existing nations were given 'their own' territorial polities. Even the territorial–political crystallization of nationhood in the Soviet Union, therefore, pre-supposed the existence of ethno-cultural nations defined independently of them and imperfectly 'contained' by them. There was indeed, as we argued earlier, a tension between the territorial–political and ethno-cultural crystallizations of nationhood. But the latter was clearly the more fundamental concept in the Soviet scheme. That scheme began by recognizing, and crystallizing in institutional form, the existence of ethno-cultural nationalities. Then, the larger and more compact nationalities were endowed with their own national republics. The nationalities 'possessed' their respective territorial republics rather than being constituted by them.

The Soviet regime, then, deliberately constructed the republics as national polities 'belonging' to the nations whose names they bore. At the same time, the Soviets severely limited the domain in which the republics were autonomous. They institutionalized a

sense of 'ownership' of the republics by ethno-cultural nations, but they limited the political consequences of that sense of ownership.[31] Ethno-cultural nations were given their own political territories, but not the power to rule them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sense of ethno-national entitlement and ownership of national territory persists, but is now joined to substantial powers of rule. Successor state elites can use these new powers to 'nationalize' their states, to make them more concretely the polities of and for the ethno-cultural nations whose names they bear. This they can do by promoting the language, culture, demographic predominance, economic welfare and political hegemony of the state-bearing nation. Such policies and programmes of nationalization, oriented to an ethno-cultural nation distinct from the total population or total citizenry of the state, are likely to be politically profitable—and in some cases politically irresistible—in the new states, in considerable part because of the institutionalized expectations of 'ownership' that the successor states inherited from the Soviet nationality regime.

I do not mean to suggest that successor state politics will be uniformly driven or dominated by such programmes of ethnic 'nationalization'. Successor state elites do have certain incentives to pursue civically inclusive, trans-ethnic state- and nation-building strategies, oriented to the citizenry as a whole rather than to one ethno-nationally qualified segment of that citizenry. Such incentives may be provided by international organizations or by economically, politically or militarily powerful states that are perceived by successor state elites as likely to be significantly more favourably inclined towards successor states whose domestic politics they perceive as civic rather than ethnocratic.

How powerful will this 'discipline' imposed by external audiences turn out to be? No doubt its strength will vary greatly across successor states, and over time and context. In general, though, it is likely that the discipline imposed by Western states and European organizations, although significant in the immediate aftermath of independence, will erode rapidly as the successor states are disappointed in their hopes for major economic assistance. What about the discipline imposed by powerful neighbouring states, above all by Russia? Will the anticipated sanctions, positive and negative, offered by Russia significantly shape the politics of citizenship and nationhood in the non-Russian successor states? No doubt the

proximity of the (potential) enormously powerful Russian state as well as the presence of large Russian minorities in the successor states, other things being equal, would lead prudent successor state elites to avoid alienating their Russian minorities (and provoking the Russian state) by an overzealous programme of nationalization. Considerations of this sort are doubtless partly responsible for the moderate, conciliatory, inclusive stance taken so far in questions of citizenship and nationhood by the rulers of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, whose Russian populations are not only by far the largest in absolute numbers among the successor states (11.4 million and 6.2 million respectively), but also the most deeply rooted and the most significant from the point of view of the Russian state. Moreover, a strong emphasis on the need for improved economic ties with Russia helped return to power the former Lithuanian Communist Party and its chairman Algirdas Brazavskas in legislature and presidential elections of late 1992 and early 1993. But prudential considerations did not deter Estonia and Latvia from pursuing restrictive politics of citizenship, although their diminutive size and the presence of Russian soldiers on their territory make them much more vulnerable than Ukraine or Kazakhstan (Brubaker, 1992). Nor is there any guarantee that such counsels of prudence will continue to guide elites in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Indeed, the presence of large Russian minorities and the proximity of the powerful Russian state may—given the institutional legacy of Soviet nationality policy—work to exacerbate rather than attenuate ethnic nationalism in the successor states.

Russians as a National Minority

To see how this might occur, let us shift our focus from the first to the second element of our tripartite scheme: from the incipient successor states to the national minorities within those states. The first point to underscore is that their quality as specifically *national* minorities is not an objective fact of ethnic demography but a subjective precipitate of their self-understanding, as channelled and shaped by the national scheme of social classification that was so pervasively institutionalized in the Soviet Union. Ethnic minorities think of themselves as members of distinct nations or nationalities because this is the way they learned to think of themselves under

the Soviet regime. This is not merely a terminological matter; it has political implications. Minority elites will tend to represent the minority as *belonging to a different nation* rather than the members of the 'titular', nominally state-bearing nation amongst or alongside of whom they live. This will tend to be true even where, as is the case in many instances, inter-marriage and assimilation, from a sociological point of view, have blurred the boundaries between the nations that are represented as distinct.

This tendency for ethnic minorities to define themselves in national terms holds *a fortiori* for the Russians living in non-Russian successor states. They were accustomed, under the Soviet regime, not only of thinking of themselves subjectively in national terms as Russians, but to enjoying a public existence as Russians, with full cultural and educational facilities and with full recognition of Russian as *a*, if not *the*, language of public life. Except where emigration is rapidly depleting the Russian communities (mainly in Central Asia, excluding northern and eastern Kazakhstan), many Russians in the successor states will want to retain, in some form, the public status and public rights they enjoyed under the old regime. They will seek a form of citizenship that is mediated by nationality, that is, by membership to an ethno-cultural group. They will be suspicious of liberal forms of citizenship, in which rights attach directly to individuals and group membership has no public significance, for they will see such formal, liberal models as ideological masks for substantive ethnocratic forms of rule assuring the cultural predominance and political hegemony of the dominant, state-bearing nation, and disregarding what they regard as the public, collective rights of ethno-cultural minorities.

Under the Soviet regime, the public status, linguistic privilege and cultural facilities enjoyed by the Russians throughout the Soviet Union meant that Russians tended to think of the entire union, rather than only the Russian Republic, as 'their' national territory. The Russian Republic, in this sense, held less significance for Russians than other national republics did for their corresponding nationalities. With the loss of this wider home territory, Russians living in territorially concentrated settlements in the successor states are likely to seek to redefine areas of the successor states, in which they form a local majority or plurality, as 'their own' territories by demanding some form of territorial autonomy in those areas (including, most significantly, northern and eastern Kazakhstan,

Moldova east of the Dniester River, northeastern Estonia, and parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, notably Crimea).

These demands of Russian (and other) national minorities for collective public rights and (where plausible) territorial autonomy, both shaped by the institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality regime, directly challenge successor state elites' claims to unitary 'ownership' of what they regard as 'their own' polities and territories. Such demands are easily perceived by successor state elites as threatening and fundamentally illegitimate, even if political prudence dictates that limited concessions be made to them. Minorities' demands for collective rights or territorial autonomy may render them vulnerable to charges of equivocal loyalty or even outright disloyalty. Although they belong, formally, to the citizenry of the state, they may be excluded, substantively, from taken-for-granted membership of the state-bearing nation. Minorities' self-definition as members of distinct nations and their claims for public rights in that capacity may thus reinforce the 'ethnicist' self-understanding and ethnocratic practices of successor state elites, may reinforce their tendency to define their own nations in ethno-cultural rather than civic–territorial terms and to rule their states with the interests of that ethno-cultural nation in mind. This can be true even where successor state elites formally define their statehood and citizenship in liberal terms; for as minorities correctly suspect, formally liberal and ethnically neutral definitions of statehood and citizenship may, in an ethnically heterogeneous state in which state-bearing majority and minority or minorities understand themselves as belonging to distinct ethno-cultural nations, mask a substantively ethnocratic organization of public life.

Reconstructing Russia

To round out this sketch of the ethno-national nexus of successor state politics, we turn to the third element of our triangular scheme—the Russian state. Under the Soviet regime, as we noted earlier, Russians tended to think of the entire union rather than only the Russian Republic as 'their own' territory, as the space in which they could live and work *as Russians*.[32] They did not think of the institutions of the Russian Republic as 'their own'. On the one hand, the Russian Republic was institutionally underdeveloped: it

lacked key institutions found in other Soviet republics. On the other hand Russians, despite their privileged position outside the Russian Republic, paradoxically felt underprivileged inside Russia. Much of the vast territory of the Russian Republic was formally allocated to non-Russian nationalities as their national homelands—16 'autonomous republics' and 15 lower-level autonomous national formations in 1989, all designated as the national territories of and for particular non-Russian nationalities and together comprising more than half of the territory of the RSFSR (calculated from *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 1970, Vol. 22). And nationally minded Russians complained of Russian under-representation (especially vis-à-vis Jews) in what were nominally 'their own' institutions, leading Russian nationalists to campaign in the last few years on the slogan of proportional representation for Russians even in the RSFSR![33]

In the Soviet era, then, Russians' national self-understanding was not firmly embedded in, or contained by, the territorial and institutional frame of the Russian Republic. The Russian Republic was not for Russians what other national republics were for their corresponding nationalities. Elites of other nationalities viewed 'their own' national polities as broadly adequate territorial and institutional frames for national statehood, and pursued greater autonomy or outright independence within those frames. But significant segments of the Russian elite did not view the Russian Republic as an even broadly adequate territorial and institutional frame for Russian national statehood. As a result, the core institutional parameters of the emerging Russian state—territorial boundaries, internal state structure, demographic composition—are in even greater flux and even more vigorously contested than those of most incipient non-Russian successor states (see, Koroteyeva, 1992).

The mismatch between ethno-cultural nation and citizenry is central to this unsettled situation. Twenty-five million Russians lived (in 1989) in non-Russian Soviet republics. Despite a substantial migration to Russia since then (mainly from the Central Asian republics), the vast majority of these remain in the incipient successor states.[34] They are not Russian citizens; indeed, the large majority (except in Estonia and Latvia) are, legally speaking, citizens of the emerging non-Russian successor states. But they are definitely considered members of the Russian nation by elites in

Russia. As such, they are viewed as legitimate, even obligatory, objects of concern on the part of the Russian state. They are viewed as belonging not only to the Russian nation but also, in an elusive yet potent sense, to the Russian state.

Why should this be the case? Why should the Russian state concern itself with persons who are not Russian citizens? Why should the Russian nation, as distinct from the Russian citizenry, be a cardinal point of reference for Russian politics? The dual (and asymmetrical) institutional legacy of the Soviet nationality regime again supplies an important part of the answer. Ethno-cultural nationality, I have argued, was more fundamental in the Soviet institutional scheme than territorial nationhood. The national territories pre-supposed the existence of ethno-cultural nations; they were defined as the territories of and for independently defined ethno-cultural nations. For Russians, unique among major Soviet nationalities in lacking an even roughly 'adequate' national territory of 'their own', the disproportion or asymmetry between strongly institutionalized personal nationality and a weakly institutionalized sense of territorial nationhood was even greater. Under the Soviet regime, the salient territorial and institutional frame 'of' and 'for' Russians was that of the Soviet Union as a whole, not that of the Russian Republic. Union territory was 'their' territory; union institutions were, in an important sense, 'their' institutions. With the collapse of this wider institutional and territorial frame, the fundamental parameters of Russian statehood are deeply contested. This is not chiefly a question—as it is in most non-Russian successor states—of nationalizing the 'given' state territory and institutions, of making them more fully the territory and institutions of and for the dominant ethno-cultural nation in accordance with the institutionalized expectations of 'ownership' that were discussed earlier. In the Russian case, the basic parameters of statehood lack even the minimal 'givenness' that characterizes those of the non-Russian successor states.[35] It is a question of what the basic parameters of statehood should be in a situation in which the existing, provisional parameters defining the territory, citizenry and internal ethno-federal structure of the state have little institutional weight or normative dignity in the eyes of Russians—in part because they stand in no 'adequate' relation to the far-flung Russian nation.

Conclusion

The Soviet nationality regime, with its distinctive and pervasive manner of institutionalizing nationhood and nationality, has transmitted to the successor states a set of deeply structured and powerfully conflicting *expectations of belonging*. Successor state elites, with their deeply institutionalized sense of political ownership and entitlement, see the polities that bear the names of their nation—above all the territory and institutions, but also, with some ambivalence, the population as well—as 'their own', as belonging, in a fundamental sense, to them. National minorities, above all Russians, with their institutionally supported, basically ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood, see themselves as belonging, in a deep if not exclusive sense, to an 'external' nation; this cannot help but colour and qualify, even if it does not exclude, their belonging to the would-be nation-state in which they live and of which they (or most of them) hold citizenship. Finally, Russian state elites whose national self-understanding was not in the Soviet period embedded in (and is now only very imperfectly contained by) the institutional and territorial frame of the Russian Federation, see the Russian minorities in the non-Russian successor states as belonging, in an ill-defined yet potent sense, to the emerging Russian state. These deeply rooted and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging—interacting, of course, with conflicts of interest engendered by state-building, regime change and economic restructuring—will make the dynamic inter-play between non-Russian successor states, Russian minorities and the Russian state a locus of refractory and potentially explosive ethno-national conflict in the coming years.

Notes

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1. For persuasive criticisms of static, essentialist, primordialist accounts of nationhood and nationality in the Soviet context see, Lapidus (1984: 560), Laitin (1991: 148–51) and Comaroff (1991: 670 ff).
2. The crucial role of institutionally constituted national elites is stressed by Roeder (1991).
3. The first aim, to be sure, was realized to a considerable degree, although as Roeder (1991: 212 ff) has persuasively argued, the centre's ability to contain and control ethno-political mobilization had been gradually eroding for a quarter of a century before Gorbachev came to power. For an earlier diagnosis along the same lines see, Hodnett (1967: 459–60). The second aim, however, was never realized on a large scale. Throughout the Soviet period the net effect (although not the intention) of Soviet nationality policies was to strongly reinforce rather than to attenuate the salience and significance of nationality as a central organizing principle of social life.
4. According to a calculation made by Walker Connor in 1972, only 12 of the world's (then) 132 states were 'essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint' (1972: 320). For a more recent statement of the point see, Smith (1986: 229).
5. On the distinction between an ethnic group and a nation see, Smith (1986: 21–31, 135–52), and Akzin (1966: 51). I deliberately elide here the distinction between nation and nationality, crucial in some contexts (in the Hungarian half of the Hapsburg Empire for example where it was used to justify major differences in political status and cultural standing) but not central to the Soviet nationality regime.
6. On the social effects of codification generally see, Bourdieu (1990b).
7. This institutionalized multi-nationality sharply distinguished the Soviet state from its Romanov predecessor, to which it is too often causally assimilated as a modernized but essentially similar 'prison of nations'. The Romanov Empire was indeed for centuries a polyglot and poly-religious state and it became by degrees a multi-national state in the late nineteenth century as ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious heterogeneity were increasingly interpreted as national heterogeneity (Seton-Watson, 1967: 485 ff; 1977: 143, 148). But its multi-nationality, while increasingly (although far from universally) *perceived* as a central political fact by some peripheral and central elites, was never *institutionalized*.
8. See, Nahaylo and Swoboda (1990: 186). See also, the detailed discussion in Bilinsky (1978–80) which, notwithstanding its publication in an organ of emigre scholarship, is a balanced and probing analysis.
9. Yugoslavia comes closest, with its Soviet inspired system of ethno-territorial federalism (Connor, 1984), yet the close ethno-linguistic kinship of the various South Slav peoples, comprising the very large majority of the Yugoslav population, made it possible to conceive of the citizenry as a whole, as at least a

potential or incipient Yugoslav (=South Slav) nation, and to institute the category 'Yugoslav' as an official nationality (chosen as a self-designation by more than 5 per cent of the population in the 1981 Census).

10. Strictly speaking, as Pal Kolsto reminded me, the vast Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), like the Russian Federation today, bore the territorial–political designation *Rossiiskii*, not the ethno-linguistic designation *Russkii*—a distinction lost in English, which renders both as 'Russian'.
11. Below them—mainly in the vast Russian Republic but also in a few other union republics—were 20 autonomous republics and 18 lower-level autonomous formations. For a discussion of the historical genesis, ethnic demography and political significance of these autonomous formations, see, Schwartz (1990).
12. When the system of internal passports was introduced in the early thirties, nationality was initially registered by self-designation. But thereafter, nationality depended exclusively on parental nationality, not on residence, language or subjective identity. There was no possibility of changing one's nationality and no regard for individual choice, except for children of mixed-nationality marriages (and even their choice—made once and for all at the age of 16—was limited to two parental nationalities). See, Zaslavsky and Luryi (1979: 147), and Karklins (1986: 23, 31–32, 42–43).
13. Discrimination against Jews—treated as a nationality in the Soviet classificatory scheme—induced most children of mixed marriages involving Jews and non-Jews to choose the non-Jewish nationality for their passports and probably to identify subjectively with the non-Jewish nationality as well (Zaslavsky and Luryi, 1979). Since inter-marriage rates for Jews were extremely high (see the data reported in the *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, 1990: 160 ff), this reclassification strategy contributed substantially to the apparently dramatic shrinkage of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union (from 2.2 million in 1959 to 1.4 million in 1989). More recently, of course, ethno-national reclassification has proceeded in the opposite direction, since the lifting of restrictions on emigration and the automatic immigration and citizenship rights extended by Israel to diaspora Jews have revalorized Jewish nationality, at least for would-be emigrants (see, Brubaker, 1993). The more general analytical point is that even the rigidly ascriptive Soviet system of personal nationality did leave room at the margins—considerable room for some groups—for the play of individual strategies.
14. In standard Sovietological usage, the 'titular' nationality of a particular ethno-territorial unit is the nationality whose name the unit bears; thus Georgians were the titular nationality in the Georgian SSR, Kazakhs in the Kazakh SSR, and so on.
15. The most thorough account of the ad hoc development of ethno-territorial federalism is in Pipes (1964), which carries the story through 1923. See also, Carr (1950: 253 ff), Carr'ere d'Encausse (1987: 143 ff), and Gleason (1990, Chapter 2).
16. Although 22 nationalities according to the 1989 Census included over 1 million members and 33 numbered between 100,000 and a million, another 47 individually enumerated nationalities (not counting 26 individually enumerated 'peoples of the north') had fewer than 100,000 members, some only a few hundred (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Statistike, 1991: 5–8).

17. To a considerable extent, this spatial mismatch between the distribution of nationalities and the boundaries of 'their' territories was induced or even directly imposed by the regime. Thus, migrations of persons outside 'their own' homeland were induced as a means of weakening homeland attachments and identities, and promoting an emergent supranational Soviet identity. And some territorial frontiers—notably in parts of Central Asia and Transcaucasia—were drawn in a manner that departed deliberately from the dictates of ethnic demography. This last point, however, should not be exaggerated: for the most part, national territorial borders reflected ethnic demography about as well as could be expected given mixed populations (Schwartz, 1990). For a comparative discussion of the 'redistribution and gerrymandering of ethnic groups' in multi-ethnic communist states, see, Connor (1984: 300 ff).
18. On non-historic nations—those without an independent political history—in the Hapsburg Empire see, Kann (1950, Vol. 1: 271 ff).
19. On migrations induced or compelled by the state, see, Lewis (1972), and Simon (1991, Chapters 5 and 7).
20. For an extended discussion of this formula, introduced by Stalin to characterize proletarian culture but aptly summarizing the core idea informing Soviet nationality policy as a whole, see, Connor (1984: 202 ff).
21. The expression is Walker Connor's (1972). Under Stalin, the regime did of course act with extraordinary brutality towards certain national groups, notably those accused of collaborating with the Germans in the Second World War, who were stripped of their national institutions, erased from history books and deported in their entirety with great loss of life to remote regions of the state. Stalin also ordered the wholesale deportations of the elites of the newly reincorporated Western territories. But despite his murderous repression of particular national groups, he did not attack the social or legal foundations of institutionalized multi-nationality as such. On war-time deportations, see, Simon (1991, Chapter 7), Nekrich (1978), and Conquest (1970).
22. For a discussion of the Soviet debate of the fifties and sixties on whether the federal forms and national republics had outlived their usefulness, see, Hodnett (1967), and Gleason (1990, Chapter 4).
23. Some consideration was given in the seventies to abolishing the legal status of nationality, but it came to nothing (Lapidus, 1984: 567–68; Zaslavsky and Luryi, 1979: 149–50; Karklins, 1986: 32).
24. John Armstrong notes that

> peculiar features of the official system facilitate retention of ethnic ties by permitting...upwardly mobile persons to obtain higher education and pursue subsequent careers in their home republics. Only those intent on highly specialized activities (from ballet to nuclear physics) or on very high level party careers must prepare to merge in the all-Soviet (Russified) career pool.... It is frankly puzzling why, decades ago, the Soviet regime did not take radical measures to integrate career patterns [rather than allowing the upwardly mobile to pursue careers in their own languages and in their own republics]. Even Stalin's totalitarianism eschewed the most extreme precedents for creating a supraethnic elite [notably the Ottoman Janissary system which] entailed forcible removal, in early adolescence, of boys in Christian families,

followed by rigorous resocialization to Islamic and Ottoman dynastic norms (Armstrong, 1992: 39).

25. For an authoritative statement of this point with respect to the Baltic republics, arguing that Baltic nations far from being on the verge of extinction after a half-century of Soviet rule, as many Baltic nationalists asserted in the Gorbachev era, were much more firmly established and consolidated as nations than they had been in 1940, see, Misiunas and Taagepera (1983: 260–62). For a similar argument formulated in more general terms but resting especially on research on Transcaucasia, see, Suny (1989: 507).
26. Many border changes were in fact made, but typically in top-down fashion for various political or strategic reasons and not in response to irredentist ethno-political mobilization. The closest thing to such mobilization, in the pre-perestroika era, involved Armenian campaigns, particularly during the Krushchev thaw, for the transfer of the overwhelmingly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast from Azerbaijan to Armenia (Birch, 1987).
27. This conception of extra-territorial or personal national autonomy was first elaborated in 1851 by the Hungarian statesman Louis Kossuth in the aftermath of the Austro-Russian suppression of the incipient Hungarian republic; it received its most thorough development a half century later in the writings of the Austro-Marxists, above all in Otto Bauers's *Die Nationalitatenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1907).
28. I am concerned here only with the union republics, not with lower-level autonomous formations. The latter, locked in their own jurisdictional struggles with the union republics to which they belonged, tended to collude with the centre against the union republics (see, Bremmer, 1993).
29. I have addressed some of them in a preliminary fashion (see, Brubaker, 1992).
30. For a sophisticated emphasis on contingency, see, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), and Sewell (forthcoming).
31. The sense of ownership and entitlement felt by titular nationalities of non-Russian republics, which developed well before the Gorbachev era, is thoroughly documented by Karklins (1986: 51 ff, 66, 96–97).
32. Victoria Koroteyeva, in a personal communication, has suggested that this was true for Russians in the Russian Republic as well as for the diaspora living in non-Russian republics.
33. I am indebted to Sergei Sibirtsev for pointing this out.
34. On post-Soviet migrations of ethnic unmixing, with special attention to the Russians in the successor states, see, Brubaker (1993; 1995).
35. On the question of the givenness on 'hegemony' of state boundaries, see, Laitin and Lustick (1989), and Lustick (1987, 1990).

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4

Immigration and the Redefinition of 'Citizenship' in Japan: 'One People–One Nation' in Question

Takashi Miyajima

The purpose of this chapter is to advance an analysis of basic issues underlying the concepts of nationality and citizenship in contemporary Japan taking into consideration the traditional concept of a 'unified nation' while examining the changing ethnic constitution of Japan in recent years brought about by the growing influx of immigrants. As of December 1992, there was an estimated total of approximately 1,280,000 foreign residents in Japan: a 50 per cent increase compared to 1987. This paper suggests that despite Japan's attachment to the idea of a homogeneous nation, whose people share the same 'culture' and the same 'blood', the reality of ethnic minority groups in Japan has challenged the nation to reconsider, not without difficulty, its notions of citizenship, which have been inseparable from the concept of a unified country.

A Homogenous Nation?

Until the end of the Second World War, under the imperial system of government in Japan, the Japanese concept of 'nation' was not that of a state which possessed a contract with its people, but that

of a family, where people were subjects rather than citizens. The relationship between the emperor and his people was accordingly believed to be like that of a benevolent father towards his children. People were thus not perceived to have sovereign rights. Moreover, Japan's long period of isolation from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries gave rise to the myth that Japan was a nation of homogeneous people who were linked together by a shared culture. Armstrong suggests that this notion of nation, central to Japanese nationalism, contained the potential for the racialization of an imagined community which rendered the criteria for membership as both 'cultural and biological' (Armstrong, 1989: 329–43).

There still exist, however, minorities in Japan which have been discriminated against for hundreds of years. One such people is the *Ainu*, a cultural and linguistic minority living in northern Japan. Today, there are about 15,000 people who identify themselves as *Ainu*. In addition, there are *Burakumin*, a minority particular to Japan, whose numbers are currently estimated to exceed 1.1 million. The *Burakumin* are a despised minority group, based historically in certain pariah occupations, whose descendants are often detected only after elaborate investigation. Described by one American scholar as 'the invisible race', it is difficult to find an equivalent minority in any other country (Stone, 1985: 36).

Under various reforms carried out after 1868, Japanese feudalism and isolationism were brought to an end, and class restrictions on roles in society were lifted. As a result, minorities against whom discrimination had been legally permitted now officially ceased to exist and legal equality for everyone before the emperor was decreed. However, the position of the *Burakumin* has become quite unique. Although as citizens they enjoy legal equality, within the province of their personal lives, marriage to ordinary Japanese is difficult and they continue to suffer discrimination when applying for jobs in the private sector. Living with ordinary Japanese was problematic, and isolated communities, or *buraku*, developed out of members sharing a common occupation and lifestyle. The name *Burakumin* (people of '*buraku*') comes from this word.

What is a minority? Rose defines it as 'a group of people—differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion, or language—who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought by the others as a differentiated group with negative connotations' (Rose, 1968: 365–71).

However, this definition is not appropriate when discussing the *Burakumin*. The *Burakumin* are rather discriminated on grounds of birth, such as blood ties and ancestor occupations. Here the unique Japanese sense of identity is at work. The *Burakumin* are not racially different from other Japanese, nor do any cultural, religious, or linguistic differences exist. Nevertheless, they live apart from ordinary Japanese. Though these people are commonly referred to as *Burakumin* by other Japanese, the Japanese government officially denies that they constitute a minority and does not concern itself with the actual discrimination they suffer, which it regards as merely discrimination on a personal level.[1] The idea of a homogeneous people is thus both part truth and part myth.

There are approximately 700,000 Koreans living in Japan today who constitute the country's largest ethnic minority. Many are third or fourth generation descendants of Koreans who migrated to Japan for work or were brought as forced labour after Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910.[2]

This group possesses distinctive features rare among other immigrant groups in advanced countries. It has attained a high level of cultural assimilation (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).

Table 4.1
Japanese Language Ability of Foreign Adult Residents

	Conversation			*Reading and Writing*		
	Good	*Fair*	*Poor*	*Good*	*Fair*	*Poor*
Koreans*	84.5%	10.6%	0.4%	70.8%	17.8%	4.3%
Others	27.6%	47.6%	10.6%	17.6%	39.7%	27.6%

* Includes 'newcomer' Koreans without permanent residency visa.
Source: International Office of Kawasaki City, 1993: 27.

Their ability in the Japanese language and level of education is no different from that of ordinary Japanese, and according to a 1986 survey, 75 per cent of the Korean population concealed its own names and assumed Japanese names (Kimbara et al., 1986: 175). The rate of naturalization of this Korean group, however, remains relatively low, and many regard the renunciation of their Korean citizenship as a kind of defeat. In 1984, no more than 0.8 per cent, or 5,107 Koreans, in Japan were naturalized citizens.

Figure 4.1: Level of Education (20 - 64 years)



Source: Kimbara et al., 1986, p. 124

When Japan colonized Korea, the Japanese government proclaimed that Koreans would also become subjects of the emperor and compelled them to speak Japanese and take on Japanese names. The rationale behind this was to maintain the appearance of homogeneity as much as possible so that Koreans would become 'like the Japanese' through complete assimilation and therefore would be able to participate as members of Japanese society. Colonial Koreans were thus given Japanese nationality per se, but this 'citizenship' was inseparable from cultural assimilation. Korean

resentment and hatred of the policy of assimilation, while often concealed, ran deep.

With the modernization of Japan, both legal equality and formal abolition of class restrictions were accomplished relatively quickly. Two major barriers, however, remained. The first of these—the belief in the transcendental and absolute nature of the emperor—crumbled with Japan's defeat in the War. However, the belief that the Japanese are a homogeneous people continues to live on. The idea that ethnic minorities should abandon their own culture and get assimilated to the point that they should give up their names in exchange for the benefits of full citizenship is one that has not fundamentally changed. Indeed, until 1984, when the Nationality Act and Family Registration Act were revised, foreigners who wished to become naturalized citizens were required to change their names to Japanese-sounding names that could be written with Japanese characters. The government's pursuit of this kind of policy of assimilation, and the naturalization and citizenship rights which are subject to it, is deeply resented by many Koreans—a fact reflected in the relatively low number of Koreans who have become naturalized citizens.

The English sociologist, T. H. Marshall, wrote 30 years ago that the modern drive towards social equality was the latest phase of an evolution of citizenship which had been in continuous progress for some 250 years. He proposed that citizenship be divided into three elements: civil, political and social. The 'social element' of citizenship was defined as encompassing the 'whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, to the right to share fully in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (Marshall, 1964: 71–72).

In Japan it was this social element of citizenship that Koreans most urgently called for. Under the post-War Japanese government, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular on 19 April 1952 to all local governments on the administrative handling of the nationality of Koreans, Taiwanese and other foreign residents. The notice stipulated that as a result of the redrawing of territorial borders and the recognition of Korean independence as stated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, all Koreans and Taiwanese, including those residing in Japan, would lose their Japanese nationality. As a result,

more than 500,000 Koreans residing in Japan became aliens, losing former rights as Japanese citizens, including rights to many aspects of social welfare.

The attitude of the Japanese government towards the Korean minorities was that as long as they remained foreigners, they would receive only limited social welfare services. As a result, their lives were characterized by economic and social insecurity. While employed labour was entitled to receive insurance regardless of nationality, others, in particular a good number of self-employed Koreans and their families, were denied medical insurance and pension benefits. A long controversy ensued over which was the more important pre-requisite for social welfare services: the fulfilment of one's duties as a citizen through the continued payment of taxes and dues, or the issue of one's nationality. Although the conclusion in 1965 of the Japan–Republic of Korea Normalization Treaty established a system to grant Korean residents 'permanent resident' permits, it was accompanied by a host of problems.

As a traditional nation-state, Japan has maintained, until recently, the concept of a homogeneous and unified nation. Except for the case of permanent residence permits for Koreans as stated here, citizenship has been closely tied to Japanese nationality. The Japanese Nationality Act is based on the principle of conferring nationality by origin (*jus sanguinis*). Thus, even second and third generation Korean residents born in Japan and holding permanent residence permits are not accorded automatic rights to Japanese nationality.

Indeed, although they may acquire Japanese nationality and full citizenship by naturalization, in a country where nationality laws are based primarily on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, naturalization is an exceptional procedure for accepting individuals of different origins as new members of a nation. Moreover, under the Japanese Nationality Act, foreign nationals seeking Japanese citizenship must satisfy a set of conditions, including a continuous residence for a minimum period of five years, a minimum age requirement of 20 years, demonstration of good conduct, and the capacity and skills to earn a living. Until the revision of the Nationality Act in 1984, it also required the adoption of a Japanese name, something which was not easily acceptable to Koreans.[3]

The right to political participation is an important element of citizenship. Foreign residents, including Koreans, however, are all excluded from this sphere of activity on the grounds that 'sovereignty rests with the Japanese nation' (Article 1 of the Constitutional Law). Even at the local community level, the voting franchise is exclusively reserved for Japanese nationals for the same reason. The government's position and jurisdiction here is of a controversial nature if we consider the number of settled foreign nationals once treated as 'Japanese' and the right of foreigners with permanent resident status in some European countries to vote.

Many of the social elements of Japanese citizenship had also been reserved for Japanese nationals. Foreign nationals, including Korean residents, were not covered by national health insurance or pension plans. Only social security payments, designed to provide a nominal income for persons unable to work due to illness or injury, were granted, primarily to Korean residents. However, this was not an automatic right, but rather a special benefit bestowed at the state's discretion. Such a concept of social welfare service ran parallel to that of permanent residence permits for Koreans which were issued only upon individual application.

Japan's ratification of the convention relating to the status of refugees and protocol in 1981 was all the more important because the Japanese government was obliged to establish, in accordance with the convention, a new legal system based on the principle of equal treatment for foreign nationals, particularly in the area of social security and social welfare. Thus, in the end, Japanese nationality as a pre-requisite for eligibility to benefits such as health insurance and worker pensions was abolished in 1982 and 1986 respectively.

In Japan, the word *kokumin* ('national') is attached to both the health insurance and pension systems. Japanese attachment to the concept of Japan as a unified nation means that although these rights are normally acquired with a duration of residency and the continued payment of taxes and dues, the belief that such a system should benefit only those living in Japan remains unquestioned. A major problem of the pension system today is that it is an organization which serves Japanese nationals and foreign settlers, with few benefits for ordinary foreign residents. For example, in Japan, worker pensions cannot be collected after leaving the country. For this reason, foreign workers who only plan to stay in Japan for a

few years (over 50 per cent of foreign residents) do not enter the pension system (Miyajima, 1993). A common payment system for foreign workers, like that provided by European countries such as France, Germany and Italy, does not exist in Japan. A 'welfare state' which has no provision for a transnational pension system is in this sense not worthy of the name.

Immigrants in Japan

In September 1986, a statement by the then prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, gave rise to widespread debate. He said essentially that the Japanese, unlike the multi-ethnic American populace, were a single homogeneous people and that their level of intelligence was therefore higher. This not only provoked the American public, but the indignation expressed by the American Congress and ethnic minorities was an important catalyst for critical reflection by the Japanese.[4] Within Japan, protests were organized by *Ainu* and Korean activists, and several critics of 'the doctrine of Japanese homogeneity' emerged among Japanese intellectuals. A typical example was Onuma Yasuaki and his work *Beyond the Myth of a Homogeneous Society* (1992) in which he argued for the recognition of Koreans as a minority population and the natural rights of those born and raised in Japan.

Also, around this time the number of foreigners coming to Japan began to increase. It is important to note that these foreigners have become a 'visible' ethnic minority. In contrast to the Koreans who are an 'invisible' minority, this wave of newcomers has had a huge impact on the Japanese, shaking the very foundation of Japan's belief in its homogeneity.

There have been changes in the number of registered aliens in Japan (see Table 4.2). (Registration is required of foreigners staying longer than three months.) In a mere five years, the number had not only jumped by 50 per cent, but the population of non-Korean foreigners had dramatically increased, representing nearly half of all registered aliens. This development, as I shall discuss later, prompted the recognition that the relationship between foreigners and citizenship needed to be redefined.

The sudden increase in the number of Asian entrants during the eighties is not so surprising if we take into consideration the wage

Table 4.2
Number of Registered Foreign Residents in Japan (1988–1991)

	1988	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*	*1991/1988 (Ratio)*
Total	941,005	984,455	1,075,317	1,218,891	1.29
Korea	677,140	681,838	687,940	693,050	1.02
China*	129,269	137,499	150,339	171,071	1.32
Philippines	32,185	38,925	49,092	61,837	1.92
USA	32,766	34,900	38,364	42,498	1.30
Brazil	4,159	14,528	56,429	119,333	28.69
UK	8,523	9,272	10,206	11,794	1.38
Vietnam	4,763	6,316	6,233	6,410	1.35
Thailand	5,277	5,542	6,724	8,912	1.69
Canada	3,510	4,172	4,909	5,903	1.68
Peru	864	4,121	10,279	26,281	30.42
Others	42,522	47,342	54,802	71,802	1.69

* Includes China, Taiwan and Hong Kong

Source: Japan Immigration Association, *Statistics of Foreign Residents* (of each year)

increases and labour shortages in Japan, along with the strong economic gap between Japan and other countries at that time. While officially the Ministry of Labour has maintained since 1967 that it would 'not accept foreign labour since we make up for our labour shortage with women and the aged' (Japan Ministry of Labour, 1988: 1), there were, in fact, entrants not only from neighbouring countries such as Korea and China, but also from countries in Southeast Asia and Central and South America. Whether they were seeking work or not cannot be determined statistically, but the number of entrants has risen sharply since the late eighties.

The problem here, however, is that unskilled and semi-skilled foreign workers are not given a visa according to Japanese immigration law, and in spite of this restriction many of them enter the country under the status of 'tourist', 'student', or 'trainee' and actually engage in work. In particular, many enter with tourist visas and work illegally. If discovered, they are usually deported. In 1993, the number of such illegal foreign workers is said to be almost 300,000. This dramatic increase reflects the number of illegal foreigners detected and apprehended by the Immigration Bureau (Table 4.3).

In 1988, 14,314 illegal foreigners were discovered, 40 per cent of whom were women. This figure jumped to 32,908 in 1991.

Table 4.3
Number of Discovered Illegal Foreign Workers from Selected Countries (1988–1991)

	1988	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*
Korea	1,033 (264)	3,129 (920)	5,534 (1,117)	9,782 (1,499)
Iran	–	15 (2)	652 (4)	7,700 (89)
Malaysia	279 (14)	1,865 (174)	4,465 (609)	4,855 (963)
Thailand	1,388 (1,019)	1,114 (745)	1,450 (661)	3,249 (2,323)
Philippines	5,386 (3,698)	3,740 (2,451)	4,042 (2,499)	2,983 (1,904)
China	502 (272)	588 (272)	1,142 (343)	1,665 (393)
Pakistan	2,497 (2)	3,170 (2)	3,886 (6)	793 (0)
Others*	3,229 (116)	2,987 (251)	8,713 (519)	1,851 (387)
Total	14,314 (5,385)	16,608 (4,817)	19,844 (5,708)	32,908 (25,350)

Note: Figure in brackets indicates number of women
* Includes Taiwan and Hong Kong
Source: Japan International Training Cooperation Organization, 1992, p. 110

However, the number of women represented in this figure decreased to 25 per cent. The countries of origin were predominantly Asian: Korea, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In 1990, this illegal labour group was composed of construction workers (35.4 per cent); factory workers (38 per cent) and service workers (mostly female, 13.9 per cent).

There appear to be three additional factors underlying the rise in entry of workers from Southeast Asia. First, some Asian countries, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh and Pakistan, have tried to solve their problems of underdevelopment and overpopulation by overseas emigration. For example, in Pakistan, 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 people, or 7 per cent of the total labour force, had emigrated by the end of 1984 (ILO, 1987). Second, although the destination of Asian foreign workers had been Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, by then the declining petroleum prices in world markets together with the end of the construction boom in these regions had driven many South and Southeast Asian workers out of the oilfields in the Middle East. Finally, the liberalization of the economy and internal migration in China, a huge neighbouring country, as well as its relaxation of emigration rules in 1985 all served to increase the flow of emigration.

One of the characteristics of these recently increasing Asian workers is that, in the case of men, they are considerably well-

educated compared to the working immigrants in Western countries. According to a survey of foreign residents in Kawasaki, a big industrial city located in the southern suburbs of Tokyo, 40 per cent of Southeast Asians and West Asians had completed higher education (International Office of Kawasaki City, 1993). It was also found that unemployment or poor wages among highly educated people in their home country were primary causes which provoked their emigration to Japan. Nevertheless, many of them engaged in unskilled manual labour that the Japanese now commonly eschew.

In the case of women, many enter the country on 'entertainer' or tourist visas, and in effect constitute cheap labour in the leisure industry as singers, dancers, bar hostesses, and sometimes as prostitutes (Yamanaka, 1993). This is partly due to the fact that they are restricted by law from having jobs which can be filled by domestic workers (those of maids, factory workers, saleswomen, nurses, etc.), but which are offered to female immigrants working in other countries. As a result, more than half the workers of Asian origin are illegal workers. This unstable status commonly leads to their exploitation and poor housing conditions.

The attitude of the Japanese people towards such 'new immigrants', although not manifestly hostile, is still not receptive. This ambiguous attitude seems to arise on the one hand from the existence of a strong prejudice that their presence threatens the employment of Japanese, while on the other from the fact that some people harbour traditional images of a 'backward' Asia. So-called ethnic conflict remains thus far latent. In some wards of Tokyo, although the population of foreigners amounts to over 5 per cent (over 8 per cent including illegal residents), there has to date been no noticeable violent xenophobic aggression towards them.

However, there are some recent tendencies which may be labelled 'new racism' (Barker, 1981; Miles, 1992). These tendencies do not explicitly establish a superiority–inferiority hierarchy of ethnic groups or give a negative and contemptuous 'inferior' image, but rather implicitly identify differences in behaviour and practices between the 'self' and the 'other' as differences in ethnic character and 'cultures'. These are then generalized and serve to provide explanations for the difficulties of co-existence of foreigners and Japanese. To take a recent example, because foreigners of Asian origin are represented in popular parlance as people who

'make noise until late at night', 'dump the garbage without regard to the rules', and 'tend to live overpopulated in one apartment', their lifestyle is viewed as incompatible with the Japanese way of life.

Such a view neglects the fact that newcomers are seldom accustomed to the language and customs of the host country, and that they are forced to live in conditions of isolation and concentration which are a result of their very exclusion. In these cases, a clearly disparaging stereotype, such as that attributed once to Korean and Chinese people, is concealed. The assertion that it is natural for foreigners to prefer to live amongst people of the 'same kind', reinforces a tendency among Japanese to differentiate those not considered to be part of their 'homogeneous' community.

Xenophobia does not necessarily take the form of direct physical aggression or hostile discourse, but may rather be manifested in rumour spreading. In 1991 and 1992, for example, rumours that the Japanese were being 'attacked by aliens' circulated and spread to local communities in the northern suburbs of Tokyo. These rumours were, however, repeatedly denied by the authorities.

Japan's immigration law (Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act) before 1990 was unusually restrictive and did not readily welcome foreign nationals coming to Japan to work. This was perhaps due to a relatively closed social system, a strong national identity, as well as economic difficulties attributed to the country's excess population. Population pressures led the Japanese government to promote the emigration of its people to North and South America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Cabinet order No. 319 of 1951, precursor of the present day immigration law, was decreed at the very epoch in which Japan was regarded as an emigration country—few could imagine that the country would suffer a future labour shortage.

Japan's immigration policy of admitting only a few select groups of skilled labour and professionals should be understood as reflecting a historical inter-play of both economic and non-economic reasons. The position of Koreans, who came to live in Japan before the War, and their descendants, who possess the right to permanent residency and experience no work restrictions, is an exception.

These immigration restrictions, however, provided no solution to the labour shortage, and in 1990 a revised law was adopted

which allowed for the employment of certain skilled foreign labour. This law also opened the way for second and third generation descendants of Japanese (*Nikkeijin*), mostly from Brazil and Peru, to work and live in Japan without restrictions. Apparently, in the process of solving a serious labour shortage, Japan adopted a method of meeting this demand that would at the same time appeal to national sentiments and satisfy political priorities. That is, on the grounds of racial closeness and blood ties, these foreigners have been singled out for special treatment, and selection according to specific criteria has taken precedence over general criteria. Under Mile's definition, the principle underlying such politics could be considered 'institutional racism' (Miles, 1989).

Korean Residents

Korean residents are those who entered the country during Japan's colonial rule of Korea, along with their descendants. They are distinguished from 'newcomer' Koreans who came to Japan after the Second World War, especially during periods of economic growth in both countries. Their number amounts to approximately 600,000, of whom about 70 per cent are estimated to be second and third generation born in Japan. Today, the majority of them are granted permanent residence status. Despite such a status and the absence of restrictions on work, Koreans are less favoured in the occupational market. For example, in the Kanagawa Prefecture, a recent survey indicated that Koreans were less likely to be employed in Japanese companies or in the public sector. More than 40 per cent were engaged in self-employed or semi-self-employed occupations (such as shopkeepers, restaurant owners, family business workers and drivers), while self-employed Japanese in Kanagawa made up only 20 per cent of the population (Kimbara et al., 1986).

Koreans who strongly insist on maintaining their ethnic identity belong to either the first generation of resident Koreans, or second and third generation activists who participate in movements demanding equality. The former still hold memories of Japan's colonial domination and keep their own language and habits; the latter, who have been raised in Japan and are generally highly educated, maintain various relations with the Japanese and do not necessarily constitute a separate community.

Nikkeijin

Nikkeijin are Japanese or their offspring who emigrated to other countries. In 1991, the principal groups included Brazilians (120,000), Peruvians (26,000) and other South Americans. If they hold Japanese nationality, they are not considered foreign workers and can be employed without any immigration restrictions. Until 1990, if they did not hold Japanese nationality, they could not be admitted as unskilled labour. In order to open new avenues of employment, however, the revised immigration law granted special status to second and third generation *Nikkeijin*, as mentioned previously. They are eligible for long-term residence (maximum three years with possible extension) with no work restrictions.

Such treatment of *Nikkeijin*, controversial from the point of view of equality among foreign nationals, may be considered a reflection of Japan's attachment to the principle of blood ties in choosing which foreign labour to prefer first. Eighty per cent of *Nikkeijin* are employed as unskilled workers in craft and manufacturing, including assembly workers in the automobile industry. Their national identity often involves conflict because they regard themselves as 'Japanese', whereas within Japanese society they are sometimes regarded as non-Japanese and marginalized because of their Latino culture and insufficient language ability.

Refugees

Refugees in Japan are predominantly Indo-Chinese people who have been accepted because of mediation by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in accordance with the Convention and its accompanying protocol. Japan began to accept Indo-Chinese, or 'boat people', about the end of the seventies and ratified the Convention and protocol in 1981. However, at the beginning of 1991, Japan had only 7,200 settled refugees, perhaps because of its stringent requirements in recognizing refugee status and the cultural differences between Japan and the home countries of these refugees.

Once refugees decide to settle, they are granted a 'long-term residence' visa (three years with possible extension), provided with assistance in finding jobs and are covered under the social security

system. The number of accepted refugees is not significant, but the revision of laws for refugees has had an undeniable effect on the 'internationalization' of Japan's legal system and has necessitated the reconsideration of the idea of citizenship, hitherto reserved for those 'having Japanese blood'.

Legally Employed Workers

Legally employed workers are qualified and professional workers who are recruited in accordance with the prescriptions of the immigration law. Working visas conferred to these workers are short term: six months or one year. There are only approximately 100,000 of these workers in Japan (Koreans and *Nikkeijin* excluded). Although the amended immigration law was designed to recognize skilled foreign workers by introducing categories of acceptable skilled jobs, this systematically excluded unskilled workers and thus failed to meet the rising demand of small- and medium-scale companies for unskilled labour.

Foreign Trainees

Foreign trainees are those accepted by public or private organizations in Japan for the 'learning and acquisition of technology, skills, and knowledge' (*Japanese Immigration Law*, Article 19). Foreign trainee programmes were created to enable the transfer of technology to developing countries, and 'trainee' visas are granted for short terms: three and six months, or one year.

If accepted by private organizations, foreign trainees often work under the same conditions as ordinary workers who are receiving 'on-the-job-training'. 'Company trainees' are not by definition employees: employers are not obliged to pay full wages but only nominal allowances for the employee's 'on-the-job-training'. It is for this reason that employers are attracted to such programmes (Yamanaka, 1993). Since they are legally not allowed to be fully employed, labour laws do not apply to them and they are deprived of any protection under the labour standard law which regulates wages and other working conditions. Thus, trainee programmes are often criticized for constituting a 'disguised' method of introducing and employing cheap foreign labour. The number of foreign trainees

jumped from 14,400 in 1986 to 43,600 in 1991. Asians predominated with 10,700 workers from China, 6,300 from Thailand, 4,400 from the Philippines and 4,400 from Korea.

Illegal Workers

As pointed out previously, the number of people who enter the country under the status of 'tourist', 'student', or 'trainee', and then find jobs illegally was estimated to be approximately 300,000 in 1992, constituting the majority of unskilled foreign workers in Japan. That is to say, there are more illegal unskilled workers than legal unskilled workers (mainly *Nikkeijin*). Almost all of them are Asians, predominantly Koreans, followed by Iranians, Malaysians and Thais. This is one of the grave consequences of the restrictive nature of the so-called 'skilled labour only' policy of the Japanese immigration law.

As they have no lawful resident status, they are often targets of exploitation and excluded from the social security system. If discovered, they are usually deported. However, because of the growing number of illegal workers, and the difficulty of controlling the inflow and subsequent employment of these workers, there are voices these days raised by human rights groups demanding amnesty for them. This too will undoubtedly contribute to a re-evaluation of the notion of citizenship in Japan.

These groups of foreign nationals in Japan seem to constitute a sort of hierarchy. What is the basis of this hierarchy? Although it may seem as though the degree of skilled work is the determining factor, it is rather the strength of historical ties as well as the presence of racial and cultural bonds which enable the continued existence of the belief in Japanese homogeneity. 'Let's welcome *Nikkeijin* who share the same blood as us Japanese' was indeed the argument of a responsible immigration officer in 1990.

On the other hand, Southeast Asians are racially (physically) different, belong to cultures which are non-Confucianist and do not use Chinese characters. As illegal workers, they are insufficiently protected by law. Although the minimum labour laws (for example, that of accident compensation insurance) can be applied, they receive little sympathy for working under poor conditions. As yet,

there have been no measures taken to at least legalize their position at the government level.

The Emerging Challenge

A unique situation has thus developed in Japan during 1991–92 that clearly contradicts the government's unyielding opposition to the importation of unskilled foreign labour. The stark reality is that under the expanding economy of the last few years, until very recently a large number of legal and illegal foreign workers (sharply differentiated in status) had become fully integrated into the labour force to fill a demand otherwise not met by domestic workers. In the analysis of Thranhardt, a German political scientist, in 1992,

> Japan, the new economic superpower, has achieved full employment for decades. 'Japaneseness' is to be maintained, leading to the principle of non-immigration of foreigners. In practice, however, immigration is tolerated in sectors like construction and 'entertainment'. This Japanese way of migration is reminiscent of the Italian practice before the reform of the late 1980s. It is clear that several forms of 'quasi-immigration' have been established during the late years. In comparative perspective the Japanese case shows the consequences of a non-immigration policy in a rich and developed country (Thranhardt, 1992: 9–10).

The foreign populations have never become a single entity. Due to their differing legal statuses, the emergence of a unified movement demanding their rights has been difficult. In this respect, the government's policy of 'different rules for different people' has been effective. Each group has its own goals and demands—the Koreans want equal civil rights, such as the right to vote; the *Nikkeijin* want better employment opportunities; and illegal Asians want to be guaranteed the right to stay in Japan. As such, no sense of solidarity or a desire for joint effort has yet arisen.

However, the notion that Japanese nationality, culture and citizenship are inseparable from each other is gradually being challenged in Japan. The following three examples may be cited. First, in 1982, when Japan ratified the convention relating to the status of refugees, differences in social rights between Japanese and

foreigners largely disappeared. Though the social security system is not well adapted to the conditions of foreign nationals, as mentioned earlier, the idea that social rights should be conferred by residency rather than by nationality is beginning to gain currency within the government as well as among Japanese who engage in movements aimed at the improvement of the conditions of foreigners.

Second, in districts with large foreign populations, foreign residents have demanded appropriate administrative services from local authorities, and although there have been disagreements between them and central government policy, independent services have begun. For example, in Osaka wards where foreigners form 10 to 20 per cent of the population, the establishment of 'ethnic education' classes (e.g., Korean language and history) and the employment of foreign teachers—neither of which is welcomed by the central government—has increased. Also, in communities in the Kanagawa Prefecture, which in the last few years has seen an influx of Brazilian and Peruvian workers and their families, bi-lingual teaching systems of the Japanese language have been introduced in primary and secondary schools for foreign students (Miyajima, 1993).

Finally, Japan's knowledge of minority rights in other advanced countries is expanding. For example, voting rights for foreigners in Sweden and Holland have been of particular interest to Japan's 'settled foreigners', such as the Koreans. Recently, Koreans in Osaka brought legal action against the government demanding that the right of 'settled foreigners' to vote in local elections be recognized. And, as a first major challenge, the Municipal Diet of Kishiwada city in Osaka, and what is more important, the Prefectural Diet of Kyoto adopted in 1993 a resolution petitioning the central government for the voting rights of 'settled foreigners'.

There are, however, no doubt difficulties in realizing a complete redefinition of citizenship in the near future. Ordinary Japanese people are not yet free of the idea of a nation-state in the Japanese sense or the 'natural' unity of the Japanese nation. The notion that the boundary between them and the non-Japanese, or *gaijin* (the Japanese word for foreigner which literally means 'outsider'), is one of blood has until now subconsciously been for many the cornerstone of their identity. In this sense, there is as yet no

conscious distinction between 'being Japanese', and having Japanese nationality and citizenship. In the long run, however, this issue should be developed on the idea of human rights based on the principle of residency, with the goal of moving towards a multi-ethnic society.

In his recent book, De Vos puts forth the following argument:

> The problems of the Korean minority in Japan are still rooted in a deep-seated social conviction that the 'Japanese' are, and should remain, ethnically homogeneous. The Japanese still pride themselves on their uniqueness and resist the idea of assimilating or accommodating any ethnic minority fully within a concept of citizenship that remains almost identical with a concept of racial purity (De Vos, 1992: 184).

This analysis is perhaps partly true, but it also overlooks certain changes in Japanese attitudes which have taken place recently. Human rights groups and some local self-government communities have acknowledged the legitimacy of, and support Korean demands for, full citizenship.

Another evolution worthy of note is the fact that the recent generation of Japanese, born in the fifties and sixties, is relatively free of negative and discriminatory attitudes fostered under Japan's colonial rule of Korea. Otherwise, how would we explain the fact that by 1985 the number of mixed marriages between Koreans and Japanese accounted for 71.6 per cent of the total marriages within the resident Korean community (Miyajima, 1990).

As for the 'newcomer' foreign workers, the major problem is that of Japan's 'non-immigration policy', criticized by Thranhardt, the German social scientist. If the Japanese economy is to continue to rely on the help of foreign workers in certain sectors, it is all the more necessary to establish a systematic policy of accepting them through the 'main door', rather than through the 'back door'.

It is no less important to realize that, similar to the experiences of certain European countries, prolonged stay of foreign workers and the growth of illegal populations require nations to accept these people on the basis of human rights. Moreover, it is necessary to redefine the notion of citizenship more in accordance with the principles of residency and the contribution of non-Japanese people to Japanese society.

Could the belief expressed by the prominent immigration scholar, Wihtol de Wenden, find acceptance in Japan by the end of this century?

> Immigrants are not just foreigners, in fact they may no longer be foreigners anymore.... The question which needs to be addressed is that immigrants have for some time formed a structural part of this society, necessitating a redefinition of the political and social participation of immigrants in the country in which they live (Wihtol de Wenden, 1983).

Notes

1. Government and local community programmes implemented after the fifties have improved the economic conditions of the *Burakumin*. However, problems of employment, schooling of children and personal discrimination in marriages remain to be solved.
2. During the Second World War, Koreans were drafted by the Japanese authorities, and approximately 700,000 were forced into hard labour in Japanese territories such as Sakhalin.
3. Naturalized citizens are presently allowed, in principle, to choose their names freely, including 'non-Japanese' names. However, their names must be written in 'easily readable ordinary Chinese or Japanese characters' (*Japanese Census Registration Law*, Article 50).
4. At the time, however, 40 per cent of the Japanese who answered a public opinion poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun*, in October 1986 said that 'most Japanese probably think the same as the prime minister'.

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5

Citizenship and National Identity in India: Towards a Feasible Linkage

T. K. Oommen

Viewed historically, there are three patterns of linking citizenship and national identity. These are referred to as hegemonic, uniformity-pattern and pluralist (Worseley, 1984). The hegemonic model is associated with feudal states; in these polities the culture of the dominant group is reckoned as *the* national culture. Others accept an inferior position within the polity if they do not or can not assimilate. The eclipse of the feudal state and the emergence of the bourgeois state resulted in a reformulation of the relationship between citizenship and national identity. The new formulation maintained that each nation must have its own state; national and political boundaries should co-exist. There was a variant of this formulation which maintained that national identity referred to the urge to preserve one's language, culture and customs. But this did not imply a separate sovereign state for each nation; several nations could co-exist under one political roof. Both these variants did exist in the bourgeois states.

The pluralist model was explicitly enunciated by the socialist state. However, the hope was that (*a*) 'non-historic' nations would not aspire for their exclusive states, or (*b*) they were destined to disappear, or (*c*) they would acquiesce and assimilate. That is, the socialist assumption was that several 'historic' nations could and

would co-exist within one state; citizenship and nationality could be delinked. The problematic of the socialist conceptualization was the hierarchization of nations—historic and non-historic—and inequality among historic nations. In all the socialist multi-national states, great nation chauvinism did emerge and contribute to the break-up of the state.

With the universal acceptance (not necessarily practice) of democracy, the hegemonic model stands clearly delegitimized. The pluralist model as it was practised has become a failed experiment. On the other hand, the dictum 'one nation, one state' has been abandoned even in West Europe, its birthplace. It is against this background that one should search for a viable linkage between citizenship and national identity for any polity, including India.

The heterogeneity of contemporary polities, thanks to constant population movements and the current commitment to democracy as a value, calls for the rejection of the old ideal—the nation-state. In fact, as Habermas noted: 'Citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity' (1992: 4). And within bourgeois states, the link between citizenship and national identity took at least three different forms (see, Greenfeld, 1992; Greenfeld and Chirot, 1994).

The English 'nation' was initially conceptualized as a collective of sovereign individuals; this later gave birth to the individualistic–liberatarian concept of the state. If individuals constituted the units of a nation, citizenship and nationality could be bifurcated. Great Britain was thus conceived as a collectivity of citizens drawn from different nations—England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. This conception was functional to its state-building. In contrast to this is the conceptualization which views nation as a distinct people, i.e., the collectivistic–ethnic nation. In this mode of conceptualization, citizenship and nationality get fused, giving birth to the collectivistic–authoritarian state. Typical examples of this concept of nation in West Europe are the German and Italian nation-states.

These two types of conceptualizations have given birth to two different criteria of membership in the national collectivity. Where nationality and citizenship are bifurcated, citizenship, at least in principle, is civic, that is, open and voluntary. It can be acquired. In contrast, where the two are fused, membership in the nation is inherent, that is, nationality has nothing to do with individual will and citizenship is inherited. One implies the other. The collectivistic

nation and the multi-national state are patently contradictory to each other.

The third mode of conceptualization is a mutation of the two and is exemplified by the French case. In France, an individual can acquire nationality, that is, citizenship, through a process of 'Frenchification'—learning the French language, getting French education and internalizing French culture, irrespective of race and religion. This, in principle, gives birth to a civic–collectivistic state fostering a community of citizens. However, there is a hierarchy of citizens/nationals even in France; the White, Catholic, French-speaking citizen from France at the top, and the 'Frenchified', Black, Muslim 'immigrant' citizen at the bottom (Balibar, 1991: 217–27).

It is clear from this that delinking nationality and citizenship is imperative if society is to be rendered open and if the polity is to remain democratic. This should not endanger the integrity of the polity because it is possible to construct a political culture dissociated from national and ethnic origins but anchored to the principle of multi-culturalism (Habermas, 1992). The British model in principle fits the bill; but in practice the dominated nations feel deprived. Thus, Ireland, Wales and Scotland are characterized as internal colonies of the dominant English nation (Hechter, 1975). Even if the national elites of these 'colonies' are full-fledged citizens of the British state, the lower classes from these nations may feel they are second class citizens. If so, the predicament of the non-national citizens—the ethnies—particularly the coloured immigrants who are also largely the underclass, can well be visualized. Which is to say that there is a fundamental problem in ignoring inter-group inequalities within a polity. Keeping these considerations in mind, let us consider the viable linkage between citizenship and national identity in the Indian context.

The Competing Contents of National Identity

It is necessary to familiarize ourselves with the historical processes involved in the formation of Indian society so as to understand the content of national identity. Indian society was formed through the processes of *accretion* of immigrants and *dislocation* of original inhabitants. The first recorded large-scale immigration of a culturally

distinct people into India occurred some 3,500 years ago with the Aryan invasion, which pushed the native Dravidians into the southern as well as to the relatively less hospitable geographical regions (the hilly tracts). Notwithstanding this dislocation, at least 40 per cent of the total population of India today is constituted by those who claim to be the original inhabitants—the Dravidians, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The Aryans evolved not only a distinct religion (Hinduism) and language (Sanskrit), but also a whole new scheme of social life (the *varna* or colour-based stratification), which were at variance with those of the original inhabitants. But, in contemporary India, that which is hailed as truly national is essentially Aryan. Today, 83 per cent Indians are Hindu and 72 per cent Indians speak one or another language of Aryan origin. This provides eloquent proof of an ethnie transforming itself into a nation in its new found home. We do not often comprehend this possibility precisely because of the long time span involved.

The second major cultural accretion occurred in India with the waves of Muslim conquests spanning 11 centuries beginning with the conquest of Sind in the eighth century AD. Although only a small section of the conquering group settled down, due to the policy of vigorous proselytization, a substantial number of the local people embraced Islam. Consequently, India has the third largest Muslim population (over 100 million) in the world, even after two Muslim states (Pakistan and Bangladesh) have been carved out of its erstwhile territory. Similarly, when Persian became the official language, a new hybrid language—Urdu—emerged through its interaction with local (north Indian) languages, and it is strongly identified (in popular conception) with the Muslim population of India even to this day.

The third major cultural influence on India was the Western intrusion, particularly British colonial rule for a period of two centuries. The British did not pursue a policy of proselytization although, of course, Western Christian missionaries did involve themselves in large-scale conversion movements, particularly among the traditionally deprived sections. And yet, the Indian Christian population now accounts for barely 2.5 per cent of the total. But the English language has a powerful presence and is the main language of learning and administration, particularly at the higher levels, although it does not enjoy any constitutional status.

The fourth major factor that contributed to the social formation that is India is the Freedom Movement. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the 'Indian consciousness' as we understand it today crystallized for the first time during the national liberation movement. By the same token, 'national' is a political and not a cultural referent in India. And yet, the Indian Freedom Movement was totalistic in its orientation. The domination by the colonizer was not simply economic and political, but also cultural, racial and even psychological. Admittedly, the unity provided by the movement was all-embracing. This was in spite of the fact that all the major religions of the world were professed and as many as 1,650 languages and dialects were spoken in India as mother tongues, and that there was nothing like an all-India dress, cuisine, painting, dance, music or lifestyle. Perhaps the only institution that had near-universal presence in India was the caste system. The importance of Indian unity in the Freedom Movement ought to be weighed against this background.

The emergence of the Indian state occurred through the partition of British India into India and Pakistan on the basis of religion, which was the fifth major factor in the formation of India, leading to large-scale and, in fact, one of the biggest population transfers in human history. Between 1946 and 1951, nearly 9 million Hindus and Sikhs came to India and about 6 million Muslims left India for Pakistan. Of the former, 5 million came from West Pakistan (that is, today's Pakistan) and 4 million came from East Pakistan (that is, Bangladesh). The majority of the Muslims who left India were from north India, however, and only a small number left east India. Thus, the influx from East Pakistan to India was not balanced by a corresponding efflux from India. Further, while migration from West Pakistan stopped by 1951, it continued for over three decades from East Pakistan. This resulted in the colonization of relatively underpopulated tracts (e.g., certain districts of Assam and Tripura) by Bengali refugees, leading to conflicts between them and the locals. In the case of the refugees from West Pakistan, the Sikhs constituted a high proportion and the Sikh male is also socially more visible because of his religious symbols (long hair, turban and so on). While a substantial number of them did settle down in Punjab itself, they also colonized parts of other states, particularly those contiguous with Punjab, as peasants. The enterprising Sikh refugees, however, went far and wide to distant towns and

cities. Their mood then was 'home was where we can earn our living'. But gradually emotional attachment to and psychological need for a separate homeland for Sikhs also crystallized. Given that religion was not an acceptable basis for the creation of an administrative unit in 'secular' India, language was used as the basis for creating the Punjabi Suba (a state inhabited predominantly by Sikhs), whose mother tongue (Punjabi written in Gurumukhi), is closely associated with their religion. A small section of Sikhs were not satisfied with this limited notion of homeland and initiated a movement for an independent sovereign Sikh state—Khalistan.

The issue of India's 'national' identity is further complicated by the fact that several neighbouring states have populations which share the same socio-cultural and physical characteristics. India, with a predominantly Hindu population (83 per cent), and the Hindu kingdom of Nepal have substantial socio-cultural similarities, sharing a common and long religious–historical tradition. Although the Nepali language and culture are distinct, the presence of a substantial number of Indian citizens of Nepali origin makes it difficult to distinguish clearly between Nepalis of Nepal and those of India, except in purely legal terms. Nepali citizens who migrate to India expect and may often find that the Indian citizens of Nepali origin are their natural allies and protectors. And both participate in the same society, notwithstanding the fact that they are drawn from two different states.

Bengali society is spread over West Bengal, Tripura and Bangladesh, having a common language and being participants in a shared cultural heritage even as they profess different faiths. At any rate, Bengali Muslims of West Bengal and Bengali Hindus of Bangladesh do participate in a society and culture beyond their respective state boundaries. Yet, those Bengalis who inhabit West Bengal and Tripura are Indian citizens, and those who live in Bangladesh are not citizens of India.

The Tamils inhabiting Sri Lanka may be categorized into three groups based on their socio-political status. These are: (*a*) Sri Lankan Tamils, (*b*) Indian Tamils, and (*c*) those who are not accepted as citizens either by Sri Lanka or by India. But all three categories are members of Tamil society and participants in Tamil culture, along with the Tamils of Tamilnadu in India.

Punjabi Hindus and Muslims have a common language and culture. But they are citizens of two states—the first predominantly found in

India and the second in Pakistan. The territory inhabited by several tribal groups in Northeast India is divided between two or more states, which, in turn, has fragmented their societies and rendered them citizens of different states. And yet they are members of a society which cuts across interstate borders. Kashmiri Muslims of the Kashmir Valley and their counterparts in 'Azad' Kashmir share a common culture and society, but they are citizens of two different countries.

These examples clearly point to the disjuncture that prevails between nation and state in South Asia, a product of a long historical process brought about by conquest, colonization and immigration. As a corollary to this, the internal situation prevailing in these countries represents the same disjuncture between polity and society. Admittedly, India's is the most complex case, and hence the link between citizenship and national identity is the most vexing.

It ought to be clear by now that three factors—religion, language and tribe—could be invoked as the bases of national identity in India. And all of them have been pressed into service by relevant collectivities to assert their national identity, which takes different manifestations. Before I list them, it is necessary to note the rationale behind these assertions.

It is instructive to note here that in all Indian languages the distinction between *desh* ('homeland') and *videsh* ('foreign land'), and consequently that between natives and foreigners, is clearly made. In fact, fellow Indians belonging to cultural zones other than one's own are often referred to as 'foreigners' (see, Oommen, 1990). *Desh* implies not merely a territory but also a people, language, style of life and pattern of culture; in fact, a 'nation'. A particular province (called state in India), may have several such 'nations' or parts thereof within it. That is, political–administrative units and national regions are not co-terminous and the concept of *desh* is essentially anchored to the notion of cultural homeland. In so far as a person is within his or her own *desh* and state, he or she is an insider, and his or her's is a 'national' identity. But should he or she cross the boundaries of this region, he or she becomes an outsider and ethnic.

One may identify several situations wherein 'ethnicity' or outsider identity becomes salient vis-à-vis 'nationality' or insider identity.

1. The demand for a distinct homeland based on religion (e.g., the demand for a sovereign state by a section of the Sikhs) or language (e.g., the Tamil demand for an independent state).

2. The demand for a political–administrative unit within the Indian state (e.g., Gorkhaland for Nepalis, Jharkhand state for the tribes of Central India).
3. The demand for expulsion of 'outsiders' when the entire state is engulfed by migrants from other states or neighbouring countries (e.g., in Assam and Tripura).
4. The demand for the expulsion of *videshis* ('foreigners') belonging to other folk regions within the state (e.g., the Chotanagpur tribal demand to expel fellow Biharis of the plains) or from other states (Bengalis or Marwaris).
5. The demand to expel those who do not belong to the same cultural region although they are from the same state (e.g., the demand for the expulsion of Andhras from Telengana region).
6. The demand to expel migrants from other linguistic states who come to work and reside in metropolitan centres (e.g., mobilization against Tamils in Bombay and Bangalore).

What is common to all these situations is the strong identification of the collectivities with specific territories, that is, with their homeland. Those who belong to the homeland are insiders, they constitute 'a nation'; and the outsiders are 'ethnies'. But the ethnies of India also have homelands normally elsewhere within India. This makes the efforts by nations to expel ethnies easier and often appears even legitimate.

These assertions of national identity can be viewed from three perspectives: statist, political and nationalist–cultural. The statist perspective assumes that such assertions are a threat to the state; ultimately the state will break-up and therefore national identity assertions should be suppressed. The political perspective assumes that one's national identity can be preserved only in an independent state of one's own. I have already noted that these assumptions are incorrect (see Chapter 1 in this volume). The nationalist–cultural perspective assumes that each nation has its genius and specificity irrespective of its size and level of 'material' development. And these specificities can be sustained within a multi-national polity if inter-nation equality is nurtured. That is, the nationalist–cultural perspective does not pose a threat to the state. Finally, the nationalist–cultural perspective conceptualizes the nation as a people with a common homeland sharing a common language; both

the homeland and the language could be ancestral or adopted. The three contestants to national identity—religion, language and tribe—need to be evaluated from this perspective.

Religion as the Basis of National Identity

Three religious collectivities of India—Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims—claim that they are nations. Presently, I shall examine the feasibility of their claims.

It is important to insist that the Hindu identity is neither entirely new nor completely old; it is a conjoint product of both contemporary construction and the givens of the past.[1] The cultural symbols and values which embody them have a recognizable trajectory, some of which are newly constructed to cope with the challenge posed by intruding Semitic religions. On the other hand, some of these values and symbols are activization of old ones, indeed revivals. It is this past–present linkage which imparts the new identity its vibrancy and vitality on the one hand, and its ambiguity and ambivalence on the other. This is evident from the differing boundary demarcations of Hinduism which fall on a continuum. That is, there are a series of Hindu identities and not just one ideal type. Let me list the three most prominent ones.

First, Hindus are simply the original and obvious inhabitants of Hindustan, that is, India. 'Hindu society living in this country since times immemorial is the national...society here.... The same Hindu people have built the life-values, ideals and culture of this country and, therefore, their nationhood is self-evident' (cited in Goyal, 1979: 40). Further, '...we, Hindus, have been in undisputed and undisturbed possession of this land for over eight or even ten thousand years before the land was invaded by any foreign race' (Golwalkar, 1939: 49). Viewed thus, Hindus are simply a people who occupy a homeland and share a lifestyle. This all-embracing definition does not have a religious content—Hindus being a people of a designated land as the Germans or the Greeks are.

Second, Hindus are all those who pursue religions of Indian origin, including the primal vision. Thus, Savarkar contends: 'Hinduism must necessarily mean the religion or the religions that are peculiar or native to this land...' (1949: 104). '...it should be

applied to all the religious beliefs that the different communities of the Hindu people hold' (ibid.: 105).

In this conceptualization the inextricable linkage between the community of faith and the country of residence is taken to be the essence of a Hindu nation. But such a proposition would be rejected by the 'non-Hindu' religions of Indian origin. Some had openly challenged it (e.g., Sikhs), and hence the following clarification:

> Sikhs are Hindus in the sense of our definition of Hindutva and not in any religious sense whatever. Religiously they are Sikhs as Jains are Jains, Lingayats are Lingayats, Vaishnavas are Vaishnavas; but all of us racially and nationally and culturally are a polity and a people.... We are Sikhs and Hindus and Bharatiyas (Indians). We are all three put together and none exclusively (Savarkar, 1949: 125).

Clearly this studied ambivalence and cultivated ambiguity is a political project designed to avoid possible wedges and potential conflicts between religions of Indian origin. Be that as it may, this definition of Hindu is both inclusive (all those who profess religions of Indian origin) and exclusive (all those who profess religions of 'alien' origin).

The third conceptualization of Hindu is more restrictive and substantially exclusivist. It includes (*a*) only twice-born Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas or, at best, also ritually clean Shudras, and (*b*) of Aryabhumi, that is, north India. It excludes the *Panchamas* (those of the fifth order),[2] that is, the ex-untouchables currently counting a 100 million; the *Adivasis* (the original inhabitants),[3] presently accounting for 50 million; and Dravidian Hindus[4] of south India, numbering around 200 million. This conceptualization questions the internality of a substantial proportion of 'Hindus'; they are rendered 'outsiders' (Oommen, 1990: 43–66). Clearly, such a definition of Hindu falls short of the requirements of a political project; it divides the Hindus of India into different 'nations'.

To avoid the extreme exclusivist orientation of this conceptualization, neo-Hindu reformers have attempted to accommodate non-Hindus through *shuddhi* ('ritual purification'). But the innovation is applicable only to (*a*) ritually unclean untouchables, (*b*) the tribal communities, that is, *vanvasis* ('forest dwellers') who

claim primal vision as their religion, and (*c*) those who have been converted into 'alien' religions. But for the Dravidian clean caste Hindus, *shuddhi* is irrelevant. Thus, once again one encounters the ambiguity of boundary and ambivalence of attitude in defining Hindu and Hinduism. The caste and linguistic factors invoked in defining Hinduism erode the saliency of religion.

Hindu is thus defined at least in three different ways invoking different variables: territory, religion and caste/language. And all of them pose problems in defining Hindu as a nation and/or nationality, and I shall list them presently.

It is true that 83 per cent of the Indian population is classified as Hindu in the census.[5] To begin with, it may be noted that the claim that India was a Hindu homeland was made with reference to undivided India in which the proportion of Hindus was much less than that in divided India. On the other hand, undivided India had the largest Muslim congregation in the world. Even after Partition, India remains the third biggest Muslim country in the world. Similarly, 80 per cent of the world's Zoroastrians live in India. Hindu nationalists counter this point by suggesting that these people are outsiders, which in turn brings in the question as to the time span required for the nativization of a people in a country.

Zoroastrians have been in India since the eighth century AD. The Muslims came to the Kerala coast as early as the seventh century AD as traders. The Syrian Christians of Kerala claim to be converts since AD 52. At any rate, an overwhelming majority of Muslims and Christians are converts from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the original inhabitants of India. Therefore, if one takes the criterion of nativity seriously, a majority of the Muslims and Christians have a better claim to being Indian nationals because the Aryan Hindus, who claim to be the original inhabitants, came to India only some 3,500 years ago.

The attitude of Hindu nationalists varies enormously with regard to different religious categories viewed in terms of their sources of presence and modes of incorporation. All religions of Indian origin are considered Hinduism according to one of the conceptualizations. However, this expansionist orientation in defining Hindus is resented by some, the most obvious case being that of the Sikhs in independent India, as they too claim to be a nation based on the criterion of religion. The Hindu–Sikh conflict, then, is to be viewed as the competing claims of two religious nationalisms.

Generally speaking, Hindu nationalists have an attitude of indifference and even tolerance towards the 'migrant' religions—Jews, Zoroastrians and Baha'is—not only because their numbers are very small (and hence they do not pose any threat) but also because they have not claimed any part of the Indian territory as their homeland and have not indulged in proselytizations.[6] However, Hindu nationalists have had an uneasy relation and a hostile attitude towards Christians and Muslims, although it has varied in intensity. The negative attitude to Indian Christians was part of the hostility towards British rulers, as both were co-religionists and hence instant objects of suspicion. The persisting hostility towards Christians after the exit of the British can be traced to the continuing missionary activities often geared to proselytization. But this hostility is moderated by two factors. First, Indian Christians have never defined themselves as a nationality and have not even demanded any special benefits from the state on the basis of religion. (However, Christian converts from the Scheduled Castes and their spokespersons do demand such benefits now, as conversion has not improved their material conditions.)

The Hindu nationalists' attitude to Muslims is very negative for several reasons. First, they number over a 100 million and constitute perhaps the single-most important vote bank against Hindu nationalism. Second, the presence of two Muslim majority states—Pakistan and Bangladesh—as immediate neighbours makes the relationship between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority uneasy, ambivalent and even tricky. Third, Hindu nationalists hold the Muslims responsible for the vivisection of India, the sacred and ancient land of the Hindus. Fourth, Indian Muslims have not entirely given up the claim to nationality even after Partition, although they are territorially dispersed. The effort to consolidate Muslims as a nationality is pursued by projecting (although wrongly) Urdu as the exclusive language of Muslims. Finally, the claim by Kashmiri Muslims that Kashmir is their exclusive homeland, the secessionist movement in Kashmir believed to be abetted and sustained by Pakistan, the special privilege conceded to Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, have all soured the relationship between Hindu nationalists and Indian Muslims.

The Hindu nationalists' hostility to other religions is thus not simply based on their 'alien' origin but anchored to the proclivity they unfold in claiming that they too are nations. Thus, inter-religious

hostility in independent India is most pronounced between Hindus, on the one hand, and the Sikhs and Muslims, on the other, both of whom define themselves as nations/nationalities. It is important to recall here that Sikhism is the youngest religion of Indian origin. Further, the definition of Hinduism proferred by the Indian Constitution, the Hindu Code Bill and Hindu nationalists includes Sikhism, along with Jainism and Buddhism.

Hinduism, although not proselytizing, is migratory. At least 12 million Hindus live outside the Indian subcontinent (see, Jain, 1989), the traditional sacred land of Hinduism. In some of the countries (e.g., Fiji, Surinam and Mauritius), they constitute majorities. Would it be correct to say that those Hindus who have settled outside the Indian subcontinent cease to be Hindus because they do not live in their ancestral homeland? The absurdity of the question is patent, but it emanates from the assumptions made by Hindu nationalists. At any rate, where does one put agnostics, rationalists and secularists in the scheme of Hindus *Rashtra*, or for that matter, in any nation constructed on the basis of religion? Finally, the Hindu nationalist claim implies the annexation of Nepal, the Hindu majority neighbour, as a part of consolidating the Hindu nation!

It is also not true that only Islam and Christianity have colonized new territories, and in that process either annihilated or marginalized the native populations. The dominant religions of Sri Lanka are Buddhism and Hinduism (both of Indian origin), and the original inhabitants of that country—the Veddas—constitute just 1 per cent of the Sri Lankan population today. In the process of Aryanizing India, the native population was stigmatized. Buddhism has been vigorously proselytizing and Hinduism acutely assimilative. Therefore, religion–territory co-terminality is not axiomatic even in the case of religions of Indian origin. The Hindus belong to a multiplicity of speech communities, that is, there are several Hindu nations. To grapple with this problem, Hindu nationalists project Sanskrit as the common ancient language of all Hindus and Hindi written in Devnagri script as the national language of India. But they encounter several difficulties and severe resistance in this context.

First, Sanskrit is not a living language and is today spoken only by a handful of people. Second, it is not true that Sanskrit is the exclusive heritage of Hindus; it is a common Indian heritage cutting

across religious categories. While Sanskrit was an ancient and highly developed language of ancient India, so were Pali and Tamil. (Of these three languages, only Tamil is a living vibrant language.) Given these facts, Sanskrit is at best identified with Aryan Hinduism, Pali with Buddhism and Tamil with Dravidian Hinduism. Consequently, Sanskrit is not even the common heritage of all Hindus. Third, Hindi, even as it is expansively defined to include several languages and dialects, is spoken by only 38 per cent of the Indian population. Fourth, several Indo-Aryan languages (e.g., Bengali and Marathi) and all the major Dravidian languages are equally, if not more, developed as compared to Hindi, and these non-Hindi speech communities do not accept Hindi as the exclusive 'national' language and the relegation of their own mother-tongues to the background. Finally, there are a dozen highly developed languages in India with 10 million or more speakers; in fact, some of them have as many as 50 million speakers. There is no possibility of these nations abandoning their languages in favour of Hindi just to facilitate the establishment of a Hindu nation!

The fallacious claim about religion–territory co-terminality is also implied in the claims advanced by Muslims and Sikhs that they are nations. As hinted earlier, the alien migrant element in the Muslim population of South Asia is negligible, and the overwhelming majority of Muslims are converts from local castes and tribes. Therefore, the claims of Muslims that particular areas of the Indian subcontinent are their homeland is legitimate and authentic, because they have a moral claim on these territories, although not as Muslims. If the Muslims were not natives and mere migrants eager to return to their homeland (as the Jews did in the wake of the Zionist movement), they would not have succeeded in staking their claim. But there are several difficulties in advancing the claim that Muslims *qua* Muslims constitute a nation.

First, none of the areas claimed by the Muslims as their homeland (as in the case of other religious groups) was populated exclusively by them even after substantial transfer of Hindu and Sikh populations from these areas. Therefore, the claim that these areas were/are Muslim homelands is not tenable, not because Islam is an 'alien' religion but because nativity and nationhood cannot be defined in terms of religious faiths and affiliations. The so-called Muslim homeland is as much the homeland of non-Muslims of that region.

Second, even if a section of the Muslims are migrants to India, to the extent that the migration occurred several centuries ago, since they identify with the territory presently inhabited by them as their homeland, the claim ought to be accepted as legitimate. This is no concession to the alien elements in the Muslim population because there are several alien elements among Hindus—Kashmiri Pandits, Maghi Brahmins and Rajputs to mention but a few—whose nativity is not questioned by Hindu nationalists.

Third, Pakistan, which emerged in 1947, although populated predominantly by Muslims, could not be sustained as one political unit for long because of the absence of geographical contiguity and cultural uniformity. In fact, Islam became an irrelevant variable in maintaining the unity of Muslim Pakistan, leading to its split mainly based on territory and language.

Fourth, the Hindi speaking Muslims, popularly referred to as Bihari Muslims, instantly became alien elements in Bangladesh, the state of the Bengali speaking Muslims. Even the Hindi/Urdu speaking Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from India are not accepted as natives and remain *Mohajirins*—the stigmatized outsiders. Thus, Muslim nationalists deny nativity even to co-religionists who are migrants from outside.

Fifth, the predominantly Muslim but multi-lingual Pakistan continues to have serious tensions and conflicts between its different linguistic groups—Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, etc.—that is, the nations which constitute the state of Pakistan. Each of these collectivities define their respective linguistic regions as their homelands. Thus, it is clear that homeland can only be anchored to speech communities and not to faith communities.

Once India was partitioned, no territory within India could be claimed as a Muslim homeland, save the Kashmir Valley. However, this claim is ambivalent because of two reasons. First, Kashmir itself is partitioned and apportioned between India and Pakistan for geopolitical reasons. Second, there are others in Kashmir (e.g., Kashmiri Pandits) who stake their claim with equal intensity and authenticity that Kashmir is their homeland too. In such a situation, the only route available to those who falsely claim that the Kashmir Valley is an exclusive Muslim homeland is to intimidate, terrorize and flush out those who make counter-claims. In the current exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir, what one witnesses is the

inevitable consequence of the perverse notion that there exists co-terminality between territory and religion.

After Partition, the Muslims of India did not have a decisive majority in any part of India except in the Kashmir Valley and Lakshadweep. But Muslims constituted about 12 per cent of India's population, around 70 million in the fifties. That is, while their absolute number was substantial, they were thinly dispersed all over the country; they became an ethnie. This necessitated the invention and maintenance of new symbols to preserve their socio-religious identity. Urdu, written in Persian-Arabic script, is the most important symbol the Muslims invoke to highlight their cultural specificity and nationality within India. But the project remains ineffective in investing nationhood on Muslims on an all-India basis because the principle of geographical contiguity is imperilled.

The language of the majority of Muslims in India is not Urdu; it is only in two states—Uttar Pradesh and Bihar—that one finds Muslims who are also Urdu speakers. These two states account for only one-third of the Muslim population and one-half of the Urdu speakers in India. In Jammu and Kashmir, though the official language is Urdu, the Urdu speakers of the state count a meagre 0.27 per cent. On the other hand, the majority of the Urdu speakers are from states where the proportion of Muslims is very low. This disjuncture between Urdu and Islam has further muted the possibility of Urdu nationalism emerging as an authentic force in independent India (cf. Brass, 1974).

The Sikh claim to nationhood too assumes religion–territory co-terminality. But the Punjab, claimed to be the Sikh homeland, was a Muslim-majority province before India's Partition, with 51 per cent Muslims in 1921. By 1961, although the Muslim population had been reduced to a mere 2 per cent in the Indian Punjab (both because of re-allocation of territory and migration), the Sikhs constituted only 33 per cent, and the Hindus were still in majority with 64 per cent. As religion was not accepted as the basis of constituting politico-administrative units in independent India, the only hope was to carve out a Sikh majority state by invoking language as the criterion. The Sikh leadership therefore staked their claim for a separate state based on the Punjabi language. A separate Punjabi-speaking state was formed in 1966, in which the Sikhs constituted only a thin majority of 53 per cent. Thus, in spite of

two successive partitions in 1947 and 1966, the Punjabi Suba cannot be viewed as the exclusive homeland of Sikhs; they do not constitute a decisive demographic majority. And the remaining 47 per cent of the non-Sikh population too considers Punjab its homeland. But a fatal error by Punjabi Hindus in disclaiming their real mother-tongue, namely, Punjabi and on falsely insisting that Hindi is their mother-tongue provided a thin veneer of legitimacy to the crystallization of the idea that Punjab was the Sikh homeland (see, Nayyar, 1966).

There is another reason why the Sikh claim to Punjab as their homeland is untenable. Although 78 per cent of the Sikhs in India live in Punjab, the remaining 22 per cent are dispersed all over India. This demographic dispersal of Sikhs may be traced to two factors. First, in the wake of Partition, a substantial proportion of the Sikhs who migrated to India settled outside the Punjab. Second, the Sikhs are an enterprising migratory community in search of economic opportunities. The logical corollary of insisting that Punjab is the exclusive homeland of the Sikhs is to render instantly the Sikhs outside Punjab and the non-Sikhs inside Punjab aliens, outsiders and refugees.

The point I want to make is this. Claims to nationhood by a people are based on their moral claim on a specific territory as their homeland. Such a claim cannot be sustained by a religious collectivity because of the disjuncture between religion and territory. Pursuantly, the claim to nationhood by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs based on the assumption and the argument that the whole of India or specific parts of India constitute their exclusive homeland is untenable. Further, the Hindus and Muslims of India have numerous mother-tongues; they do not have a common ancestral or adopted language. The Sikhs do have a common ecclesiastical language, but this single criterion is a tenuous basis for claiming nationhood.

Language and Tribe as Bases of National Identity

Having noted that religion cannot be the basis of providing national identity in India, we need to examine the feasibility of the other

two bases—language and tribe. In pursuing this analysis, I shall apply the same criterion in defining a nation as applied to religion, namely, the combination of language and territory. Although by definition languages and tribes are associated with definite territories, there are several complications/variations. First, the same territory may host two or more language groups/tribes, in which case they co-jointly constitute a nation. Second, a tribe or linguistic group may get de-territorialized and hence may lose its homeland (e.g., Sindhis in India). Third, a linguistic group or tribe or its segment may establish a new homeland and may become a 'new nation' (e.g., French Canadians). Finally, all language groups and tribes may not or can not claim national identity because they may be too small in size.

In considering language as a plausible basis of national identity, it is necessary to recognize the polyglot character of Indian society. It is also important to remember that we are referring to some 900 million people—one-sixth of humanity! The problem is further complicated because of the differing estimates of the number of languages spoken in India. Thus, George Grierson, who undertook the monumental *Linguistic Survey of India*, listed 723 major languages and dialects. The 1931 Census, the last enumeration done by the British, recorded more than 2,000 languages/dialects. The figures of mother-tongues listed in the censuses of independent India too vary and waver: 1951 (782), 1961 (1,652), 1971 (1,019). The number of mother-tongues seems to have stabilized by the 1971 Census. But a categorization of languages in terms of size-groups and an understanding of the entities listed as 'mother-tongues' in the census help to steer clear of a lot of confusion.

According to the 1951 Census, there were 210 languages with 10 or less speakers! On the other hand, only 132 languages out of the 782 listed in the 1951 Census had 10,000 or more speakers. While the stupendous linguistic complexity of India cannot be denied, if we go by the census figures we get a rather confusing picture of this complexity. There are two sources of this confusion. The first is the procedure followed in identifying mother-tongues in the Indian census. The census enumerators simply list 'mother-tongues' as reported by the respondents. Thus, in the 1961 Census, 60,000 south Indians living outside the region described their mother-tongue as 'Madrasi' or 'Dravidian'. The census also records 'languages' such as 'Reddy Bhasa', 'Muslim Pahari', 'Ahiri Hindi',

'Rajputi', 'Ad Dharmi', 'Islami' and 'Christian'. It is clear that a large number of 'languages' listed in the census are not languages but expressions of socio-cultural affinities. And this indicates the second source of confusion.

The notion of language is different to a speaker and to a linguist. To the latter, the formal characteristics of a particular speech—grammar, structure of language, etc.—have primacy in determining whether it belongs to one or another language family. For a speaker, a language is more a matter of national identity and group loyalty. Therefore, the denial of national identity to a speech community by labelling it 'tribal', 'peasant', 'underdeveloped', 'non-literate', etc., will result in a deep sense of a deprivation and revulsion. That is, the abandoning of any set of common criteria and the arbitrary invoking of a select set of them for privileging some languages and stigmatizing others are at the root of the problem. Let me amplify here.

There are only 12 languages in India with 10 million or more speakers, and all of them are accorded recognition as 'national' languages. However, when one slides down the size-category, the issue becomes very complex. In 1971, the languages spoken by more than a population of 100,000 numbered 82, but there were only 33 speech communities with 1,000,000 or more speakers out of the 1,652 mother-tongues spoken. That is, when we consider the total population of India and its staggering linguistic diversity, to accord national identity to 33 (or even 82) speech communities should not have been viewed as a problem. And yet, by 1993 only 18 languages have been privileged as 'national' in India.

What is more, there is absolutely no sustainable basis of extending this recognition. Sanskrit, with a community of 22,000 speakers, is recognized as a 'national' language, being a rich and ancient language of India. But Pali, which would qualify for recognition in terms of the same criterion is denied recognition. On the other hand, languages of subaltern (tribal) peoples with substantial speakers are also denied recognition. Prominent examples are Santali with 3.7 million, Gondi with 1.5 million, Pahari with 1.3 million, and Bhili and Kurux with 1.2 million each in 1971.

If national identity is to be discerned in terms of territorial linkages, a few of the languages which are accorded such status do not qualify. Thus, Sanskrit, Sindhi and Urdu, which do not have any exclusive territorial enclave in India, are 'national' languages.

On the other hand, numerous subaltern communities with firm territorial anchorages are not 'national'. To add insult to injury, quite a few of them are vivisected and apportioned between two or more politico-administrative units (called states). For example, the Santals are divided between West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the Bhils between Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. In this process, different segments of the same nation are required to learn different languages depending upon where they are assigned, leading to the very eclipse of their national identities.

Although Kashmiri is recognized as a 'national' language, in its homeland, Kashmir, it is not Kashmiri (the spoken language) but Urdu which is the official language. Similarly, although English is the mother-tongue of a distinct community (Anglo-Indians) and the official language of one of the states (Nagaland), and perhaps the most widely used language in inter-regional communications as well as in administration and academy, it is not a 'national' language in India. Finally, some of the languages included in the Eighth Schedule (e.g., Kashmiri) are much less developed as compared with some others which are excluded (e.g., Konkani) from the Eighth Schedule.[7]

The language policy of free India has created a hierarchical structure of legitimacy for languages. At the apex of this hierarchy has been installed Hindi. The intermediary layer of the hierarchy is constituted by the 'regional' languages—the languages of those speech communities which wield political clout and those languages which are perceived to be a part of India's ancient heritage. But numerous other languages with millions of speakers are dismissed as dialects (like Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Brij Bhasa, Santali, Bhili, Gondi and Kurux). Not only are these languages not given any official recognition, but every effort is made to stigmatize them. The regional languages complain of Hindi imperialism, but they indulge in their brand of linguistic imperialism against the languages of subaltern groups. In this process, weaker groups and their national identity get liquidated. The whole ethos is one of perpetuating the cultural hegemony of the dominant nationalities at different levels.

Keeping this all-India picture in mind, it is instructive to analyze the regional–linguistic situation. An analysis of the distribution of 'Scheduled Languages' reveals the following (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Distribution of 'Scheduled Language' Speakers in India (1971)

State	*85 or more %*	*84–75%*	*74–50%*	*49–25%*	*24–11%*	*10–5%*	*Below 5 but above 1%*
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*
Andhra Pradesh	Telugu					Urdu	Tamil
Assam			Assamese		Bengali		Hindi
Bihar				Hindi		Urdu	Bengali
Gujarat	Gujarati						Hindi, Marathi, Sindhi, Urdu
Jammu & Kashmir			Kashmiri	Punjabi			
Kerala	Malayalam						Tamil
Karnataka			Kannada			Telugu, Urdu	Marathi, Tamil, Malayalam
Orissa		Oriya					Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Telugu
Rajasthan			Hindi			Punjabi	Urdu

Table 5.1 *(contd.)*

Table 5.1 *(contd.)*

State	*85 or more %*	*84–75%*	*74–50%*	*49–25%*	*24–11%*	*10–5%*	*Below 5 but above 1%*
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*
Tamilnadu	Tamil					Telugu	Kannada, Malayalam, Urdu
Tripura			Bengali				Hindi
Uttar Pradesh		Hindi				Urdu	
West Bengal	Bengali					Hindi	Urdu
Delhi		Hindi			Punjabi	Urdu	Bengali
Goa					Marathi	Gujurati	Hindi, Kannada, Urdu
Pondicherry	Tamil					Malayalam, Telegu	

Notes: 1. Based on *Distribution of Languages in Indian States and Union Territories*, Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore, 1973, the latest data available on this score.

2. Only 14 out of 15 'Scheduled Languages' in 1971 and the administrative units with a clearly identified 'dominant language' are taken into account. Sanskrit, although a 'Scheduled Language', has only a handful of speakers
3. In the case of Bihar, the 'dominant language', namely Hindi, is spoken by only 35 per cent of the population; mother-tongues such as Maithili and Bhojpuri are not 'Scheduled Languages'. In the case of Goa, the dominant mother-tongue, namely Konkini, was not scheduled in 1971
4. The 1971 data on Punjabi speakers in Punjab is not available separately and is confusing, and hence has not been included
5. In some of the states the speakers of 'Scheduled Languages' are negligible (e.g., Manipur 3 per cent, Nagaland 7 per cent, Arunachal Pradesh 13 per cent) and hence have been excluded

First, only eight of these languages are heavily concentrated (75 per cent or more) in one or more regions/states. Thus, all 'Scheduled Languages' do not have a home state and/or territory; which means some of these languages are minority languages in one or more regions/states. If minority languages are apt to be oppressed or not provided with facilities to develop, some of the 'Scheduled Languages' will suffer from these disabilities. That is, scheduling of a language is no guarantee against oppression, disability or ill-treatment.

Second, in terms of spread and dispersal, the 'Scheduled Languages' may be placed on a continuum. Hindi and Urdu have an all-India presence with 12 and 13 enclaves each. And yet, there is a critical difference between them: Hindi has a dominant presence in half of the enclaves in which it is present whereas Urdu is a minority language in all the enclaves, with a concentration of only 10 or less per cent speakers. Consequently, Urdu is not the language of administration or education in most of the states/regions where it is spoken. The attenuation of the relationship between the Urdu language and a given territory makes it difficult to foster national identity among the Urdu speech community.

Third, languages such as Bengali and Telugu are in six enclaves each; Tamil and Marathi in five enclaves each; and Malayalam in four enclaves. These languages have a moderate spread. But in terms of their concentration they vary substantially. Telugu has a heavy concentration only in Andhra Pradesh, its homeland, but is thinly distributed elsewhere. In contrast, in three enclaves, Bengali has a strong presence. Other languages fall in-between. What is common to all the languages with a moderate spread is that their concentration outside their homeland is confined to their neighbouring states/regions (save in the case of Bengali in Delhi). This mode of dispersal to geographically contiguous and culturally proximate regions is favourable in upholding the cultural rights of migrant collectivities as speech communities. Because, in the event of discrimination and ill treatment, their co-national community in their homelands would take up their cause, and in a situation of extreme persecution the persecuted speech community can always cross the borders to reach their ancestral homeland where they are likely to be tolerated. In the final analysis, each of these languages has an accredited homeland (nation); outside their nations they are ethnies.[8]

To conclude, the legal/constitutional status accorded to a language is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for its survival and development. Equally important is the mode of distribution exemplified in terms of the size of the enclave(s) of the speech community and the advantage it has in terms of its physical location vis-à-vis its ancestral homeland.

Apart from these 'ecological' and political factors, the socio-cultural factor too is important. A language can survive only if a speech community interacts with adequate frequency and intensity. Such a possibility is often absent if the number constituting the speech community is too small, and if it is widely and thinly dispersed. And such a scenario often obtains with regard to several speech communities in metropolitan centres to which they migrate in search of economic opportunities. This is illustrated by the Sindhis in India. Even a state deeply committed to the policy of linguistic pluralism may not be in a position to create the conditions for the sustenance of the national identity of widely dispersed small migrant speech communities. In contrast, it is possible to foster the national identity of those speech communities which inhabit their ancestral homeland even when their size is not too big, say around 100,000. Such communities are just 82 in India. It is here that one notes the Achilles heel of fostering national identity in India.

As I have indicated earlier, even a state pursuing a policy of enlightened linguistic pluralism cannot foster the development of all languages when (*a*) there are too many languages spoken in its territory, (*b*) the size of a language community is too small, and (*c*) it is territorially dispersed. Keeping these considerations in mind, let us look at the distribution of mother-tongues in India (see Table 5.2).

The number of mother-tongues spoken in India according to the 1971 Census data is 1,019, as noted earlier. But several of these mother-tongues are spoken in more than one enclave. Thus, in the 18 states for which data are presented in Table 5.2, there are 1,524 language enclaves. An overwhelming majority of them, that is 1,274 (84 per cent), are small in size, if a population of below 10,000 is viewed as small for this purpose. But the fact is that not all the 1,274 enclaves have a concentration of even this small a number, as speakers of mother-tongues are not always concentrated in one specified unit—village, *taluka* or even a district. Be that as it may, there are 250 enclaves with 10,000 or more speakers of

Table 5.2
Distribution of Mother Tongues in Indian States

State	*No. of Mother-tongues spoken*	*Below 10,000*	*10,000 to 1,000,000*	*1,000,000 to 10 million*	*Above 10 million*
Andhra Pradesh	120	113	6	–	1
Assam	93	67	24	2	–
Bihar	78	54	17	6	1
Gujarat	48	36	11	–	1
Himachal Pradesh	148	138	10	–	–
Jammu & Kashmir	57	47	9	1	–
Karnataka	74	61	10	2	1
Kerala	28	25	2	–	1
Madhya Pradesh	155	124	28	2	1
Maharashtra	293	265	25	2	1
Manipur	53	44	9	–	–
Nagaland	31	19	12	–	–
Orissa	32	12	19	–	1
Punjab	60	55	4	1	–
Rajasthan	53	33	16	4	–
Tamilnadu	57	50	5	1	1
Uttar Pradesh	63	48	12	2	1
West Bengal	155	144	9	1	1
Total	1,524	1,274	218	22	10

Source: *The Distribution of Indian Languages in India*, Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore, 1973

mother-tongues distributed in the 18 states. This number is much larger than the enclaves of 'Scheduled Language' speakers, which is just 62. While the data presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are not strictly comparable, one can safely infer that the discrepancy in the number of language enclaves can be traced to the anomaly in India's language policy. This anomaly is that a large number of mother-tongues with substantial territorial concentration are not 'scheduled', that is, extended constitutional recognition; they are not 'national' languages. As noted earlier, these languages are mainly spoken by the subaltern peoples of India. This denial of legal recognition to the languages of numerous speech communities is indeed a denial of national identity to them.

In conclusion, two points may be noted. First, the nations in the Indian polity may be divided into two categories: those whose

languages are 'national' and those whose languages are not recognized as 'national'. Those nations whose language is recognized may be further grouped into two: the Hindi-speaking nation (with five administrative units—the states) whose language is also the official and link language, and 17 other languages which are simply 'national' languages.

The second conclusion relates to the ambivalence between language policy and practice in India. While only 18 languages are recognized by the Constitution, as many as 190 languages are used for broadcasting by the All India Radio, the state owned and administered communication agency. Similarly, literary and film awards are given by the state instituted agencies to works written or films produced in several languages which are not listed in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. This is also true with regard to the medium of instruction used for elementary education. All these unfold the anxiety of the state to attend to the cultural deprivation of numerous speech communities. If the languages used for these different purposes are included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, it would do away with the persisting contradiction between practice and policy and would be a step in the right direction in conferring national identity on several speech communities.

It is reasonable to conclude from this analysis that both linguistic groups and tribes with territorial bases are nations, and those without homelands or those segments of them which are dissociated from their homelands have become ethnies. The insider–outsider conflicts are then conflicts between nationals and ethnies vis-à-vis entitlements *within* nations. Admittedly, common citizenship entitlements guaranteed to all by the Constitution irrespective of socio-cultural backgrounds, and claims to entitlements based on the nationality principle stand in a relation of contradiction. The tension between state and nation in India emerges precisely because of this contradiction.

Reconciling Identity and Equality

I had hinted at the very outset of this chapter that what is at the heart of delinking citizenship and national identity is reconciling the competing demands of equality and identity. This is so because

the assumption that a trade-off between the two is possible has proven to be largely incorrect almost everywhere. In independent India, national identity has been claimed on the bases of religion, language and tribe. However, it is not true that all those who have claimed national identity wanted their exclusive sovereign states; in fact such claims were few and far between considering the numerous identity groups involved. This attests to the fact that citizenship and nationality can be delinked, not only conceptually but also by people's own volition.

On the other hand, some sections of people who insisted on specific national identity did stake a claim for a separate sovereign state. While this proclivity was particularly prominent among those who defined national identity based on religion—Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, it was not altogether absent among those who defined national identity based on language (e.g., Tamil) or tribe (e.g., Mizos and Nagas). However, secessionist tendencies stand either terminated or are kept under suspended animation as of today. Thus, it seems that there is a general need in India for the separation of national identity and citizenship entitlements; the latter should be extended to all irrespective of the former.

To the extent national identity and citizenship entitlements are linked, democratic principles are likely to be endangered in a multi-national polity. This is particularly so when national identity is defined on the basis of religion. At any rate, religion cannot provide the basis of national identity because the two basic conditions of nation formation, namely common territory and language, are not common to a faith community, as I have argued earlier. In contrast, linguistic and tribal communities can provide the bases for nation formation, provided they have a minimum size. The size factor is a tricky one, and yet if one fixes the size of a nation say at 1 million there are not more than 33 such communities in India. And all of them do not qualify to be nations because some of them do not have an accredited homeland. I am not making a fetish of the size factor but pointing out the fact that the number of nations even in India is not too many in spite of her stupendous size and linguistic diversity. Issues of inter-nation tensions within a polity arise out of two contexts. First, spatial dispersal of the people of one nation into the homelands of other nations, that is, tension between nationals and ethnies. But ethnies can become nationals if two conditions are met: (*a*) they adopt the

land into which they have migrated as their homeland and learn the local language, and (*b*) the nationals accept the ethnies as co-nationals when the first condition is met. But this does not always happen, as less developed, weaker and smaller nations tend to resist the hegemony of big, strong, developed nations. However, these tendencies are partly moderated by two factors: the market mechanism which provides opportunities to all irrespective of their nationality, and citizenship entitlements conferred on all by the state.

Several factors however complicate the situation at the operational level. First, although theoretically the market operates 'openly', in reality numerous interventions by the state favour one or other national groups, particularly the elites among them. Second, the local national bourgeoisie, the all-India supranational bourgeoisie and the global bourgeoisie compete in the market. And they are not placed in conditions of equality. Third, the entity called state in India is not one piece; it is bifurcated and hierarchized into the local, the state, and the union levels. Considerable contradictions obtain across these levels, particularly because the instrument of the all-India single citizenship and the domiciliary prescriptions within states pull in different directions. In effect, this gives birth to dual citizenship. Understandably, tensions between citizenship entitlements and national identity occasionally surface. But this is a small price to pay in order to keep a large number of nations under one political roof.

Notes

1. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that the terms Hindus and Hinduism are appellations invented by conquering or colonizing outsiders to refer to the inhabitants of the then India, today these are terms which connote a particular religious collectivity, and a corpus of belief system and ritual practices specific to them. It could be argued, with some justification, that notions such as religious collectivity and belief system are scarcely applicable to Hindus and Hinduism. Extrapolating the Thomas Theorem, I suggest that if the people who define themselves as Hindus assert that Hinduism is their religion, their perception should be endorsed as authentic. At any rate, it is those who assert that Hinduism is a religion who have emerged as its accredited spokespersons.
2. According to the Hindu doctrine of creation, Brahmins emerged from the mouth of the creator, Kshatriyas from the hands, Vaishyas from the thighs and Shudras

from the feet. This *chaturvarna* ('four colour') scheme does not even account for the untouchables, belonging to the fifth varna.

3. The 400 odd tribal communities of India claim that they are the original inhabitants (*adivasis*) of the land. But this claim is not acceded to by Hindu nationalists who insist that Aryan Hindus were the original settlers, and consequently label the tribal communities as forest-dwellers (*vanvasis*).
4. The population of India speaks languages belonging to four families: Indo-Aryan (73 per cent), Dravidian (25 per cent), Austro-Asiatic (1.5 per cent) and Tibeto-Chinese (0.5 per cent). Dravidian languages are spoken mainly in the four south Indian states: Kerala (Malayalam), Karnataka (Kannada), Tamilnadu (Tamil) and Andhra Pradesh (Telugu). The Dravidian movement, which opposed Aryan domination, considers Dravidian Hinduism distinct from Aryan Hinduism.
5. This figure is problematic because the Indian census automatically counts all those who do not belong to one of the world religions as Hindu. In the British Indian census, there was a religious category variously designated as 'animist', 'tribal', 'primitive', etc., which accounted for 2 to 3 per cent of the population (about 25 million persons in those days). This category has been absorbed under the rubric of Hindu from the 1951 Census onwards.
6. It may, however, be noted that the Baha'is did pursue the project of proselytization in the sixties in the region of Malwa in central India. Consequently, they increased from a small number in the fifties to 400,000 in the late sixties (see, Garlington, 1977).
7. Konkani was included in the Eighth Schedule and given the status of a 'national' language through the 57th Constitution Amendment Bill (1992) along with Manipuri and Nepali.
8. Such instances are not infrequent in India. For example, when anti-Tamil riots break out in Bangalore, the 'cosmopolitan' capital city of Karnataka, Tamils flee from Bangalore to Tamilnadu. When 'anti-Muslim' riots break out in Bombay, non-Maharashtrian Hindus as well as Muslims leave for their *desh*, i.e., 'homeland', in Uttar Pradesh, Tamilnadu, Punjab, etc.

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6

Colonialism, Citizenship and Fractured National Identity: The African Case*

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> For people who are hungry, people who are unemployed and roaming the streets, the benefits of the constitution and democracy are really theoretical. People who are illiterate cannot read the constitution and understand and therefore obey it.
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> Hage Geingob, Namibia's Prime Minister,
> *Africa News*, 3–16 August 1992, p. 9.

> In all these countries the ruling party—or rather the ruling bureaucracy, for the concept of political party in every legitimate sense had ceased to apply—was itself the state; and this state, effectively, had ceased to have any citizens. Its condition of 'having no citizens' was every bit (as) complete, if sometimes less blatantly obvious.... Citizens might remain present as existential phenomena; they were absent as participating actors.
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> Basil Davidson (1992),
> *The Black Man's Burden*, p. 273.

As the twentieth century draws to a close, Africa in world politics presents a picture of very painful realities. The living conditions

of the inhabitants of its 54 countries, counting the newly liberated Eriteria, make the continent a mosaic of contradictions and a question mark for the twenty-first century. Africa occupies slightly less than one-quarter of the earth's land mass and has one-eighth or 12.23 per cent of the world's population.

The two passages cited at the beginning at once summarize Africa's present realities and what must be righted in order that the peoples of that continent can be considered 'citizens' of some geopolitical entity in an experiential rather than statutory sense.

Since the conditions which make this true continue to be played out right before our very eyes, we have chosen to allow media reports up to the second week of August 1992 as well as other publications of recent vintage to inform our discussion of national identity and citizenship from the perspective of Africans. (This chapter was written in the third week of August 1992.) For this purpose, we proceed as follows. Section One presents a general introduction in which we define the concepts of citizenship, nation/nationality, and national identity, ethnicity and state, as they will be used in this study. Section Two provides general salient characteristics of African countries pertinent to the thrust of our bias. These include geopolitical, demographic, linguistic, economic and cultural characteristics which bear scars of Africa's historical experience of the last 500 years.

In Section Three, we deliberately provide a substantial sketch of statutory provisions for citizenship in Africa in order to underscore the suggestion that constitutionalism remains an anathema in the governance of the peoples of Africa and relates minimally to their experiential reality. Section Four summarizes the well-documented position that the ongoing degradation of both the peoples of Africa and its land by Africa's leadership, and the despondency which has crippled the civil society everywhere on this continent are historical. As such, the issue out of this debacle, taken up in Section Five, cannot be the institutionalization of the despotism which has engendered it in the first place. Only full participation by a majority of the African peoples in their own governance holds the hope of deliverance to them as voluntary members of their own polities. But it is doubtful whether the West's conception of its 'New World Order' can entertain or countenance participatory democracy in Africa, except as exploitable markets, since class suicide has no historical antecedent and economic suicide has never been seen as

an option by any political power, at least not as long as such a power is able to preach *laissez-fairism* without any fear of compromising its own privileged stature.

Conceptual Clarifications

The assessment of existing proven historical data suggests that contemporary readings of concepts such as citizenship, nationality, ethnicity and state acquire an anomalous ring when applied to the peoples of Africa. This anomaly results from the nature of the historical contact of the last 500 years which has turned Africans into strangers in their own natural milieux. It becomes compelling, therefore, to specify the sense in which these concepts apply to the African situation, in spite of modern usage which continues to blur distinctions among them.

Thus, 'citizenship' from the African perspective applies to three realities. First, it refers to the African's membership in a given polity or in a definable civil society with an identifiable, institutionalized focus of authority for its own governance. Second, it refers to the rights, privileges, obligations and disabilities accruing to the African by reason of such membership. Finally, as it must, citizenship refers to both the existential and experiential realities which the African copes with by virtue of that membership. The first two senses of citizenship are codifiable in textual forms, while individual lives bear the evidence for varying degrees of the third.

All available evidence about contemporary African experience persuades one to accept Malcom Waters' view of constitutionalized citizenship, when he writes, that

> Far from being a source for egalitarian developments, citizenship is a primary mechanism for the establishment of inequality under any conditions other than pure capitalism. As state enterprise, state intervention and state regulation increase, parallel extensions are made to citizenship status. These have the function of maintaining domination by a minority ruling class located at the apex of state and economy because they represent extensions to state authority (1989: 174).

The 'state' as an apparatus for the management of the affairs of a polity ought to be an institution which a people invests with both

directive and regulatory authorities for their own governance. Although individuals or the collective of individuals who exercise power as officers of the state in this sense are normally referred to as 'government', common usage applies the term 'state' to both the collective and any geopolitical entity which adopts this institution. Whether equitably or otherwise, therefore, the state as the custodian of prescriptive authority dispenses the rights and privileges which accrue to individuals by virtue of their being bona fide members of a polity. The state also exacts from the individuals under its sway obligations such as service, taxes and obedience. In addition, the state reserves the power to constrain the individual to act or not to act.

We consider the term 'nation', unequivocally, to apply to a given people identified with a territory, a shared history, a culture, a common set of symbols of belonging which may or may not include language. 'National identity' combines a conscious orientation and loyalty to a nation. Territoriality need not be a consideration. Thus, citizens of the United States of America, for one, would demonstrate national identity if they severally or collectively express a sense of historical destiny and loyalty to a people external to the United States with its own culture and geopolitical existence, even if these citizens of the United States of America entertain no perceptible yearning for a union with that people.

In other words, national identity by no means pre-supposes separatism, although separatism is not precluded. Furthermore, national identity and citizenship are neither mutually exclusive nor does one pre-suppose the other. While national identity is, therefore, a socio-psychological disposition, citizenship is both a legal status conferable on individuals as members of a polity and the existential experience of such individuals regardless of their *de facto* national identity. From this point of view, the 30-month civil war (Biafran War, 1967 to 1970) in Nigeria, decades of struggle in the Horn of Africa resolved only recently with the recognition of Eriteria's right to nationhood, the ongoing struggle by the Polisario as Sahara Arab Democratic Republic against Morocco over western Sahara, and the death dance in southern Sudan referred to as civil war between the Muslim North and the Christian South are political struggles in which one party feels alienated and has no loyalty to the nation of which it is an acknowledged part. On the other hand, the conflicts in Angola, Somalia and Liberia by no means involve nationalism or national identity, since in none

of the latter set of cases can one discern a sense of otherness among the antagonists. Rather, what is at stake is access to the institutions of power.

As Chazan et al. (1988) suggest, ethnicity applies to a group of persons who accept and define themselves by a consciousness of a common descent or origin, shared historical memories and connections. While ethnicity may serve, and indeed often does serve, as an organizing force for the pursuit of group socio-economic and political interests, like national identity, territoriality is not an essential feature of it. This view of ethnicity is particularly opposite to the African situation, which is undoubtedly the most ethnically complex continent on this planet. The African context challenges social scientists to address the issue of conditions under which persons or groups of persons may consider the expression of national identity, as defined earlier, a useful disposition. In other words, under what conditions would one expect any one of Africa's more than 1,200 ethnic groups to manifest national identity or to suppress any tendency towards it? Furthermore, is the manifestation of national identity inimical or conducive to nationhood in the African context? We shall conclude that any solution to Africa's problems that has a chance of success will have to recognize and take Africa's ethnic differences as an input of fundamental importance. But, it is not clear to what extent it is meaningful to think of ethnicity and national identity as concomitants in a situation where citizenship as a perquisite of membership in a nation has little or no meaning for myriads for whom physical survival itself remains problematic.

Colonialism and the Vivisection of Nations

All the works on which this study is based, and the vast references in them, agree that each of the countries of Africa sees itself as representative of the nation-state, a phenomenon of nineteenth century Europe. But they all have peculiarities not shared with the nation-state in Europe. These peculiarities are indeed considered abnormal when and where they are observed in Europe. First, if language is an index of ethnicity, then, as has been suggested earlier, Africa has at least 1,200 ethnic groups, each with its own language and each language counting dialects to the extent not attested to in Europe. The question then arises: what would have

been the ethnic constitution of typical individual African states and the content of citizenship had Europe not interrupted the march of history in Africa?

The present geopolitical structure of the continent is conveniently ascribed to the arbitrary partition of Africa among the European imperial powers at the Berlin Conferences of 1884–1885. As a result of this act, territorial boundaries of virtually all of Africa's 55 countries divide autochthonous ethnic and, in a large number of cases, veritable would-have-been nationality groups among two or more 'nation-states'. Thus, as you move from west to east along the West African littoral in the Gulf of Guinea, you encounter the Ewe group in substantial proportion in Ghana, Togo, the Republic of Benin and Nigeria; and the Yoruba in the last three of these. Further inland, along the southern fringe of the Sahel Region, you encounter the Fulani from Senegal to Cameroon. In East and Central Africa, the Oromo are found in both Ethiopia and the newly liberated Eriteria; the Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi; and so on.

Second, apart from Rwanda and Burundi, and perhaps Somalia, all the African nation-states are plurilingual with respect to the presence of indigenous African languages. Nigeria presents an extreme case with its estimated 400 languages spoken by perhaps no more than 90 million persons. In addition, all over Africa at least one European language—English, French, Portuguese, Spanish or Italian—serves as the official language in each state.

The third supposed anomaly about African nation-states is the nature of the institution of political authority. Despotic clientelism currently reigns as the political order, with the possible exception of the repressive, dehumanizing apartheid regime earlier in South Africa which began to crumble only in 1990. Everywhere, clientelism notoriously represents the latest vicious perversion of the alienated oligarchies—military or civilian—who have assumed power in quick succession in most of the countries of Africa since the early sixties.

Arising from the foregoing, perhaps the distinguishing mark of Africa's present leadership is membership in a small minority which is set apart from the masses they govern by literacy in, and fluent manipulation of, the languages of their former European imperial masters. Symbolically, and for this reason, Africa's leadership has failed to institute much needed political originality and is handicapped in the same way as artists who operate in unfamiliar

mediums are known to be. Africa's ruling elites have, therefore, infested the body politic they preside over with a ruinous schizophrenia and have been incapable of doing anything to correct the legacy of alienation of colonial rule. Thus, most African countries reel under the imponderable weight of pluralistic legal and constitutional systems. Nigeria, for example, struggles to operationalize a system which is at once customary, Islamic and Graeco-Roman. Algeria and Sudan are torn apart by an antagonistic pitch between Islamic fundamentalism and the Graeco-Roman system identified at best as West European, if not outright Judaeo-Christian.

Under this kind of leadership, the economies of African states have inevitably become alienated. The essence of colonial rule was the expropriation of the products of the labour of the colonized peoples to enrich the metropoles. Thus, most African countries since the late nineteenth century have cultivated agricultural products they no longer consume, and continue to extract from their subsoil mineral wealth they neither process nor have any use for. Characteristically, since the granting of concessionary political independence under indigenous oligarchies, the wealth generated from these extractions continues to be systematically expatriated into the former metropoles. For two decades now, this expatriation has extended to Africa's intelligentsia who were systematically marginalized or decimated by the ruling despots.

The spectacle before us then is that of the African masses struggling under incapacities and sufferings which need not be the lot of citizens of any state anywhere as the twentieth century draws to a close with man's unprecedented mastery over nature. Under these circumstances, how do the concept and reality of citizenship fare? And what kind of socio-political identity is discernible, now and in the foreseeable future? What follows in the next section is what most African states have to show as reassurances for humane citizenship for their largely non-literate masses.

Conferring Formal Citizenship

Prior to the partition of Africa in Berlin in 1884, citizenship under African local governance, whatever the structural nature of the polity, was customary, carefully edged in tradition and jealously guarded against tyrannies in no romantic sense (Du Bois, 1946; Rodney, 1981; Davidson, 1992). The safeguards against abuse of

power and the guarantees for the integrity of the citizen were not reduced to writing. It was experiential and participatory, as we shall discuss later.

The rule imposed by the imperial powers over the territories assigned to them in Berlin was not only absentee, it was despotic. The existential conditions which colonialism prescribed for the involuntary citizens of African states allowed optimum benefits to accrue to the metropoles at a minuscule fraction of the cost and risk involved, for example, in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Such conditions were specified in imperial directives and ordinances from the metropoles to local governors. At independence, citizenship became constitutional and divorced from the people's existential conditions.

Immediately following the annexation of different territories in Berlin, the picture that was prevalent in Africa, therefore, was that of two administrations within each colonial territory. The first administration was that of the extension of the imperial country to the 'colonies', usually on the coast; while the second, the administration of the hinterland regarded and often referred to as 'protectorate', took a different style.

The inhabitants of the 'colonies' automatically became citizens of the imperial countries, presumably with the same rights as home citizens. Inhabitants of the 'protectorate', on the other hand, remained aliens, although treated in international law as 'nationals' of the imperial countries to which the scramble for Africa had assigned them.

The situation in the 'protectorate' later changed, following the takeover of the responsibilities over such areas by the colonial masters through amalgamation, as in the case of Nigeria in 1914. For instance, in 1948, Britain enacted the British Nationality Act which redesignated the inhabitants of her overseas colonies as citizens of 'the United Kingdom and Colonies'. The same Act redesignated inhabitants of its 'protectorates' as British protected persons.[1] As far as international law was concerned, nationals of each imperial country and its 'colonies' and/or its 'protectorates' were both regarded as citizens of that imperial country, since both were under the care of the same imperial country.

During the colonial period and before independence, therefore, citizenship in Africa derived from and was ascribable by each imperial power to Africans whose native territories had been assigned either at Berlin or by subsequent international agreement,

neither of which enlisted the interest nor the participation of the Africans. Thus, Africans in their own native lands were either citizens, protected persons, or aliens as it suited the private objectives of the European imperial powers.

The constitutions of African countries at independence were fashioned by their colonial masters. The constitutions had—and some still do—traces of colonial interests. A sample of the provisions[2] relating to citizenship shows that the colonial masters were interested in keeping colonies together by making all the inhabitants of the colonies and the imperial countries citizens of all the former imperial countries.

A common feature was to confer the citizenship of a country on persons born in the colony and protectorate before a particular date (usually the date of a country's presumed political independence), as well as on citizens of the imperial countries or protected persons provided any of their parents or grandparents had been born in that former colony or protectorate.

For example, the Nigerian Constitution of 1963 provided that every person who had been born in the former colony or protectorate of Nigeria before 30 September 1960, or who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and its colonies, or was a British protected person, would become a citizen of Nigeria on 1 October 1960 (the day Nigeria acceded to political independence), provided either of his parents or grandparents had been born in the former colony or protectorate of Nigeria.[3] That Constitution conferred Nigerian citizenship on any person born outside the former colony and protectorate on 30 September 1960 if he was a citizen of the United Kingdom and its colonies or was a protected person, provided his father was born in the former colony or protectorate, or was a citizen of the United Kingdom and its Colonies, or a British protected person.

Persons born outside Nigeria after 30 September 1960 would also become citizens of Nigeria, if at that date their fathers were Nigerian citizens. A person born in Nigeria after 30 September 1960 would become a citizen at birth, provided any of his parents was a citizen of Nigeria and his father was not an envoy of a foreign country accredited to Nigeria or an enemy alien and/or born in a place then occupied by the enemy.

The positions examined here are regarded as citizenship by birth. Such is conferred by virtue of parenthood (*jus sanguinis*) and by

place of birth (*jus soli*). By these, it was possible for someone born in England by an English father to become a Nigerian if his mother had been born in Nigeria. It was also possible for a person born of a Kenyan father and a Zambian mother to be regarded as a Nigerian, if the father or mother of the Zambian mother or Kenyan father (i.e., any of the grandparents) had been born in Nigeria. This was aimed at keeping members of the British colonies together and making them free to belong to any of the colonies.

Apart from citizenship by birth, citizenship can still be acquired by registration and by naturalization. Some countries confer citizenship on persons not covered by birth, registration or naturalization. This aims at preventing statelessness. Moreover, apart from citizenship by birth or by descent as has been described earlier, constitutions of African countries emerging from colonialism also confer citizenship by 'registration'. This falls into four categories.

The first category relates to any person whose parents or grandparents were not born in an African country of reference, say Nigeria. Such a person can register for citizenship by completing the necessary application form within the prescribed period which varies from country to country. A person so applying must be at least 21 years of age or married, otherwise his or her parents or guardian must apply on his or her behalf.[4] This category of citizenship aims at giving individuals the opportunity to become citizens of their own free will, irrespective of where they may come from.

The other three categories of persons who can register as citizens consist of married women. Any woman, who before the date of independence was a citizen of the imperial country or was a protected person and was married to a person who became a citizen of the particular country or married to a person who but for his death would have registered as a citizen can become a citizen by registration. Second, any woman married to a person who has registered as a citizen, can also register as a citizen. Finally, any woman citizen of the imperial country, or a protected person married to a person who but for his death would have registered as a citizen of the African country, can also register as a citizen after completing the necessary application forms. In all these cases, registration should be completed within a particular period, in most cases two years from the date of political independence.

Most categories of persons who could have registered as citizens were connected by marriage to the territory; but there was opportunity for those not so connected and who wished to be citizens of those countries to naturalize, after going through the appropriate procedures. This opportunity was open to citizens of imperial countries and colonies or protected persons. In each such case, the naturalization process was to have been completed within a period after the date of independence of the country concerned. Where the person concerned was less than 21 years of age and, in the case of a woman, not a married woman, application for naturalization could be made by his or her parent or guardian.

The constitutions of some post-independent African countries attach conditions to naturalization. For example, in Kenya under the 1969 Constitution, for a person to naturalize, he or she should (*a*) have attained the age of 21, (*b*) have resided in Kenya for not less than 12 months preceding the application, (*c*) have been a resident of Kenya for an aggregate of not less than four years in seven years preceding the twelve months in (*b*), (*d*) satisfy the minister of his or her good character, (*e*) satisfy the minister that he or she can speak the Swahili language, and (*f*) satisfy the minister that he or she will continue to reside in Kenya. Also, in Ghana, for persons to register they must be able to speak a local Ghanaian language.[5]

Some countries try to avoid statelessness of persons whose citizenship is not known. For example, under Section 4(2) of the Nigerian Citizenship Ordinance 1960, the appropriate minister, in circumstances where the citizenship of a minor is not known, could order that such a minor be registered as a citizen. Also under Section 7 of the 1969 Constitution of Ghana, a child of not more than seven years found in Ghana, whose parents are not known, will be presumed to be a citizen of Ghana.

Though African countries appeared to be very liberal in granting citizenship to persons, a situation which called for divided interests and allegiance was to be avoided. Various countries of Africa were prepared to deprive any person of his or her citizenship if such a person had acquired the citizenship of another country without being prepared to renounce such citizenship. Dual citizenship could occur in cases of infants born in a foreign country, who acquire the citizenship of that country and of an African country by birth. Such infants, upon the attainment of 21 years, had to renounce the citizenship of the foreign country before the age of 22 years.

otherwise they would forfeit the citizenship of the African country. But it was not enough for such a person to simply renounce the citizenship of the foreign country; he had to take an oath of allegiance and make a declaration of his intentions concerning residence and employment in the African country. Where he could not make a renunciation by virtue of the law of the other country, he could make a declaration as prescribed by law. Where adult nationals also acquired the citizenship of another country, they lost the citizenship of their countries of reference.

There is no doubt that like other countries elsewhere in the world African countries have made changes in respect of citizenship since the attainment of political independence. While pre-independence positions have remained in some, a few countries have further restricted the process of acquisition of citizenship. Generally speaking, it is no longer common to leave the door wide open to citizens of former imperial countries or their colonies.

Thus, while citizenship on the basis of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* remains generally accessible, citizenship by registration and naturalization has been restricted. An applicant for the latter two categories must demonstrate unequivocal willingness to become a citizen. The applicant must be of good character and must show a clear intention to be domiciled in that particular country. In some countries, opportunity is given to an alien adopted by a citizen to be registered as a citizen.

To be able to naturalize today, an applicant must satisfy the authority that he is of full age and capacity; that he is a person of demonstrably good character; that he has a clear intention of being domiciled in the country; and that he has taken the oath of allegiance. There is now an attempt to require such an applicant to show proof that he is acceptable to a particular community before being granted citizenship. Thus, the authority must be satisfied that the applicant is acceptable to the community in which he proposes to reside permanently and must have been assimilated into the way of life of that community. He must also show that he is capable of making a useful contribution to the advancement, progress and well-being of the country in general.

Furthermore, the pre-application residence qualification requirement has become more stringent. In few places, an applicant for naturalization must have resided in that country for a continuous period of 15 years, or must have resided in the country continuously

for a period of one year and, during the period of 20 years immediately preceding his application, should have resided in the country for an aggregate of not less than 15 years.[5]

It does appear that African states may have begun to reconsider their tough stand on the issue of citizenship. Thus, it is reported (*Nigerian News Digest*, 4 December 1992) that 'the Nigerian federal government has recently approved dual citizenship for Nigerians naturalized in foreign countries'. One of the implications of this decision is the obvious acceptance by the Nigerian state that 'citizenship' is contractual, revocable by either of the parties to it; that although the state has coercive powers in extracting obligations from members of the polity under its sway, it must meet needs or be seen to be ready to meet its own side of the contract in order to retain the allegiance of its constituent members.

Municipal laws in Africa conform with international standards in relation to deprivation of citizenship. Of the three categories of citizenship, only those by registration and naturalization may, in principle, be withdrawn. The conditions for withdrawal appear to be in line with those relating to avoidance of dual citizenship. But in a few cases, the deliberate actions of an individual account for withdrawal.

Generally speaking, citizenship by registration and by naturalization may be withdrawn if the person concerned (*a*) has acquired the citizenship of another country voluntarily or by marriage, (*b*) has voluntarily claimed and exercised, in a foreign country, a right that is exclusively accorded to citizens of that foreign country, (*c*) has obtained the citizenship by fraud, false representation and concealment of material fact, (*d*) has been disloyal by act or words towards the country, (*e*) has within a particular period (depending on each country) of being registered or naturalized been sentenced to imprisonment for a certain duration, (*f*) has, during any war in which the country is engaged, unlawfully traded with the enemy or has been engaged in or associated with any business that was carried on in such a manner as to assist the enemy in that war, or has unlawfully communicated with such enemy to the detriment of or with intent to cause damage to the interests of the country, and (*g*) has maintained continuous residence abroad for a long period without yearly renewal of citizenship with the country's envoy in his country of residence or without demonstrating intention to do so.

Under the present dispensation, no African country has adopted constitutional provisions depriving a citizen by birth who is not a dual national of his citizenship. This is predicated on the fact that a person may not be deprived of his/her roots, thus making him/her stateless should he/she decide not to acquire the citizenship of any other country.

The case of *Shugaba Abdulrahaman Darman v. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs of Nigeria and ors*[7] provides an example where deprivation of citizenship by birth was judicially condemned. Section 23 of the 1979 Constitution (of Nigeria) provides for citizenship by birth as follows:

> (1) The following persons are citizens of Nigeria by birth namely
>
> (a) every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria; provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Nigeria by virtue of this section if neither of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born in Nigeria;
>
> (b) every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria; and
>
> (c) every person born outside Nigeria either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria.
>
> (2) In this section 'the date of independence' means the 1st day of October 1960.

Section 38(1) of the same Constitution confers the right to freedom of movement on every citizen of Nigeria and that 'no citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereto or exit therefrom'.

In the case in question, the applicant, Shugaba, who was the majority leader in the Borno State House of Assembly was bundled out of Nigeria and dumped in the Republic of Chad on the ground that he was a security risk and, being an alien, was no more entitled to live in Nigeria. Evidence showed that the applicant had been born in Nigeria of a Nigerian woman from the Kanuri tribe and a Chadian father. The court held that as a citizen by birth, he could

not be deprived of his citizenship. Thus, his deportation contravened the Constitution and was unlawful.

Ongoing Degradation

The constitution of every African state adopted at or since independence carefully crafts statutes which embody provisions for citizenship as mentioned earlier. In addition, each constitution contains statutes guaranteeing specific rights and liberties to citizens. The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 follows this pattern. In Chapter 3, titled 'Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms', Articles 5 to 25 go to great lengths to guarantee far-reaching freedoms and rights to individuals, the family and children, including the right to education at the expense of the state. Namibia's constitution goes further to make every provision justiciable.

Like Namibia, The Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution, 1989 contains elaborate provisions for fundamental rights and freedoms for citizens. Under the heading 'Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State', Nigeria's constitution further details rights, liberties, and welfare services which it behooves government to make available to citizens. As Oyelaran (1991: 109–39) comments, 'although the constitution proclaims that the Nigerian State shall "be based on the principles of democracy and social justice", it demands, vide article 16(4), "that loyalty to the nations shall override sectional loyalties", and proceeds in section 6(6)(c) to make all provisions non-justiciable unlike Namibia'.

Now, Shivj (1990: 381–408) joins Nwabueze (1973, 1985), whom he cites, to assert that even where citizens' rights are specifically rendered, the mere ascription of those rights in a constitution has both moral and persuasive force. However, the experience of the citizens of Nigeria to date casts serious doubts on the position of these scholars. In any case, the experience of citizens of most African states since independence supports the position that statutory provisions for citizenship and for rights of citizens by states relate minimally to social reality.

It is, therefore, valid to say that these constitutions do no more than reflect the rallying cries which nationalists employed in mobilizing the masses against colonial domination from the late forties to the early sixties. As recent analyses of African politics put it,

characteristically the battle cry of 'Freedom for all, life more abundant' (Action Group of Nigeria, led by Obafemi Awolowo) soon gave way to songs of national sovereignty. The wants and welfare of the people which used to intimidate the colonial administrators were soon forgotten.

What in the antecedents of the immediate inheritors of colonial authorities could have prepared them for such radical alienation? One explanation advanced by scholars suggests that they were either conscious collaborators of, or had been taken in by, colonial administrations (particularly the British and the French) who appeared to have acted in concert to camouflage continuing domination in absentia under the rhetoric of independence constitutions crafted in the metropoles (Shivj, 1990). After all, colonial administration was despotic everywhere, allowing no room for participation by the ruled, except, and in rare cases, by a few hand-picked agents. As the argument goes (see Ayandele, 1974), the early rationalists learned their lesson well, 'deluded hybrids' that they were. No wonder that they exhibited no qualms in turning callous exploiters of their own people soon after the colonial administrators had left for Europe.

The institutions enshrined in the alien constitutions which the independence nationalists agreed to implement allowed no consideration for dismantling, for example, the marketing boards, which colonial offices in London, Paris and Lisbon had used to siphon revenues from primary products of their colonies into the coffers of the metropoles to the continuing gratification of the latter and the fulfilment of the colonial mission articulated by Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya, in 1947, who said: 'We are not here to create a succession of Bulgarias, but to develop and civilize this continent as part of what I may call Western European civilization and economics' (cited in Davidson, 1992: 178).

Other explanations seek the root of the bankruptcy of Africa's elite and the continuing degradation of the living conditions of Africa's peoples in the cannibalistic dismemberment and partitioning of Africa for purposes of exploitation by European powers without regard to ethnic or nationality boundaries. For Du Bois (1946: 82), the motive force behind the Berlin Conferences was that:

> The products of Africa began to be shared and distributed around the world. The dependence of civilized life upon products from

> the ends of the world tied the everyday citizen more and more firmly to the exploitation of each colonial area: tea and coffee, diamonds and gold, ivory and copper, vegetable oils, nuts and dates, pepper and spices, olives and cocoa, rubber, fruit, sugar. All these things and a hundred others became necessary to modern life, and modern life thus was built around colonial ownership and exploitation.

Notice that 'colonial ownership and exploitation' involved owners of labour—the exploited—who did not consume that which they produced (and still do not) on the one hand, and the exploiters who consumed things they did not produce, on the other. As this explanation goes, at independence, African nationalist leaders and their successors not only inherited despotic administrations, complete with their institutions for economic exploitation, they cultivated and improved upon their former masters' taste and consumption habits to the detriment of Africa's toiling masses.

Du Bois's perspicacious analysis of the African situation might be attributed to a curious but little remarked historical parallelism on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, it is curious that the scramble for Africa and the eventual Balkanization of the continent in Berlin took place precisely at the onset of decades of the infamous Jim Crow Laws in the United States of America. More curious still: the Reconstruction which followed the Emancipation Proclamation and the end of the American Civil War in 1863 parallels, both in time and in character, the attitude and actions of the colonial offices of the European imperial countries towards their African colonies. Thus , as Davidson reports, the Select Committee of the House of Commons in London concluded that: 'the acknowledged African chiefs, in this case of the Gold Coast "settlements", should best be "left to their own jurisdiction, with only an appeal, when necessary, to the British magistracy"' (Davidson, 1992: 31). In the same manner, African-Americans were ceded some rights of citizenship following the emancipation proclamation in 1863.

There certainly is no doubt that the system which enacted the Jim Crow Laws beginning about 1880 in the United States of America had the same objectives as the powers who convened in Berlin in 1884 and pursued similar devices of exploitative governance for seven decades, the same length of time before the presumed onset of the end of colonialism in Africa. Does this parallelism correlate with any relative similarity in the civil status

of the African and persons of African descent on both sides of the Atlantic? To answer in the affirmative would suggest that there might exist, both in Africa as in the United States, civil, political and economic conditions conducive to the predatory behaviours of Europeans and Euro-Americans in these matters. An increasing number of scholars continue to turn up material evidence to support the argument as advanced by Du Bois (1946), Rodney (1981) and Davidson (1991, 1992) that the incursion of Europeans into Africa in the fifteenth century aborted an otherwise orderly development of statehood in Africa.

Davidson (1992) refers to this European incursion as 'invasion and dispossession', while for Rodney (1981) it is a systematic 'underdevelopment of Africa'. Du Bois prefers to call it 'the rape of Africa'. Scholars find that the indigenous systems subverted by the European invasion and dispossession had invariably sustained

> ...a well-built polity...a participatory polity. No participation had to mean no stability. In 'traditional' Africa this concept of an indispensable participation formed the hearthstone of statesmanship. Standing on that, power would prosper; but not otherwise (Davidson, 1992: 86).

It is clear that all the explanations examined so far may account for the brutal arrest of the development of indigenous African states, perhaps on a pattern different from the configuration which gave rise to the European type of nation-state in the nineteenth century. But they by no means provide a satisfactory answer to the alienation and perversion of the African elite which, more than two decades after coming into power, has completely destroyed the civil society in countries such as Nigeria, Zaire and Somalia, and is about to accomplish the same feat in many others, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Algeria and the Sudan.

How does one explain senseless wars and internal conflicts which continue to decimate the youths of areas such as Mozambique, South Africa and Togo, and regions like southern Sudan and western Sahara? In these, and virtually all other countries of Africa, expatriation of both national wealth and of the intelligentsia renders the state incapacitated to stem calamities such as desertification, environmental degradation, drought, famine and diseases. Civil society lies prone before all these; and disoriented citizens grope about without any civil status or security of existence.

Institutionalization of Participation

Naturally, under the circumstances of the present global economy, interests in the future of Africa and in qualitative changes in the civil status of its citizens come from many more quarters than we can assess in this brief discussion. We wish to consider three proposals for the establishment of 'democracy', presumably the only form of governance after the Cold War capable of turning things around throughout the Third World. But what, in fact, now comprises 'democracy'—a term which can have meaning only in a universe with contrasting systems? If, as Schwartz (1990: 1366–67) reviewing Wolin suggests, democracy is a process, an 'initiating of cooperative action and accumulation of political experience by all people'; and if 'true democracy can only occur on a small scale, with shared power', then how does Africa expect to tame power now in the hands of its rapacious alienated ruling minority, whom Davidson (1992) refers to as 'pirates in power'?

Curiously enough, even Davidson appears to accept that what Africa lacks is social strata occupied by social formations which answer to the same characteristics as the capitalist middle class of nineteenth century Europe. This certainly is one reading of his pitch for 'democracy for Africa' (Davidson, 1992: 223) where he appears to argue that instead of promoting 'a simulacrum of the West's governing conditions conducive to democracy',

> What they [the colonial powers] had done, much more often, was to destroy or downgrade Africa's own institutions and cultures which, through an immensely long history, had taught how to provide forms of public control over executives, forms of public comment against executives, forms of public distrust of executives—in short, forms of democratic behavior—and which had given Africa's peoples, or many of them, a confident sense of possessing and exercising a real control over their own lives (Davidson, 1992: 214).

Waters (1989) too predicts bluntly that as long as the ruling elite in Africa is not capitalist and fails to constitute a hegemonic class which can successfully combine patriotic ideas with its own class interest, it will fail to engender uninational citizenship—apparently the only desirable form of relationship between state and civil society. Indeed, the authors of this chapter would simply ask 'What

else, since the binationalism which Waters predicts is already here with us in Africa?' Do we credit him with observational adequacy, or does his brilliant analysis in fact provide us with an explanation and a plausible prediction of probable contingent development when he writes that Africa without a capitalist middle class will at best develop

> A two-nation strategy incorporating a large-scale state sector where the labour force engaged in welfare administration and surveillance provides a decommodified form of labour with a 'life of its own' (sic); or at worst, an economy characterized by a derationalization of labour employed by the state by means of the control and devaluation of education and research and the de-collegialization of professional life? (Waters, 1989: 169).

Fatton claims to trace a different path and advocates what he terms 'passive revolution' by which despotism is transformed and democratized, or presidential monarchism legitimatized and consolidated through selective co-optation from among Africa's 'nascent bourgeoisie that is both rooted in the material structures of the parallel economy and relatively independent of state' (ibid., 1990: 472). He is certain that 'whatever may be the future of this class, changes in Africa are more likely to take the form of passive revolutions rather than radical structural ruptures with existing realities' (ibid.: 472). This is because, as he puts it, 'the organic crisis in Africa is (therefore) more favorable to the accentuation of existing authoritarianisms than to the development of liberal democracies' (ibid.: 473).

Finally, faced with its multifarious and seemingly recalcitrant endemic problems, Africa has intensified the proclamation of its own initiatives marked with the publication of *African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes* (The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1989), the *African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990)*, and *The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa* (1991). The Africa Policy Information Centre has put all three publications into a handy format under the title *Africa's Problems, African Initiatives* (Minter, 1992).

After a rather dispassionate review of the dismal record of the economic and political performance of Africa's leadership in the

last thirty years, and the disastrous predicaments for civil society everywhere on that continent, much of the proposals which emanate from Africa appears to come to the same conclusion, namely, that

> installing a strict free-market economy was not, as sometimes advertised (sic), a return to normalcy, but a leap into the unknown. The principles of free market capitalism...have never existed in pure form in the real world. Modern capitalism was protected in Europe by mercantilist manipulation of market prices and filled by wealth extracted from colonial empires (Minter, 1992: 16).

Successful capitalist take-off in other regions of the world has benefited from 'trade protectionism and active intervention by government in industrial development' (Minter, 1992: 17–18), precisely the type of activities which both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been insisting that African states should desist from undertaking. Among other measures, African leaders are called upon to urgently set the following objectives for their respective states, namely, structural transformation, diversification and increased productivity. In order to achieve this, each state should

1. Adjust its domestic systems of government, the nature of the public sector, the learning systems, the cultural motivations and value systems.
2. Adjust the different ways it produces what its people needs: the human resources in terms of know-how and imagination; natural wealth in terms of minerals, land, forest, livestock, energy, etc.; the financial wealth in terms of what people keep or have kept aside for the future.
3. Produce goods that are vital for the welfare of its people and for keeping the process of production running smoothly and continuously.
4. Adjust in a way that improves rather than worsens human welfare.
5. Ensure that adjustment programmes derive from within the people; involve popular participation; and create access to basic factors of production, even to the poor, employment opportunities and improvement in the way national wealth is shared throughout the population (Minter, 1992).

Alas! for a call to duty to have the desired effect, it must be heard. At the beginning of this chapter we averred that language was not pre-supposed by citizenship, national identity, or by ethnicity. Yet social, economic, political and even cultural productivity is a function of one's competence in the language of 'transaction'. It is certainly beyond debate that both the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would seriously threaten the power base of current African despots were it possible to place its advocacy of the African initiatives in African languages into the hands of the citizens over whom the despots rule.

Laitin (1992) recognizes the need to take account of the multi-lingual nature of the African state if Africa is to move forward and improve the quality of life for its citizens. A nationalist African will find Laitin's argument unpalatable, namely, that at least one European language has become a permanent feature of the operative language equation of every state in Africa and shall remain so. For the rest, however, his position seems to be rather unassailable, agreeing with Oyelaran (1988) and Scotton (1990), that 'closed or excluded from elite discourse, the great majority of African citizens face linguistic barriers to social mobility' (Laitin, 1992: 58). 'Elite closure in Africa, in which social barriers between elites and the masses are becoming rigid, is being helped along by language policies that exclude the voices of the masses' (ibid.: 58). Laitin argues further that

> Perhaps the most grievous horror in postcolonial nationalism has been the treatment of minorities. It might be said that what Africa has best produced in the postcolonial era has been refugees. Constraints on the free commercial operation of minorities has been a hallmark of twentieth-century Third World nationalism.... But an alternative scenario is one in which regional governance permits separate economic-development programs. Economic growth in one region could serve as a catalyst for their regional leaders to copy the winning formula. Regional competition within a state could well be a motor for economic growth. Citizens who are in a better negotiating position with leadership are more powerful, and more powerful citizens are better able to check the arbitrary rules of a potential dictator (Laitin, 1992: 160f).

Finally, and as a corollary to his linguistic determinism of humane citizenship, Laitin argues for the recognition of 'tribes', in the inoffensive sense of that term, and advocates the need to take account of Africa's ethnic diversity and to eschew clientelism. Rather than insist on the emergence of a middle stratum *à la Européenne* to inaugurate the much heralded capitalist democracy in Africa, he urges us to accept that 'the hegemonic framework in most of Africa, ..., has been a framework that has recognized and even reified "tribes"' (Laitin, 1992: 162). Therefore, linguistically complex African states, and these are in the majority, will do well to cultivate a system whereby every citizen will have competence in the operative European language of his or her state, the indigenous language developed into the state's lingua franca, the language of his or her region, if different from the lingua franca, and finally the citizen's mother tongue, in case this again differs from both the regional language and the lingua franca. This is Laitin's 3 ± 1 language outcome. He argues that

> The advantage of an institutionalized pattern of group political activity—even if based on tribal identities—is that it is better than no group political activity at all. If political action based on tribal identities is treated by African leaders as illegitimate and other forms of political mobilization are difficult to organize, then there remains a politics without a civil society. There will only be the government and its retainers (Laitin, 1991: 162).

One must conclude therefore with Laitin that since Africa has accepted the reality of its diversity in recent calls for African initiatives, and given the anomalous nature of its national frontiers, perhaps the most cost effective way to transcend both is to make them the basis of a broad based participatory democracy. Resources are debased when their usefulness is determined by values that have little or no bearing to the existential realities of their users. Africa's external debt has not been incurred on importation of products which Africa can not do without. Surely, the new world order, inspired as it is by the self-aggrandizement of the industrial countries, will seek to perpetuate Africa's servitude and to prolong the degradation of the living conditions of the African people. The only way out is the mobilization of the citizens of African states to their own cause. This will have to be done in spite of Africa's international environment which cannot grow kinder.

Until and unless this begins to happen, both citizenship and national identity cannot have real meaning for the teeming millions of Africans who must live and die within the confines of the geopolitical entities in which they find themselves.

Notes

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1. For example, a Nigerian in the colony and protectorate of the south or the north was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colony, and is protected. But a person from Togo, colonized by the French, was regarded as an alien.
2. See the 1960 Constitution of Nigeria and the post-independence constitutions of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Lesotho, Zambia and others.
3. Section 17, 1963 Constitution of Nigeria. The constitutions of all former British colonies take the same form.
4. See Section 8, 1963 Constitution of Nigeria; Section 8, 1969 Constitution of Ghana; Section 91, 1969 Constitution of Kenya; and Section 4, 1966 Constitution of Zambia.
5. Section 10(2), 1969 Constitution of Nigeria.
6. See generally Sections 26 and 27 of 1989 Constitution of Nigeria which repeated Sections 24 and 25 of the 1979 Constitution.
7. (1981) 1 N.C.L.R. 1., (1981)2 N.C.L.R. 459.

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7

Religious Fundamentalism, Ethnicity and the Nation-State in the Middle East

Bassam Tibi

The current times are an expression of our crisis-ridden age of globalization. Crises are no longer of domestic range and scope, related as they are to global formations (see, Chase-Dunn, 1989). One of the indicators of contemporary crises is the pervasive recourse to religion, not primarily in its function as faith but as an ideology. The result is the political ideology of fundamentalism. Scholars from different disciplines are involved in an effort to understand this resort to religion (see Marty and Appleby, 1991). In this context, the pivotal question for us is: can religion be solvent or dissolvent? Before answering this all-encompassing question, another, although preliminary, question also has to be asked. Can we pose and answer the question of religion as solvent or dissolvent in one coherent way for entire humanity, or do we have to honour the regionalized nature of our globalized but not yet unified world to the extent of resigning ourselves to the view that no global answer can be given? How can we view the Middle East in this regard?

Despite the fact that traditional world historians and social science general theorists of international relations have differing disciplinary orientations, they nevertheless share the very same holistic view of the world, be it with reference to world history or

within the framework of the international system of nation-states. Area studies scholars are certainly free from such relentless reduction of the entire, much diverse world to a holistic concept. They are, however, mostly characterized by the narrowness of the scope of their fairly one-dimensional enquiry, which is regularly restricted to regional confines (see Binder, 1976; Ismael, 1990; Tibi, 1990a). Most of them resent comparisons that go beyond the region they are familiar with, let alone attempts at theory-oriented efforts. It is true our world is structurally inter-connected in such a way that it links people living on this globe to one another interactionally despite all their differences and divergent natures. Through modern means of communication, transport and other kinds of interaction, divergent cultures of this world are exposed to one another to the extent that 'the history...of the world since the Second World War, and more particularly, during the third quarter of the twentieth century' (Hobsbawm in *Times Literary Supplement* [London], 1989, June: 23–29) ought to be written in a novel way yet to be created by the scholarly community in a cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary effort. This is required because we lack the needed tools and new outlook to answer impending questions related to the rise of politicized religion in the crisis of the nation-state. These cannot be dealt with adequately, neither within the universalist world historical vision, nor with the ostensibly intricate general system-oriented international relations methodologies. This chapter intends to contribute towards filling this gap.

Situating the Middle East

In the first place, we need to understand the structures that are emerging through the globalization process linking the Middle East and other divergent cultural worlds on our globe to one another, without however overlooking the individual character of each of these cultural worlds now being globally constrained. Globalization does not create the grounds for a world culture, nor does it standardize existing incompatible cultural patterns. Culture, understood as interpreting reality symbolically, is always specific and divorced from the view that culture symbolizes global consumer items such as television and Coca Cola, or modern music and fashionable dresses. In this context, we also need to understand the meaning inherent in the culturally determined specific action

of peoples of domestic societies that are, however, structurally constrained on a global scale. These preliminary conceptual remarks serve to explain the basis on which the question how to view religion—as solvent or dissolvent—in the current crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East is being addressed.

The Middle East is the hub of the culturally diverse Islamic civilization (see, Hodgson, 1974). Politically, the Middle East is a formation related to the dissolution of the Islamic Ottoman Empire after the First World War (Fromkin, 1989; Tibi, 1993a). Both in its Arab and Islamic scope, the Middle East is a politico-cultural world in its own terms, even though it is not exclusively Arab, and is inextricably linked to the prevailing global structures.

It is epistemologically naive to believe that a scholar could approach a topic without a pre-conception. At issue is, however, whether the pre-conception is a reflection of an imposed intellectual tool, be it world history or the world systems approach, or is based on the subject in question after having studied it empirically and seriously. In conceptualizing the Middle East in this fashion—as a cultural world in its own terms although incorporated into the overall process of globalization—I want to look at the current crisis of the nation-state in that part of the world and address the question asked at the outset: Is religion solvent or dissolvent in this crisis? The answer has to be specific, emerging from a study of the subject, and not from empty, purely conceptual generalizations. It also has to be general in such a way that the global constraining environment of the Middle East is kept in mind while answering the question.

To begin with, the current crisis of the nation-state in contemporary Middle East is related to the fact that this modern institution is alien to that region and was virtually imposed on it (Tibi, 1990b). All the states of that region are now organized along the lines of the modern institution of the nation-state. What are the constraints of the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East? Some scholars misinterpret this crisis in stating, in an unspecific fashion, that Islamic history is quite familiar with the state. They refer then to the territorial, dynastic or other traditional state patterns that existed in Islamic history (cf., Piscatori, 1986). These scholars do not understand the very specific nature of the nation-state as a modern phenomenon and that the nation-state is not a state in general, but a state based on the organizational principle of popular sovereignty. Defined thus, it then follows that there is no such thing

in Islamic history. This, incidentally, is also the argument of Islamic fundamentalists who challenge nationalism as an alien ideology and the existing nation-states as imposed institutions transplanted in their countries (see, for instance, Najib, 1983). In a way, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism is a response to this failure of the modern institution of the nation-state to take root in the Arab–Islamic part of contemporary Middle East. These fundamentalists view the nation-state as a *hall mustawrad*, that is, an imported solution (al-Qaradawi, 1980). The political culture of secular nationalism is not only a novelty in the Middle East (Tibi, 1990c), but also remains on the surface of the societies involved. The political culture of Islam pre-dates nationalism and the nation-state. There is a severe conflict between this institution of the nation-state that has been introduced into the region in the course of the political formation of the Middle Eastern state system and the current attempts at retrieving the cultural domestic patterns that pre-date this formation. In this conflict, and in the crisis emerging from it, religion is presented as the solvent. The revival of political Islam in the guise of religious fundamentalism results from this crisis and creates a great challenge for the existing nation-states in the Middle East. However, Islam as a religion and a cultural system exposed to modernity is itself in a state of crisis (Tibi, 1988). In this situation, religion as a political ideology igniting conflict and crisis seems to become the dissolvent. It is important to note in passing that these challengers of the nation-state conceive of themselves as fundamentalists, as *usuliyyun*, to use their own label (Hanafi, 1989). In other words, this characterization is not imposed on them. In their view, the modern Muslim is, above all, a political man. That is the way they conceive of themselves.

A prominent international relations scholar, the late Hedley Bull, referred in his enquiry on 'The Revolt Against the West' (Bull, 1988) to Islamic fundamentalism as an example. The phrase is appropriate in as much as Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction against the West; the image of one's self as being anti-Western is the basis of the definition of the phenomenon involved. It is the definition of one's cultural identity with reference to the inimical global environment depicted as 'The West'. The world of Islam is viewed as encircled by this hostile environment and constrained by the process of globalization generated by this environment. To

resist the intrusion of global civilization is, for Muslim fundamentalists, an action which is tantamount to resisting Western civilization in general as a traditional enemy of Islam. The reference to the medieval Christian Crusades is revived in this modern context and it serves to reject the incorporation of the world of Islam into the globalization process as a 'modern crusade' of Christianity against Islam. The organization of the Middle East along the lines of the modern nation-state is regarded as the result of this incorporation. Old historical memories and burdens are evoked and linked to very recent contexts (Garisha and al-Zaibaq, 1987). In other words: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East is inter-related to the exposure of this part of the world, which perceives itself to be a collective entity, to the process of globalization, to nationalism and the nation-state as globalized principles of organization.

In their rise against the nation-state, Islamic fundamentalists, firmly resolved to fighting the West and to revolting against it, are themselves unwillingly under the impact of the very modernity for which they employ the subsuming epithet 'The West'. My research on Islamic fundamentalism, pursued in the region itself, led me to the conclusion that Islamic fundamentalists are neither traditionalists nor 'nativists'. Their response to the challenge of modernity as inimical to them stands, to a great extent, under the impact of the very same modernity, since their thoughts and actions are imprisoned in the context of modernity itself (Tibi, 1993b). In an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, I coined the term *Der Traum von der halben Moderne* ('The dream of semi-modernity') to characterize the ambiguity of Islamic fundamentalists vis-à-vis modernity (cf., *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 February 1991; Tibi, 1992a). They, on the one hand, want to accommodate instrumentally all the material achievements of modernity (science and technology) into their culture. On the other hand, they reject vehemently the adoption of the man-centred rationality that has enabled and led to these achievements. In contrast to the modern sovereignty of the nation-state, they construct the 'government of God'.

For Islamic fundamentalists, God has not only created the universe, but also governs it with His will as expressed in the *Qur'an*. Man is only a *makhluq*, that is, created by God and subjected to His overwhelming will. *Das Subjektivitätsprinzip* ('The principle

of subjectivity') (Habermas, 1987), which determines the philosophical discourse of modernity, is heresy for Islamic fundamentalists. The fundamentalist politicization of the unrestricted vision of Islam—theocentrism—dismisses the concept of man as a free subject on his own. This dismissal leads the adherents of this politicized religion to reject the normative underpinnings of the nation-state. We have to bear in mind that the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East stems either from development related problems (e.g., Algeria whose fundamentalism is discussed in Tibi, 1992b), or is the result of the repercussions of war and dictatorship (e.g., Iraq, Syria and the Sudan). Islamic fundamentalists present a counter-programme based on religion as a solvent. It is not issue-oriented; rather it is an alternative to the existing state. In their view, the nation-state, *dawla qawmiyya*, ought to be replaced by the Islamic system, *nizam Islami* (for details see, al-Awwa, 1983), in which *Hakimiyat Allah* ('the government of God') as expressed in His divine law, the *shari'a*, is the hallmark. Fundamentalists avoid the term for state, *dawla*, and prefer the term *nizam* ('system'). They do this to avoid drawing boundaries. For them, Islam has no boundaries; God's sovereignty is universal and so is the political system of Islam which they envisage. It first addresses the Islamic *umma*, then entire humanity. The Algerian mouthpiece of the fundamentalist *al jabhah al-Islamiyya li al-inqadh* ('Front Islamique du Salut' [FIS]), the weekly *al-Munqith*, published a heated debate between one functionary of the dissolved Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) party and Abbasi Madani, the founder of FIS, in which Madani was quoted as saying to this functionary:

> You refer to the concept of sovereignty and argue it is incorporated into the constitution.... I do not find it in the Qur'an and thus cannot accept it. In committing yourself to this concept, you are falling back behind the age of Islam, you are returning to the *Jahiliyya*.... (Madani, as quoted by Ayashi, 1991: 120).

Experts on Algeria had predicted earlier that the Algerian army, which historically grew from the liberation army—the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) which fought for the sovereignty of Algeria—would not let the fundamentalists take political power (Roberts, 1991). This prediction came true in January 1992. The

geopolitical concept of the Algerian fundamentalists was the *al-Maghreb al-Islami al-kabir* ('the Islamic greater Maghreb'). This concept strongly rejects the nation-state. It was clear that the envisaged Muslim state encompassed entire northern Africa and it was left to surmises and hints whether this entity touched upon Europe.

The normative foundation of the nation-state is the idea of popular sovereignty (Hinsley, 1986; James, 1986; Giddens, 1987), which is a political expression of the man-centred view of the world, a crucial component of cultural modernity. For fundamentalists, the government of the people and by the people is heretical in as much as it is an expression of *ta'til*. This term stems from the medieval political thought of the orthodox Islamic jurist, Ibn Taimiyya. The term *ta'til* refers to those human measures which serve to suspend the rule of God over the universe (Ayashi, 1991). In employing this medieval concept in a modern context, the conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and the existing nation-states assumes, ideologically, the character of a conflict between politicised, theocentric universalism and national sovereignty.

To interpret the conflict in this manner is not to argue that the existing nation-states in the Middle East are really secular, that is, governed by the principle of popular sovereignty, let alone that they are expressions of a government of the people or by the people. To varying degrees, all states in the Arab part of the Middle East are authoritarian and despotic regimes. These states are not substantive, that is in structural and normative terms, nation-states. In the Middle East, the states are nominal states, or as Jackson suggested for most Third World states, quasi-states (Jackson, 1990). From modernity they have adopted the technology of rule, not the democratic logic of governments. However, these states claim to have the legitimacy of governments by the people. In being organized as nation-states, all Middle Eastern states enjoy international legitimacy. Internally, however, these states lack legitimacy (Hudson, 1977). The rise of fundamentalism is the great challenge to their acclaimed legitimacy. These states are in a crisis. Is religion the solvent?

The nation-state pre-supposes the existence of a political community designed as a civil society in which the people share basic

norms and values in a general consensus that links them to one another on pluralistic grounds. Citizenship (Giddens, 1987, Chapter 8) in a civil society politically accommodated to a democratic nation-state is the expression of the political identity and loyalty of the people belonging to the body politic. In contrast to this democratic model, in the Middle East the nation-states are imposed structures in which all the aforementioned requirements are missing. Citizenship here is of no substance and is only, in theory, related to identity cards, not to an awareness of belonging to a political community. In the Middle East, the awareness of being a member of a community is not related to a civil society but to an ethnic or sectarian sub-community and to its non-state subordinate identity. In the Middle East, political loyalty does not grow from popular consensus to the political order, but is based on coercion. The Middle Eastern state is the 'Republic of Fear' (al-Khalil, 1989), exemplified by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This description is intended to expose the indicated conflict between fundamentalism and the nation-state whereby religion is presented as the solvent. Fundamentalist groups juxtapose religion to the nation-state and view their recourse to religion as an alternative to nationalism.

The crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East is accompanied by the revival of particular solidarity groups for which I shall henceforth employ the term ethnicity. There are in the Middle East ideal and real patterns of collective identity. The religious ideal of an overall Islamic *umma* ('community') underlies the supposition that there exists an overall superordinate Islamic identity. Similarly, the belief that there is an Arab *umma* ('nation') is related to the superordinate national pan-Arab identity. In Arabic, the term *umma* indiscriminately covers both meanings. Beneath these supranational and superordinate collective identities, there exist subnational subordinate identities related to the existing nation-states. As an example, we can refer to the idea of *al-Iraqiyya* ('Iraqihood') (Baram, 1991a, Chapters 9–12) outlined and practised in Iraq by means of the *mukhabarat* ('security apparatus') of the totalitarian regime. This is also a pattern of national superordinate identity since real identity patterns in Iraq are either ethnic (the Kurds) or sectarian (the Schi'a).

These ideal superordinate identities are not *real*; they are visions or ideological concepts and imply an expectation enforced respectively

on the people through coercion. The real identities in the Middle East are related to communal, ethnic and/or sectarian sub-groups within their own cultures. Thus, while seeking a solvent, the real conflict is not a conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and pan- or local-nationalist-oriented regimes. Similarly, the crisis of the nation-state is not related to the threat from an Islamic system of government, but rather to the potential breakdown of existing nation-state regimes induced through mobilization on religious grounds. The term 'libanization' has been employed in this context to denote such a process by which ethnic and sectarian communities enforce themselves against the state order of the centre while employing religious formulae. Needless to say, this fragmentation is not the goal of Islamic fundamentalists. Rhetorically, they envisage a *Hakimiyat Allah* ('rule of God') (see, Qutb, 1989), not ethnic rule. Their challenge to the existing nation-states could however expedite such a breakdown. In one case, in the Sudan, where fundamentalists have succeeded in seizing power (since 30 June 1989), their government has clearly been enforcing ethnic supremacy of the Arab and Islamic north against the non-Arab and non-Muslim ethnic groups of the south (for more details see, Ali, 1991; Fluehr-Lobban, 1992).

Ethnicity, at present, is the major source of conflict in the Middle East. Ethnicity is, however, related to religion in as much as political groups are ethno-religious groups. This new phenomenon is not restricted to the Middle East. In the struggle for power in Afghanistan between three of the major ethnic groups—the Pashtun, Tadjik and Usbek—in multi-ethnic Afghan society, we see clearly, for example, that religion as a perceived solvent does not unite, but rather is mingled with ethnicity, as is also the case in the Sudan. It is true that Afghanistan belongs to the world of Islam, but not to the area dealt with in this paper. Nevertheless, Afghanistan is worth looking at to see the ethnic fragmentation in Islamic fundamentalism.

In Algeria, the fundamentalists carried the slogan *al-jaza'ir arabiyya wa al-Islam dinuha* ('Algeria is Arab and Islam is its religion'). The Berbers, who are Muslims but not Arabs, understood this slogan as a declaration of war upon them. For this reason, the Algerian Berbers sided clearly against fundamentalism. In Sudan, as governed by the fundamentalist Islamic National Front, the Algerian Berbers are an ominous example of what could

happen to non-Arab ethnic groups that do not commit themselves to a Sunni Arab Islam. The two Algerian Berber parties, *Front Des Forces Socialistes* (FFS) and *Ressemblement de la Culture et Democratie* (RCD), for simple ethnic reasons were decidedly anti-fundamentalist in their actions during the 1991–1992 crisis.

Ethnicity as a source of conflict was also evident in Iraq after the Gulf War, when tensions erupted between the Shi'ites and Kurds on the one hand, and the ruling ethnic Sunni clientele of Takrit on the other (Baram, 1991b). The most dramatic example is Sudan, where ethnic conflict amounted to a civil war, not to forget the current conflict between the Sunni majority and the Alawites in Syria (for a Sunni fundamentalist view see, Abd-Allah, 1983), which could also lead to such a war. In the following pages, I shall focus on ethnicity and the nation-state and place the issue of religion as a solvent/dissolvent within this context.

Ethnicity and Religion

In this section I shall outline the conceptual framework pertaining to 'ethnicity' and the 'sub-system' of Middle Eastern nation-states (Tibi, 1993a). Based on this effort at elucidation of the issue and the conceptualization of the data, I shall proceed in the following section to analyze the basic unit of the Middle Eastern sub-system, namely, the nation-state. This enquiry takes account of the fact that the modern state, as it evolved into a nation-state (Giddens, 1987, Chapter 10), is alien to the historical experience of the Middle East. Prior to the encounter with modern Europe, this region was familiar with the imperial as well as with the dynastic–territorial state, but not with the nation-state (cf., Piscatori, 1986; see also Tibi, 1990c). The latter pre-supposes a superordinate national community that renders ethnic communities insignificant. It also requires national, i.e., nation-state related loyalty and identity patterns capable of superseding divisive ethnic commitments. This European model (Bendix, 1978) of the modern state (France and England) has been elevated to a global model of the nation-state in the international system of states (Hinsley, 1973).

In the Middle East, the nation-state did not grow from domestic heritage. It was externally imposed in the historical context of the globalization of the originally European system of nation-states

(Tibi, 1990b). It is built upon Ottoman and colonial legacies, which exacerbate the process of this state pattern taking root in an alien environment. In the liberal nation-state model of nationalism, common symbols—not ethnic bonds—relate people to one another in a communicative–discursive context (Giddens, 1987). Symbols become ethnic to the extent that a national population has to share a common ethnicity. Peter Weinrich argues, for instance, that the 'vast majority of people in the typical nation-state will have one core social identity in common, namely, that of a common ethnicity...[if] those sharing it agree on its meaning and value, then it will dominate their behaviour. The other social identities...would become subordinated' (Weinrich, 1988: 301). Not only do the existence of sub-national and sub-ethnic divisions within the confines of the nation-state exacerbate the establishment of this new institution in the Middle East, but the existing claims of supra-national, that is, pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic, entities also generate conflicts related to the existing superordinate ethnic communities. To complicate the matter, in the Middle East, superordinate formulae (Islamic fundamentalism) and subordinate ones (ethnicity) are inter-mingled.

Analysis of ethnicity as a source of conflict within the regional setting of the Middle East compels us to draw up on several disciplines. Earlier, ethnicity was a major concern of only ethno-sociologists and anthropologists (Horowitz, 1985; Rex and Mason, 1988). Only recently, in particular after the ethnic fragmentation of the Soviet Union, did professional international relations scholars start discovering ethnicity. Basically, ethnicity underlies the rise of various ethno-nationalisms, which are in contrast to the liberal concept of Western nationalism and the nation-state.

In the past years, ethnicity has assumed many diverse meanings. In the Middle East, the more substantive research on ethnicity shows that this term has replaced the notion of *minorities* employed earlier. Michael Hudson has suggested that there exists a core of overall Arab identity whose hallmarks are, 'on the ethnic dimension, Arab language and culture, and on the religious dimension, Islam' (Hudson, 1977: 38). To be more specific, Islam means only Sunni Islam. Within this context, non-Arab Sunni Muslims such as the Kurds and the Berbers, as well as non-Sunni Muslim Arabs such as the Alawites, the Druzes and the sectarian offshoots of Shi'ite

Islam (the latter are the majority in Iraq) are referred to as minorities in the sense of communal solidarity groups. Nevertheless, Hudson is aware of the fact that the conflict between the minorities thus defined and the majority can assume an ethnic character. Events have shown that it is very unlikely that modernization will contribute to eliminating ethnic or sectarian minority solidarity groups through assimilation along the lines of the European model that formed the national-state (Tilly, 1975; Bendix, 1978). To take this into account is to acknowledge that the 'possibility for ethno-sectarian conflict remains a constant danger should the conflict precipitating circumstances arise' (Hudson, 1977: 79). This ethno-sectarian conflict assumes a fundamentalist character, as we can see in the Sudan. It is a conflict between superordinate and subordinate identities.

The Arab nation is an idea of superordinate identity which lacks the underpinnings of firm social and political foundations (Farrah, 1987; Tibi, 1990c; and in particular, Chalala, 1987). Compared to Africa, it is true to state in accordance with Hudson that the Arab Middle East

> ...is fundamentally homogeneous in terms of its widely shared national and religious values [however]...in a political culture, noted for affectivity and the persisting salience of primordial identifications, Arabism must coexist or compete with certain other parochial identifications.... It would be much too simple...to assume that modernisation is performing an assimilationist melting-pot function in this area (Hudson, 1977: 56–57).

This line of argument leads us far away from the dichotomy of majority/minority insofar as it takes into account the ethnic and sectarian sub-divisions within Arabism.

Each social group of the populations of a subsystem is linked together ethnically. The core of ethnicity resides in the socially produced and ever-changing quartet of common myths, memories, values and symbols (Smith, 1986). Thus, ethnicity cannot be properly defined in terms of static cultural elements, such as Arabism, or shared religious beliefs, such as Sunni Islam. Nor can we come to grips with ethnicity along the lines of the suggestions of Esman and Rabinovich that ethnicity can be defined as 'collective identity and solidarity based on such ascriptive factors as imputed common

descent, language, customs, belief systems and practices (religion), and in some cases race or color' (Esman and Rabinovich, 1988: 3). Instead of such static definitions, we would rather draw on the concept of historically perceived forms of the quartet—common myths, memories, values and symbols—which are constantly in flux. This concept can be equally applied to communal solidarity groups, such as the Alawites and Druzes of Syria, the Dinka of the Sudan or the Berbers of Morocco, as well as to over-arching human populations such as the Arabs who claim to constitute a modern nation. Viewed from this angle, every nation can be considered to have ethnic origins.

Nations are neither primordial nor perennial, but entities which have grown in modern times from ethnic origins (Smith, 1986). Nations are a modern phenomenon that dates from the late eighteenth century. In modern industrial societies, all nations have their ethnic origins. National ties underlying the new pattern of identity replace the hitherto prevailing local communal identifications. Structurally generated processes of integration and cultural assimilation, supported by the new modes of communication under novel technology, make it 'possible and necessary to imagine communities, at once, sovereign and limited, through which a sense of immortality can be evoked and with which otherwise anonymous individuals can identify' (ibid.: 10). Communication networks facilitated by discursive capabilities underlie this pattern of national community. The crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East, which led to the rise of religious fundamentalism, is a result of the failure to generate this complex of integration–assimilation–communication that could have contributed to the formation of a national identity.

Dealing with changes within collective units and sentiments requires an analysis of the differences and similarities between modern national units and sentiments, and the collective cultural units and sentiments of previous eras, those which Smith terms 'ethnie'. The relevance of Smith's analysis to our enquiry is not restricted to the disclosure of respective ethnic origins of nations. Rather, Smith's exploration is into the nature and durability of ethnic forms and contents, and into the transformation of these ethnic forms and contents into national ones or their persistence against their transformation (of great value to our enquiry) into ethnicity in the subsystemic context of the Middle East. The

pre-existing relative cultural homogeneity among the Arab population of the Middle East is the evidence on which the supposition that there exists a superordinate identity engendering community in the Middle East operates. Contributions by Arab authors such as Ali Dessouki, Matar, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Hilal-Dessouki and Matar, 1983) to this debate rest on this assumption, thus inferring that the subsystem under consideration is basically an Arab subsystem. The Middle East is, however, not restricted to its Arab part. In focusing on the Arab part of this Middle Eastern subsystem while simultaneously taking into account the ethnic sub-divisions within Arabism, we are in a position to discern competing superordinate and subordinate ethnic identities and also to view the tensions among them as a source of conflict. Ghassan Salame's (1987) analysis of the identity conflict in the Arab state between the claim of unity of the existing nation-states and the diversity of the populations these states accommodate strikes me as important for the claimed common identity of an Arab subsystem.

At this conjucture, we can differentiate between pre-national and national, that is, nation-state-oriented, identities. Social identities are related to cultures. To be sure, culture is not referred to in this context in static terms such as language, religion or alleged primordial values. Rather, culture is based on the realities and necessities underlying the production of symbols in the Geertzian sense of symbolic dimension of social behaviour in a given structural context (Geertz, 1973; Tibi, 1990d). Viewed from this angle, every culture is local, since the creation of symbols is regularly related to a concrete socio-cultural context. Local cultures assemble on the lines of a cross-cultural civilization (e.g., one Islamic civilization and diversity of Islamic cultures). The assumed overall Arab culture, as defined in static terms of Arab language, scriptural Sunni Islam and imputed overall values, is believed to be the same in the Gulf and in Morocco. In terms of socio-cultural analysis, however, interpretation by the variety of concrete cultures in both areas is fairly different. *Iqlimiyya*, meaning 'regionalism' in pan-Arab political language, conveys a sentiment hostile to pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabists thus fail to acknowledge the locality of cultures and of the ethnicity related to them. The idea of an overall Arab ethnicity is challenged by local ethnic realities, which cannot be simply reduced to an ideological commitment to *iqlimiyya*. These identity patterns are related to local cultures in the Geertzian

sense of the social production of meaning. In this chapter, these local identities in the Arab part of the Middle Eastern subsystem are viewed and interpreted as subordinate identities. The decline of pan-Arabism in the aftermath of the crisis of the nation-state has contributed to strengthening these local identities. Paradoxically, it has also given rise to the new superordinate identity of Islamism.

The superordinate identities at the level of the subsystem are related to ideal types and not fully to real socio-cultural contexts. Essentially, pan-Arabism and Islamism are the ideologies around which these superordinate identities revolve as referents. Having defined 'ethnie' in the Smithian sense of ethnic community as a human population with shared (ancestry) myths, (historical) memories, and ever changing common values and symbols, we are in a position to state that both secular and religious superordinate types of identities can assume an ethnic character. Thus, the superordinate ethnicity of Arabism exists in a competitive context to other subordinate everyday ethnic, though Arab, communities.

Islamism is related to a religion, and no religion, except in the scriptures, can exist in the nowhere of abstract beliefs. Beliefs are always a part of the social interpretation of reality. Thus, religion fuses with ethnicity, as was the case in early Islam when this religion was exclusively an Arab Islam. Despite its claim of universalism, we find Islam reinforcing ethnic sentiments to form the ideal of an Arab–Islamic religio-ethnic identity. Montgomery Watt (1968; 1977) tells us that the 'federation of Arab tribes' in the Islamic city-state of Medina resulted in the creation of a 'supertribe' depicted as *umma*. In early Islam, the distinction between Arabs and *mawalis* ('non-Arab Muslims') indicated a variety of ethnic conflicts, which supports the view that ethnicity was not superseded. In the course of the spread of Islam beyond Arabia, Islam was no longer restricted to Arab ethnicity (Tibi, 1988, Chapters 4 and 5) and it fused with other ethnicities.

With a view to the present, the ethnically sub-divided religious identity of Islam as a superordinate identity of an Islamic civilization is relevant for understanding several varieties of interstate conflict (Iran–Iraq) as well as intrastate conflict (the Alawites of Syria). These religious sub-divisions when fused with ethnicity assume an ethno-religious character. Sectarianism is the vehicle of this pattern. As Anthony Smith argues 'the rise of religious sectarianism...

provides a...fertile field for [an] ethno-religious community. Sectarian, even heretical, forms of...Islam become associated with remote provincial communities, whose earlier religious association gradually becomes ethnicised' (Smith, 1986: 36).

The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that at the level of a subsystem and with a view to the dimension of identity in the Middle East, there are competing superordinate and subordinate ethnicities. In the course of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the resort to religion is laden with these ethnicities. In the following section, we will face the fact that most of the Middle Eastern nation-states are nominal, that is, they lack the firm political and social foundations and, foremost, a unified ethnicity. Thus, fundamentalism is also directed against the existing states. At the level of the nation-state we will find other varieties of competing superordinate and subordinate ethnicities, all of which make use of religious symbols.

We cannot conclude this section without making the point clear that ethnicity is not simply a socio-cultural issue. Ethnic boundaries are not just psychologically drawn in terms of 'us–them' distinctions while determining social identities. Ethnic boundaries are subjectively as well as structurally drawn. Traditionally, sets of tribes, such as the four Alawite tribes of Syria (Matawirah, Haddadin, Khayatin and Kalbiyya), which grouped on religio-ethnic grounds had their own socio-economic rural settings for the reproduction of their material lives. Ghassan Salame (1987: 213–16) has coined the term *tamaddun al-sukkan wa taryif al-sulta* to refer to the present conditions, under which we can no longer speak of Alawite sectarian tribes in structural terms. By the quoted term, Ghassan Salame means the consequential migration of peasants to towns and the ruralization of political elites in the Middle East. With regard to this, the question to be asked is whether this change has contributed to a greater national assimilation, thus enforcing the nation-state related superordinate ethnicity as opposed to the subordinated ethnicities like the one of the Alawites. No empirical evidence can support a favourable answer.

Anthony Smith brings the paradox of ethnicity to our attention. This paradox lies in its mutability in persistence, and its persistence through change (Smith, 1986). The structural change in Syrian society, looked at here as a case in point, contributed to a change in the social network of the Alawites, but did not override the

existing ethnic boundaries in enforcing the national conformity required by the superordinate ethnicity of the nation-state. The persistence of ethnic networks, their structural undermining through change notwithstanding, can be observed in the social and political contexts in which ethnicity is expressed. In considering the fact that the state is the single most powerful agency for resource allocation, and keeping in view the ethnicization of political elites, we can see that ethnic networks are tightly bound to state networks. Ethnicity is no longer a tightly bound set of local networks which preserve the integrity of the local system (see, Wallman, 1988).

Structural change renders traditional forms of ethnicity insignificant insofar as the competitive contest for state resources becomes ethnicized. This compels us to take a closer look at the character of the basic units of the subsystem, namely, the nation-state. The crisis of this institution has been the origin of the recourse to religion as the solvent and, thus, to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Instability, as a source of conflict potential in the subsystem, is partly due to the fact that the subordinate ethnic communities of these basically nominal nation-states mobilize religion against the imposed superordinate secular identity and loyalty patterns. The linking of these ethnic, subordinate determinants to the universalist referents of political Islam is a greater puzzle for the social scientist.

Nation–States Sans Nations

Nation-states in the Middle East are nominal nation-states as noted earlier. With the exception of Egypt, and to a certain extent Morocco, the creation of the contemporary states of the Middle East is fairly recent. The post-colonial state in the Middle East, established as a nation-state, has to muddle through pan-state related superordinate claims and identities (pan-Arab and Islamic) and local subordinate identities—except the case of the Kurds—not necessarily related to the claim of a state. The superordinate formula is an ideal, whereas subordinate identities are realities backed by subjective and structural networks.

In fact, the nation-state of the Middle East, like other Third World states, is a 'historically derived heterogeneous collectivity thrown together by the processes of colonialism' (Murphree,

1988: 157). This nation-state did not grow from the area's historical experience, familiar as it was with the dynastic–territorial and the imperial state. Sovereignty as the logical substance of the modern nation-state was alien to that experience. This new state pattern was externally imposed on an environment which lacked the needed infrastructure for establishing it. Thus, the state was institutionally weak and unable to resolve conflicts arising from the fact that its population was an ethnically heterogeneous collectivity, not only thrown together but also expected to be a national population. Intrastate conflicts rest mostly on politicized ethnicity mingled with religion within the framework of the struggle over the assets of the state. Patron–client linkages (Waterbury, 1977) within ethnic communities, competing with each other for the control over state resources, shape the new patterns of conflict, with politicized ethnicity related to religious–sectarian ties.

The institutionally weak Middle Eastern nation-state lacks the procedural and substantial consent over the rules of competition and for regulating ethnic conflict. State power rests on imported means of coercion. It has been argued that the Middle Eastern state had never been as powerful as it is today. This statement is true and it does not contradict the description of the Middle Eastern state as a weak state characterized by a low degree of institutionalization of its foundations. Gabriel Ben-Dor argues, with some basis, that:

> The European colonial powers exported to the Middle East is the most advanced governmental technology available in the form of state apparatus. This governmental technology has a logic of its own, which, however, is not easily exportable...Thus, the Arab world ended up with the powerful instrument of the state, but instead of tempering this instrument by its own logic, it was inflamed by the passion of nationalism (Ben-Dor, 1988: 85–86).

This nationalism has been a construct for a superordinate entity aimed at achieving and for providing a legitimacy for a pan-Arab state for which the structural underpinning is still lacking. This superordinate entity is not able to regulate ethnic conflict and cope with the ethno-politics arising from the competition among the real, subordinate ethnic communities for state resources. For a better understanding, it is imperative to draw both on the global background of the Middle Eastern nation-state as a basic unit of the subsystem as well as on its Ottoman and colonial legacies.

As earlier noted, state patterns known to the history of the Middle East prior to the imposition of the new institution of the nation-state were the imperial and territorial states. As Charles Tilly and a group of distinguished historians have clearly shown, the present international system of states can be traced back to the European system of states established in the aftermath of the peace of Westphalia in 1648. 'Over the next three hundred years the Europeans and their descendants managed to impose that system on the entire world. The recent wave of decolonisation has almost completed the mapping of the globe into that system' (Tilly, 1975: 45). The French Revolution was the turning point for the transformation of that system from one of sovereign states to the present one of nation-states. As Bernard Lewis (1979) argues, since the nineteenth century the idea of nation has been a major preoccupation of Western educated intellectuals who were involved in adopting Western patterns of organization so as to impose them on their own communities. It was, however, not simply the influence of ideas which led to the present state of affairs. Primarily, the global structural pressures for transforming the world into a comity of nation-states underlaid this process. This structure that we refer to as an international system is sub-divided into regional subsystems, paramount among which is the Middle East.

In looking at the modern Middle East while considering the Ottoman legacies, we will find that the Ottoman Empire, unlike the modern nation-state, did not demand a core social identity related to the state structure, namely, the identity of a common ethnicity. As the leading Ottomanist, Kemal Karpat puts it (in a remarkable paper on ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire):

> The establishment of religion as the chief identifying characteristic of both Muslims and non-Muslims...did not destroy the ethnic sense but in fact strengthened it as well as the religious identity.... While the Ottoman government took its legitimacy from Islam and enforced, to the extent possible, Islamic legislation, it did not identify itself politically and ideologically with the Muslim community until the nineteenth century.... The Muslim community encompassed a great number of ethnic and linguistic groups...the early Ottoman state recognised these as ethnic divisions (Karpat, 1988: 43–45).

The colonial penetration of the Ottoman Empire stretches through a long span of time contemporaneous with the globalization of the European economy and of its networks. Prior to direct colonial conquests, Western colonialism drew on ethnic groupings in the search for local supporters. During the period of colonization, European powers made full use of the existing ethnic divisions which were hitherto insignificant under Ottoman rule. The Moroccan case of playing ethnic communities against one another became the general tactic, of which Syria is a case in point. In Europe, the nation preceded the nation-state. In the Middle East, nation-states were established without a nation. Moreover, these nation-states were burdened with the expectation of 'development', which they failed to meet. Thus, the crisis was imminent and gave rise to the resort to religion as another expectation, as a solvent.

Colonial rule unwittingly contributed to the rise of anti-colonial national movements which were mostly based in urban centres, as was the case in Syria. Philip Khoury informs us about the conflict among domestic forces centring on the issue of separatism and nationalism. 'The birth of the nationalist movement within a relatively unified and integrated political culture' occurred in the Syrian urban centres, and it was carried out by the 'cohesive Sunni upper class in four towns' (Khoury, 1987: 13). Contrary to this was the ethnic culture of the Druzes and the Alawites supported by French colonial rule. It was a culture divided along tribal or clan lines which Khoury interprets as 'separatism'. The national culture of the major towns was, however, not less ethnic—as per the meaning employed in this chapter—than the separatist one of the Druzes and Alawites, even though it was avowedly related to the idea of the nation as the superordinate identity. As Khoury tells us, 'the French promoted certain Alawite leaders' (ibid.: 515) and used them against the national movement. This colonial legacy rests heavily as a burden on the post-colonial state. When the ethnic Alawite elites succeeded in acquiring political power, they established their own rule ethnically along patron–client lines (Batatu, 1981; Seale, 1989). However, they legitimized themselves nationally as once the urban elites had. Ghassan Salame aptly comments on the ruralization of the politically ruling elites who have an ethnic *asabiyya* but legitimize themselves nationally:

> These *asabiyyas* hate to sign their political practices with their own name. Instead they present their state as if it were the

> exemplary instrument in the service of the entire society, a feature which characterises modern Arab discourse.... The ruling Arab authorities are imprisoned in the ideology of modern state which compels them to obscure their origins (Salame, 1987: 24, emphasis in original).

Uncovering this nationally disguised ethnicity, which Salame refers to as *asabiyya*, should not distract us from the ethnicity of the urban national movement itself. This movement was ethnic despite the fact that its ideological claims were unrestrictedly pan-Arab. In a recent monograph by a Palestinian-American written on the origins of Palestinian nationalism, we are informed that the inability of the Syrian and Iraqi urban notables to be sensitive to the concerns of the Palestinians, a different ethnic community, was the basis of the emergence of early Palestinian nationalism. 'For all the pan-Arab fervour of dominant Syrians and Iraqis, the Palestinians were not at the top of their agenda' (Muslih, 1988: 214–15). This judgement uncovers ethnic elements included even in the pan-Arab nationalist movement.

In the period of decolonization, secular pan-nationalism as a formula for a superordinate identity legitimized the anti-colonial struggle and welded together the collectivity driven by the colonial powers. In the formative years of the Arab part of the Middle Eastern subsystem, this formula served royal national elites as a means to establishing their post-colonial power regionally. The shift from the royal pan-Arabism of Arab kings to the populist–inclusivist secular pan-Arabism of Nasser was a forceful and honest effort to contain ethnicity under the umbrella of an Arab superordinate identity supported by a model of development. The internally and externally determined failure of the secular nation-state as a model of development (see the case study by Waterbury, 1983) led to the revival of ethnic subordinate identities and resorting to religion as the solvent in this situation of crisis. It must suffice to state that ethno-politics has gained momentum subsequent to the decline of the nation-state model of Nasserism. When pan-Arabism subsided, ethno-politics began to thrive again, and it is today more than ever a substantive source of interstate and intrastate conflicts. In my view, the politicization of ethnicity and its combination with political Islam is related to the crisis of the existing nation-states. These states are entities without nations in the sense of institutionalized and sovereign polities linked together by a common sense of citizenship.

The foregoing discussion has shown that Arabism can only be defined as ethnicity in the static sense of cultural homogeneity (Arab language and Sunni Islam). This paper suggests drawing a distinction between superordinate and subordinate patterns of ethnicity. Both are related to religion. The projection of the modern European idea of a nation in the latter half of the nineteenth century into the Arab cultural area served to construct a nationally defined superordinate secular Arab ethnicity. Collectivities lying beyond this entity were defined in earlier research as minorities. More recent research suggests going beyond static definitions in determining ethnicity and along the dynamic lines related to the quartet of ever-changing common myths and collective memories. Dynamic definitions must also include values and symbols based on a social interpretation of reality and which lie below the surface of respective cultures. Ethnicity thus defined can be transformed into a nation on the grounds of a citizenship-backed internal sovereignty and an institutionally-structured polity. Only if both requirements are met can a nation-state be substantive, that is, not a nominal nation-state or that which Hedley Bull termed 'nation-state by courtesy' (Bull, 1977). The lack of substance of the nation-state in varying degrees in the majority of Middle Eastern states leads to ethno-politics becoming a major source of conflict.

Citizenship in Crisis

I would like to conclude this chapter with a rough outline of the substance of sovereignty and institutionalized polity as distinctive features of the nation-state. In polities that lack these features, political conflict assumes the nature of ethnicized conflict. In my view, the crisis of the nation-state in the Middle East is also related to the lack of substantive sovereignty that undergirds citizenship. Religious and ethnic ties have proved stronger than belonging to the existing nation-states. The internal sovereignty of a substantive nation-state is based on the awareness of the members of a collectivity of their membership in a political, and not an ethnic or religious, community. As Giddens puts it, 'a state can only be sovereign...if large segments of the population of that state have mastered an array of concepts with sovereignty' (Giddens, 1987: 210). This mastery needs to be wholly discursive, and this requirement was historically met in the European nation-state by

the development of the means described by Giddens as 'discursive capabilities'. They help monitor social reproduction and pursue the formulation of interests that matter.

To be sure, the sense of membership in a political community, termed here as citizenship, is structurally upheld and is not simply an idea debated among intellectuals. Citizenship is a structurally backed awareness of being a member of a nation-state.

> The exigencies of industrialism...demand the defusion of common modes of thought and belief to the state which is the means of their coordination.... The disintegrative impact which is wrought upon pre-existing traditional cultures by modern economic and political development creates a search for renewed forms of group symbolism, of which nationalism is the most potent (Giddens, 1987: 215).

Without this structural underpinning, citizenship as an awareness of a superordinate identity cannot thrive in a political community, and it cannot be

> anchored psychologically in distinctive features of modern societies.... The extension of communication cannot occur without the conceptual involvement of the *whole community as a knowledgeable citizenry*. A nation-state is a conceptual community in a way in which traditional states were not (Giddens, 1987: 219, emphasis mine).

In contrast, the community in the Middle East is the subordinate ethno-religious group, not the population of the respective nation-state.

Citizenship as the substance of internal sovereignty pre-supposes an institutionalized polity in which sovereignty is shared by all the members of that political community. In states in which political power is not shared and is instead monopolized by an ethnic or ethno-religious sub-community, as is the case in present Syria and the Sudan or in pre-civil war Lebanon, the combination of ethnicity and of state power results in the politicization of ethnic loyalties and the delegitimization of the state as a nation-state. The ethnic solidarity of the rulers gives rise to the ethnic solidarity of the ruled. Moreover, the ruled mobilize religion against the secular

nation-state and unite their ethnic and religious ties. Gabriel Ben-Dor makes the point that 'for the sharing of sovereignty between the state and the subcommunities, the state must first acquire sufficient institutionalised strength to be able to deal with sovereignty in the first place' (Ben-Dor, 1988: 92). The weak, institutionalized Middle Eastern state, in which—to varying degrees—sovereignty is not yet shared, exacerbates ethnic tensions. With reference to this, Ben-Dor argues:

> The ability to regulate ethnic conflict depends on the capacity to institutionalise a variety of techniques, mechanisms, and procedures.... Ethnic conflict will be most difficult to contain in societies that have a low degree of institutionalisation, which is precisely a salient feature of political culture in the Middle East.... Ethnic conflict and ethnic loyalties hinder the development of...institutionalisation (Ben-Dor, 1988: 77).

In the Middle Eastern subsystem, intricate linkages between this intrastate source of ethnic-religious conflict and the interstate conflict formations can be clearly observed. Middle Eastern states are institutionally weak and lack substantive sovereignty. The crisis of the nation-state leads to resorting to religion as the solvent. The result is Islamic fundamentalism. The resort to religion is not spiritual but generally political, and is the result of ambiguous state–society relations. The question that needs to be asked and for which we are challenged to seek the appropriate answers is the one formulated by Joel Midgal (1988) who deals with state–society relations and state capabilities in Third World countries in general, though with reference to the Middle East. Midgal asks why Middle Eastern states have such difficulty in becoming the organization in society that effectively establishes the needed rules and citizenship-oriented behaviour emanating from the distribution of social control among many organizations that vie to make these rules consensually accepted ones. In referring to the dichotomy of strong societies/weak states with respect to the Middle East, we have to acknowledge the strong coercive capabilities of the nevertheless institutionally weak states. The latter, as nation-states, imposed on ethnically sub-divided societies lack a shared common sense of citizenship. The inability of these states to meet the challenge of

development and to cope with the needs of the population results in the general crisis in the Middle Eastern nation-states. The resultant ethnically embedded Islam exacerbates the crisis. Thus, political Islam is a dissolvent, not a solvent.

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8

CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT MOORINGS: AMERICAN RESPONSES TO A TURBULENT WORLD

James N. Rosenau

Perhaps more than ever, today's news is filled with accounts of citizens engaging in collective actions that challenge established authorities and, indeed, even defy their own leaders. A recent first page of the *New York Times* is illustrative: on 6 June 1992, it carried a story from the Earth Summit in Rio that described 'pressure from environmentalists in their own countries' as the reason several countries signed the biodiversity treaty (Brooke, 1992: 1), another that quoted Serbian leaders as repeatedly insisting that the Serbian irregular forces spearheading the onslaught on Sarejevo 'were not under their control' (Kaufman, 1992: 1), and still another report about the Haitian army, whose commanding general 'is no longer in control of all his forces' (Crossette, 1992: 1).

The worldwide simultaneity of such challenges—and the breakdowns of authority they precipitate—suggests that any enquiry into the meaning of citizenship and national identity for a particular country or region can usefully start with an assessment of the universal tendencies presently at work in the political arena. It is all too easy to become preoccupied with the particulars of civility (and the opinion polls that reflect it) in specific societies and thus overlook the generalized context in which all citizenries are presently ensconced and to which they must respond. To be sure, every

country and region does have unique features that configure how people conduct their social roles, but these features do not exist in a vacuum. They are reflective of larger forces that, however much they may be shaped by particularistic conditions, underlie the competencies and orientations that people bring to their roles as members of society.

The global context in which citizenship is claimed and practised is especially intrusive in the present era. With people, economies, cultures and polities becoming ever more inter-dependent, the larger forces playing upon citizens everywhere are sometimes liberating and sometimes constricting; but at all times they are relentless, complex and substantial, often demanding adaptive responses even as they invite habitual acquiescence. Elsewhere I have outlined the prevailing global context as one marked by turbulence—by fundamental parameters undergoing transformations such that national governments are becoming weaker while sub-national and transnational organizations are becoming more coherent and effective (Rosenau, 1990). The resulting crises of authority and legitimacy that pervade every region and continent pose difficult and unfamiliar challenges for modern citizens and their political identities. The world impinges too closely for them to rely on the widely used strategy which readily justifies 'the rational ignorance of the typical citizen'.[1] Today their identity, their ethics and their conduct are in question as the dynamics of change alter the boundaries, norms and goals through which they relate to their fellow citizens.[2] Many of them appear to have lost their way politically, as if they are practising what might be called citizenship without moorings.[3]

Yet, individuals are far from helpless in the face of the new and unyielding challenges. Due to huge advances in communication and transportation technologies, people everywhere have expanded their analytic skills. They are better able than were, say, their grandparents to anticipate and trace the complex causal scenarios through which distant events impact on their daily routines and pocketbooks. And these same skills also enable them to discern leverage points through which collective action can bring about movement towards desired goals and then to act accordingly (Rosenau, 1990, Chapters 9 and 13). It is hardly coincidental that the central squares of most of the world's cities have lately been filled with crowds demanding either new leaders and policies or a reversion to old ways of conducting public affairs (Rosenau, 1992b).

It is important to emphasize that the expansion of a citizen's analytic skills is independent of his or her level of information. Critics find it all too easy to dismiss the political relevance of citizens by calling attention to poll data which depict great gaps in their information about world affairs. (Noting the proportion of poll respondents who are unable to identify the capital of Pakistan always seems a winning blow.) Glaring gaps do exist, but they do not necessarily prevent the acquisition of greater civic competence. To become more analytically skilful, is to be able to construct more elaborate scenarios, to discern more causal relationships, and to be more ready to accept complexity—irrespective of the amount of information one may possess. What counts is not the capital of a country, but the capacity to trace events into and out of the capital regardless of its identity. One does not need to know the capital of Pakistan—indeed, one can be misinformed about its name and location—in order to grasp ominous stirrings in distant places and appreciate how these can trace a path to one's doorstep and pocketbook. To be sure, it may be the case that the more information people have, the more they are able to frame goals, sift alternatives and make decisions; but analytic skills also derive from a host of sources and experiences unrelated to levels of information. Political wisdom can be acquired through families, work situations and community crises—to mention only its more conspicuous sources.

As the skill revolution enables citizens to have a greater impact on the course of events,[4] so do they have greater responsibility for what happens—for the weakening of communal ties, the persistence of political stalemates, the onset of violence, and the many other instabilities at work in a turbulent world. Whether they are able to see and shoulder the connections between their micro actions and the macro outcomes is, of course, another matter. It is one thing to be ever more skilful in identifying and acting on behalf of one's self-interests, but it is quite another to look at the world from the perspective of the whole system. To appreciate what benefits or damages the collective welfare, and then act in such a way so as to achieve a reasonable balance between personal and public interests, is not so much a matter of skill as it is a value issue, an appraisal of the relative worth of self and society,[5] of what I call the citizen's *self-environment orientation*.

Alternative Citizen Roles

Several basic citizen roles can be readily derived by distinguishing among self-environment orientations in which individuals attach either high or low priority to themselves or their societies. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, those who are inclined to treat their own needs as far more important than those of society practise what can be called *self-centred* citizenship. Persons who have the opposite tendency and place society's needs well ahead of their own practise either of two forms of citizenship: those who have an incremental approach to societal problems practise *altruistic* citizenship, whereas those who proceed from an inflexible image of what societal life ought to be practise *ideological* citizenship. People who are skeptical about the responsiveness of macro politics to micro inputs, or for other reasons attach little political significance either to their own or society's needs and are thus disinclined to enter the public arena, practise what can be regarded as *apathetic* citizenship. Finally, individuals who are deeply invested in the realization of both their own and society's needs are likely to practise a *democratic* form of citizenship. This balanced form approaches the democratic ideal in the sense that citizens are

Figure 8.1: Four Types of Citizenship



not unmindful of their own interests even as they recognize the necessity of also accommodating to the processes and goals of the larger collectivities to which they belong.

While self-environment orientations derive primarily from the way in which people assess the value of their interests relative to those of society, they are also shaped by another crucial perception—namely, how individuals perceive the interactive processes that sustain micro–macro relationships. The causal strength of micro factors relative to macro dynamics is never self-evident. Whatever may be the objective bases of micro–macro interactions, the interpretation of them can vary widely, from the total cynic who believes individuals can exercise no influence over the course of events to the unmitigated optimist who sees macro institutions as keenly responsive to micro inputs. Cynics are thus likely to be attracted to forms of citizenship wherein minimal consequence is attached to actions at the micro level; they just cannot believe that anything they may do in the political arena matters, a belief that may well be so powerful as to offset the values they attach to their own or society's interests. Contrariwise, optimists are likely to be drawn to citizenship practices consistent with their view that societal institutions are malleable, that what they do counts. Strong convictions about political issues, in short, can be moderated by views of how the political process functions.

Neither the cynic nor the optimist, however, can be oblivious to the spectacular ways in which micro actions have been converted into macro outcomes in recent years. More often than not, the town squares crowded with protesting citizens have produced concrete and visible results in the form of revised policies and collapsed governments. There is good evidence that such outcomes in one country embolden people elsewhere, and that this contagion effect is a major factor in the rapidity with which change has come to the former Soviet empire, South Africa, and many other parts of the world. Never before perhaps has the sense of subjective competence felt by citizens everywhere been so thoroughgoingly stimulated. They have literally witnessed, both in person and through television, micro stirrings reshape macro institutions.

It follows that self-environment orientations can never be more than subjective appraisals developed through personal experience, society's socialization processes, and the class, economic, political and other objective circumstances that prevail at any moment in time.

In a rapidly changing and dynamic era, the objective circumstances are likely to foster new self-environment orientations, shifting practices of citizenship and altered political identities. Or at least it is this likelihood that serves as the main focus of the ensuing analysis. I seek to identify and evaluate how the global turbulence presently at work may interactively redirect or solidify the practices that undergird the several self-environment orientations and how, in turn, each form of citizenship then feeds back as micro inputs that shape the macro patterns which sustain the coherence of societies and/or the authority crises that beset them. Given this generalized context, I subsequently undertake to apply it to the circumstances that currently mark citizenship and the sense of political identity in the United States.

Before proceeding, however, it must be stressed that my focus is on the interaction of subjective orientations and objective circumstances. The latter are presumed to exert sufficient pressure on the former to foster pronounced patterns worthy of analysis, but this is not to predict the citizenship behaviour of particular or all individuals. Because self-environment orientations are a product of personal experiences and early socialization as well as prevailing realities, and not a little because the familiar moorings on the political landscape have become unhinged, there are bound to be some people who deviate from the expected pattern even though the pattern itself is likely to persist as long as there is no major alteration in the objective conditions which conduce to it. In other words, whatever objective realities may prevail, any of the self-environment orientations can be practised.[6] Although objective conditions may be favourable to a balanced, democratic citizenship, for example, some people will nevertheless be disposed toward ideological or apathetic forms of political involvement.

To note the subjectivity that underlies how people conduct themselves in the political arena is to remind ourselves of the difficulties that attach to probes into the micro underpinnings of political systems. We can recognize and trace the macro patterns, and these may well become so habitual as to endure for decades, but even so they rest on subjective foundations that are capable of great volatility in times of enormous change such as that which presently prevails.

The skill revolution constitutes a major source of the volatility fostered by global turbulence. As the analytic skills of citizens expand, so does their capacity to identify their own interests, to

evolve scenarios of how the course of events will culminate on their doorstep, or to otherwise cope with the welter of complexity churned by the parametric transformations. For some of those mired in apathetic and ideological inclinations, their new-found skills are likely, other things being equal, to wrench them out of their habitual orientations and render them more ready to engage in either self-interested or democratic forms of citizenship. In some cases, on the other hand, the expanded skills may foster a greater sense of futility over the ability of micro actors to shape macro outcomes and thus move some self-interested and democratic citizens away from politics and into passivity and apathy.

In a like manner, the worldwide authority crises that mark the present era are likely to have micro consequences irrespective of the type of citizenship people practise. Other things being equal, for example, the more citizens get caught up in the volatility of such crises, the more they are likely to redefine their self-environment orientations, revise their political identities and undertake new forms of behaviour in the public arena. In effect, the shifting lines of authority in their environment leave them with little choice but to reconsider how they want to conduct themselves.

New conceptions of territoriality are still another consequence of global turbulence that can be traced in all the citizenship types. With authority undergoing relocation 'upward' towards transnational organizations, 'sideward' to social movements, and 'downward' towards sub-national collectivities, the sense of who one is politically and the meanings of territory—of geographic space to which historical and cultural significance is attached—are no longer as compelling as they once were.[7] As a result, citizens of every orientation are subject to diminished claims on their loyalties and, other things being equal, are thus more ready to revise the collectivities with which they identify and to redefine the balance between their own and society's interests.

But other things are rarely equal. Just as crises which lead to the relocation of authority can vary in their intensity, scope and direction, so can the dynamics of the skill revolution be varyingly applied. Hence, in order to take note of the systematic underpinnings of such variabilities, we need to look more closely at how each of the citizenship types have been affected by the cascading changes brought on by global turbulence.

Self-centred Citizenship

The distinguishing features of this manner of relating to the political arena are the high value attached to one's own interest and the low concern for the welfare of any larger collectivity. Most people are, properly, keenly attentive to their own needs and wants, ever ready to seek a minimum degree of comfort for themselves and their families. In this sense, self-interest is a prime source of the power that propels political issues and sustains political processes. But many people are also preoccupied with the more encompassing systems to which they belong, partly because their own welfare is tied to the stability and progress of the larger system and partly because they also care about the values to which their societies are committed. Except as noted later, however, these larger concerns are essentially irrelevant to those who practise self-centred citizenship. Their focus on themselves is so extensive as to preclude appreciation of macro institutions.

This is not to imply, however, that self-centred citizens are necessarily inclined to advance their interests by exploiting the larger system. Such individuals can certainly be found in every corner of the world. Whenever possible, they cheat on their taxes, avoid regulations, disregard efforts to conserve resources and limit pollution, and so on through a long list of actions that could make a contribution to the welfare of their communities. They are the free riders of societies and, as such, their collective impact serves to exacerbate macro tendencies towards stalemate and fragmentation. If the larger society is unstable and incapable of addressing and resolving its major problems, self-centred citizens could care less as long as the disarray does not undermine their livelihoods. If their way of life is endangered by societal disarray, of course their keen attention to their own goals will lead them into momentary concerns for the macro system and to actions designed to preserve the status quo through which they have benefited.

It follows that as economies flounder and standards of living decline, and as societies become increasingly fragile and unable to retain an underlying value consensus or institutional coherence, so will more and more individuals be inclined to restructure their self-environment orientations in the direction of self-centred citizenship. Indeed, the individual can be viewed as the ultimate

sub-group, and it would not be difficult to amass evidence that this form of sub-groupism has become increasingly rampant on a worldwide scale.

Nor are the tendencies toward self-centred citizenship confined to mass publics. Leaders in all walks of life are giving voice to subsystem values and neglecting to stress the virtues of whole-system cooperation and coherence. Rare today is a leader who speaks of the need to maintain balanced self-environment orientations. Rare are leaders like Edvard Shevardnadze who resign their position rather than yield to sub-groupist impulses.[8] Rare are the heads of state or prime ministers who articulate a vision which stresses that societies cannot move forward without compromises, in which people give up some of their personal needs on behalf of larger aggregates. Put differently, gross leadership failures throughout the world have undermined socialization processes and contributed to the emergence of new generations lacking the values necessary for whole-system progress and persistence.

While global turbulence may well be swelling the ranks of self-centred citizens at an exponential rate throughout the world, it needs to be stressed that not all of them are free riders. Some are self-centred, so to speak, by default. Due to the dynamics of turbulent change, they have no larger system for which they can feel any attachment and to which they can devote their energies. They are not apathetic about the political arena, but either they are confused as to where they fit in it or they have been drawn into lines of work or lifestyles that transgress the traditional boundaries of politics. Instead of being free riders, they are either lost riders whose political homes have been swept away by authority crises or jet-set riders whose political homes have been transformed by an ever more globalized economy and the expanding webs of an ever more intricate global inter-dependence.

With governments weakening and sub-national groups becoming more demanding, and with the established boundaries of political communities thus being called into question or overthrown, it seems likely that more and more citizens will lose their bearings. They may be inclined to care about the well-being of a larger system, but they no longer know what that system is and thus are compelled, by default, to practise self-centred citizenship. A quintessential illustration of such lost riders is provided by this comment in a letter to the editor of a Russian newspaper: 'I am a citizen

of a nonexistent state, and I don't know where I live. Is it the Commonwealth of Independent States, or is it the Russian Federated Republic? Is it Siberia, and is it the Sovereign Republic of Altai?' (quoted in Bohlen, 1992: 1).

Similarly, although for entirely different reasons, jet-set riders have had to default to their own self-interests. In their case, the larger national communities to which they have been attached are less and less salient the more they become ensconced in new, transnational roles that orient them to see the world as their bailiwick. The product of ever greater inter-dependence and the globalization of national economies, these roles require their occupants to focus on concerns that extend well beyond national boundaries and that obscure the values into which they were originally socialized. Since there are no reasons to anticipate a slowing down of the pace of globalization, the ranks of jet-set riders seem bound to become more numerous, as the following account of the variety of new, transnational roles implies:

> Commercial pilots, computer programmers, international bankers, media specialists, oil riggers, entertainment celebrities, ecology experts, demographers, accountants, professors, athletes—these compose a new breed of men and women for whom religion, culture, and nationality can seem only marginal elements in a working identity (Barber, 1992: 54–55).

Put in terms of self-environment orientations, these new global roles have not only loosened their occupants from the psychological constraints of territory, but to a large extent they have also liberated them from the responsibility of worrying about the welfare of political communities.

Not all self-centred citizens, however, have been comfortable with their new roles in the global economy. For some, the shedding of territorial commitments and responsibilities is worrisome, as if they retain their democratic self-orientation even though their line of work no longer contributes to their prior society. Consider, for example, the case of Americans who moved from long-time jobs in Detroit's automobile industry to comparable positions in Japanese firms producing Japanese cars in the United States. Consisting of designers, engineers, salespersons, public relations specialists and manufacturing experts, these 'Detroit expatriates' who have

committed their professional lives to the Japanese have apparently been increasingly confused by their citizenship as US–Japanese automotive competition intensifies. 'Cast into a neutral space in terms of patriotism', they speak of 'evenings when my wife and I look at each other and I think, "I wish I could be doing this for an American company"'.[9] Yet, despite their concern that their new positions may seem like a betrayal, most of the expatriates are eventually able to accept and rationalize the political implications of their new positions. Some see their work as having helped the US by prodding its automobile industry into adopting higher standards. Others view themselves as having contributed to the creation of US jobs that offset Detroit's losses. Still others regard themselves 'as ground-floor participants in the borderless economy, their positions in the industry transcending such quaint notions as them-against us' (Woutat, 1992: A7). As one of them put it, 'I could feel the shrinking of the globe in a very personal way. It's been overwhelmingly exhilarating'.[10]

Whatever may be the extent to which self-environment orientations are turning in self-centred directions on a global scale, the result is a further weakening of governments and other institutional mechanisms for realizing collective goals and maintaining social order. Such is the central dynamic of macro–micro interactions in the present era. The macro arrangements work less and less well, thus turning micro actors inward, all of which further reduces the effectiveness of the macro arrangements. As will be seen, this process appears to be gathering momentum in the US today.

Altruistic Citizenship

It will be recalled that this is one of two forms of self-environment orientations in which citizens treat society's needs as considerably more urgent and important than their own. It involves an incremental approach to the political arena, a focus on particular issues which come to be viewed as so salient or threatening as to warrant putting personal concerns aside, or at least achieving a perceptual convergence in which personal satisfactions are equated with societal goals and needs. In this sense—in the sense that such individuals come to focus so intensely upon larger problems that they ignore their own immediate interests—it is an altruistic form

of citizenship. It is driven not by ideology, in the sense of being a blueprint for society, but by a concern with one problem or issue at a time.

The quintessential expression of this form of citizenship is found among those who participate in social movements. The feminists, the environmentalists, the anti-war activists—these are people for whom a single set of issues is all-encompassing. They tend to have enough personal resources, or to be so ready to place societal concerns over their own, that they have or make the time necessary to engage in a wide variety of activities on behalf of their issue-based goals. For some of them the issue-oriented incremental approach becomes so much a way of life that they turn to new issues if and when the old one is resolved. An example here are members of the peace movement who moved on to environmental preoccupations when the end of the Cold War reversed the global arms race.

To a large extent, transnational rather than national or sub-national concerns serve as the driving force of altruistic citizenship. All the issues that sustain modern social movements involve global problems, and thus the movements become informal networks of like-minded citizens in different parts of the world who communicate and converge episodically as the issues that draw them together surge and wane on the global agenda. It follows that altruistic citizens, like some of their self-centred counterparts, tend not to be oriented towards specific societies. But unlike self-centred citizens, the altruistic types have no sense of loss with respect to their political homes. Rather, their home takes on a global cast as they develop allegiances to issue outcomes. And their convictions along this line, reinforced by movement members elsewhere in the world, lead them to believe that micro actions can have desirable collective outcomes, that governments can be moved if enough people share in their efforts to bring about change. Indeed, it is reasonable to presume that no other form of citizenship stimulates deeper beliefs in macro–micro interactive processes than does the altruistic form. The image of a member of some movement engaging in protest behaviour that leads them to be physically removed by police exemplifies the depth of their perception that micro actions can have cumulative consequences.

It seems plausible that the transformative consequences of global turbulence have also greatly enlarged the ranks of altruistic citizens.

With governments weakened and lines of authority obscured, social movements have flourished with the onset of turbulence.[11] People are attracted to them because the movements are, so to speak, picking up the slack brought on by the globalization of national economies and the bifurcation of world politics into multi-centric and state-centric worlds.[12] Since inter-dependence issues such as environmental pollution, famine, AIDS, currency crises, terrorism, the drug trade and the ozone gap cannot be addressed, much less managed, by governments alone, and since the informal structures of social movements are well suited to transgressing the boundaries that inhibit states from resolving these types of issues, individuals pre-disposed towards self-environment orientations that attach greater value to the environment than the self are likely to gravitate towards the transnational networks which social movements offer their members. Self-centred orientations, in short, are not the only form of citizenship spurred by the parametric transformations that have accompanied the onset of worldwide turbulence.

Ideological Citizenship

For very different reasons, there is a second type of person who attaches much greater importance to societal needs than to personal ones. Unlike the incremental approach of the altruistic citizen, the ideologue has a vision of total society and is inflexible with respect to the basic principles on which the vision rests. Ideologues are more than ready to sacrifice their personal well-being on behalf of their larger blueprint. The image of an Iranian fundamentalist throwing himself into battle and seeking martyrdom on behalf of Islam captures well the extent to which the self-environment orientations of ideologues are skewed in favour of the environment. It also highlights the large extent to which ideologues have faith in the processes through which micro actions can serve macro goals.

Of all the citizenship types identified here, it is probably the ranks of the ideologues that have been most diminished by the onset of global turbulence. The ever greater complexity of societal life, the increasing intractability of economic problems, the pervasiveness of authority crises and the unmistakable tendencies towards political stalemate—not to mention how the collapse of the

Soviet Union revealed the falsities of communism—have all contributed to a flight from rigid ideological formulations and a worldwide readiness to cast self-environment orientations in a more pragmatic context. To be sure, some personality types still cling to the rigidities that sustain ideologues and all societies will thus always have some ideological wings. In the present era, however, it seems likely that these wings will be small even as they will doubtless continue to be vociferous.

And how have the disaffected ideologues restructured their self-environment orientations? As indicated by trends in the former Soviet Union, many have turned towards a balanced set of orientations and come to subscribe to democratic citizenship practices. More accurately perhaps, such people were always pre-disposed in this direction even as they underwent the socialization processes of communist regimes. Accordingly, the collapse of communism made it easy for them to give expression to their underlying inclinations.

On the other hand, there is also considerable evidence that the transition to democratic practices has proven difficult, even impossible, for many in those lands that have thrown off the communist yoke. The heady first days and months of freedom have been followed by the realities of an economy in shambles and the lures of ethnicity. Learning to accept the consequences of democracy—votes that produce undesired results, debates that seem interminable, competitive programmes that seem confusing—is not easy under the best of circumstances and it requires huge leaps under horrendous conditions. And given the absence of an elite capable of articulating extensive experience in democratic procedures, it is hardly surprising that many in the former Soviet empire have moved quickly through democratic self-environment orientations and come to adhere either to apathetic or self-centred orientations.

Apathetic Citizenship (Passive and Alienated)

Notwithstanding the incentives to active citizenship that the skill revolution and other dynamics of global turbulence have highlighted, there remain many people in all parts of the world who attach little importance to either their own or society's needs insofar as these can be served through action in the political arena.

This self-environment orientation, however, derives from several contradictory sources, with the result that it is possible to differentiate between two basic types of apathetic citizenship—one that we shall call *passive* citizenship and another that can be labelled *alienated* citizenship. The former is, so to speak, the truly apathetic citizen who attributes no causal strength to collective action at the micro level and no readiness on the part of macro institutions to attend to his or her needs. Such people are, thus, oblivious to the political arena. They neither care about it nor follow its developments. Alienated citizens, on the other hand, are no less ready to see themselves as lacking influence through collective action or to view society as unresponsive to their needs, but they differ from the passive citizen in that they are not oblivious to the political arena as they are disgusted by it. That is, they care, and at some level they tend to believe that their alienation conveys a message which may eventually be heard by the society's leadership. The alienated citizen, in short, engages in a form of active passivity, contradictory as such a characterization may seem.

A host of factors operate to encourage and sustain passive citizenship. The poor and downtrodden, long suppressed in the relentless rigours of poverty, have little reason to hope that society will be responsive to their needs and, thus, they have even less reason to believe they can do anything about their plight. Passivity thus becomes a way of life, not only because the resources needed to be active in politics are lacking, but also because the spirit lags. Under these circumstances, the skill revolution is of no consequence. Passive citizens have no reason to enlarge their skills, and thus either resist or avoid the powerful stimuli that the skill revolution has to offer.

It may also be that passivity becomes a way of life for some people who live well above the poverty line but who have used their new-found skills to extend their belief that the world is too complex to change. Such people may have a modicum of the resources needed to participate in collective action, even though they have become habituated to passivity by virtue of the assumption that collective action at the micro level is futile. Citizens of this sort do not become alienated in the sense of actively detesting the political arena. They are, rather, truly passive because they have long since presumed that the political world is essentially irrelevant to their daily routines.

In the case of alienated citizens, however, futility is moderated by caring, and passivity is offset by indirect involvement. Normally their behaviour consists, for all practical purposes, of inaction and detachment, but it is also a studied inaction and detachment because their orientation is to follow the course of events and derive therefrom reinforcement for their alienation. Most importantly, on occasion, their convoluted form of caring can actually lead to action, to staying away from the voting booth, casting blank ballots, avoiding rallies, or otherwise seeking to make known their alienation through non-participation. Indeed, sometimes town squares remain empty because leaders have urged their followers to engage in collective action wherein the macro sum of micro actions is a conspicuous avoidance, a message that the political arena has gaps because they chose to remain outside it.

Still another reason for the pervasiveness of apathetic citizenship is the worldwide dearth of effective leaders who can rouse people out of their doldrums. Confidence that micro actions can produce collective outcomes is, presumably, subject to variability, depending in part on whether the case for it can be persuasively voiced. Yet, such voices are hardly a salient aspect of the political landscape in this turbulent era. As previously noted, the ranks of leaders throughout the world are so pervaded with those who focus on narrow interests, that few are concerned with making politics seem meaningful to those who have either lost hope or are alienated. To be sure, there is no dearth of leaders who seek to capitalize on fear, racism and territorial attachments among apathetic citizens as means of enlarging the ranks of their followers, and to some extent such manipulations do result in stirrings among the apathetic. And there are also some leaders who seek support by offering themselves as no-nonsense outsiders who can break through governmental stalemates and produce effective cures to society's ills, and again these tactics can lead to momentary in-roads into the ranks of the apathetic. But the messages of outsiders are not geared to an enduring break with apathy. They are only palliatives, temporary expedients, that are ill-designed to initiate basic alterations in self-environment orientations.

None of this is to say that the several forms of apathy presently at work on a global scale constitute a major pattern. The skill revolution and the successes of collective action in recent years

have surely inhibited tendencies in these directions. As noted earlier, in some countries these products of global turbulence have induced a swing towards self-centred citizenship on the part of many who might otherwise have been apathetic. Elsewhere, the alienated have been moved to join social movements and engage in altruistic citizenship. Still others have employed their enlarged skills to derive hope from the downfall of communism and have renewed their faith in democratic practices. To be sure, there are also signs that alienation and apathy are on the rise as politics and political leaders descend further into disrepute. As will be seen, such a pattern is perhaps especially discernible in the United States. Still, such a trend must be viewed in the larger context of authority crises and enhanced skills that stimulate people into a greater readiness to experience the full measure of their citizenship. It is hard to remain outside the political arena while parametric transformations are rendering the world ever more turbulent. The moorings of citizenship may have been loosened, but the impulse to be politically anchored persists.

Democratic Citizenship

Since recent years have been witness to a widespread turn away from authoritarian towards democratic governments, it is tempting to conclude that there has been a corresponding tide in the direction of democratic citizenship. As previously implied, however, it is easier to establish formal institutions that adhere to democratic procedures than it is to evolve self-environment orientations which sustain and enlarge support for those procedures. Clarity about the intent and meaning of these procedures, and the processes of socialization through which they become habitual lines of thought for citizens, take decades to evolve. And in the course of their evolution a variety of intervening events can undermine the core values that need to be grasped. So there is little certainty that newly established democratic institutions at the macro level can take full root at the micro level, as the people of the former Soviet Union are presently demonstrating.

Put differently, the values associated with achieving a balance between self and societal needs are complex and delicate. They necessitate being prepared to favour process over outcome, and

thus to accept unwanted outcomes to which the majority subscribes. They require a readiness to be sensitive to the needs of the larger collectivity precisely at those times when one's own interests may be at stake. They demand an ability to resist corruption and other forms of self-interested behaviour which might undermine equity and curtail deliberative forms of decision-making. And, they are also founded on an understanding that the rights of minorities need to be protected. Such values are not easily maintained without any prior experience in democratic ways.

Nor is the preservation of balanced self-environment orientations a simple matter for those whose cultures have long inured to democratic principles. In times of economic downturns when the societal pie shrinks, not to mention the onset of tense international situations or the influx of large numbers of immigrants, even those most committed to democratic values can be sorely tempted to accept short-cuts, emergency measures, restricted liberties, martial law and a host of other procedures which compromise their commitment to open and equitable procedures.

Given the authority crises fostered by the parametric transformations of this turbulent era, moreover, the practices of democratic citizenship can be subjected to enormous pressures. In the absence of clear-cut lines of authority and the presence of paralyzed or otherwise ineffective governments, individuals in the majority can all too easily begin to forget the principles that accord protection to minorities. No less important, they can begin to lose touch with the democratic value that differentiates between being heard and being heeded by public officials, and thus start to reject political processes that fail to yield their preferred outcomes. And all of this is especially the case if the leadership of democratic societies begins to compile a record of deception, self-serving corruption and a host of other actions that can make micro actions seem irrelevant to macro outcomes and thereby erode public appreciation of democratic values and procedures.

In sum, while the challenges to democratic citizenship have always been severe, today they seem particularly intense and subtle. More than that, the challenges are everywhere, or at least wherever governments are faltering and change is overwhelming. As stressed in the ensuing discussion, this is no less true of the United States than elsewhere in the world.

American Citizenship without Moorings

As the foregoing analysis makes clear, the onset of global turbulence has had major consequences for the way in which people everywhere balance their own needs off against those of their larger societies. Most citizens at every point on the self-environment continuum are in motion, either searching for a new balance or struggling to reaffirm the old one. Like their ships of state, the anchors that tie citizens to core values have become unhooked, leaving their commitments adrift and their sails buffeted by cross-cutting winds. The inner need to maintain macro attachments and political identities persists, but the foci of the attachments and identities have been increasingly obscured by transformative events. There are no moorings on to which people can readily latch.

Much the same can be said about people in the United States. Faced with so much change, they too have become unmoored, their new-found skills still searching for satisfying means of expression. Quite aside from the numerous recent developments (summarized here) that have fostered this disarray, the historical foundations of the US as a settler country in which no linguistic community could stake a claim to its territory have rendered its people especially vulnerable to confusion over their identities and loyalties during this period of global turbulence and transformation. While historically the country did develop into a coherent society through the absorption of waves of immigrants into its 'melting pot', and while most of the early waves of immigrants thus did come to identify with the symbols and institutions of the continent-wide society, the society itself did not emerge as a national state in the sense of being dominated by a linguistic community that could claim the rights of self-determination that attach to an ancestral homeland. Rather, society's history is marked by assertions of the rights of non-discrimination, with the result that what evolved was not so much a Europe-like national or multi-national state, but more poly-ethnic state.

To be sure, it is commonplace in the US to refer to the successful decades of its assimilative, melting pot dynamics as having fostered an 'American nationalism' that was widely shared and served as a galvanizing symbol through which support was generated for

most of the country's wars. Even as diverse groups came to identify with and give voice to nationalist sentiments, however, the resulting societal coherence was always fragile, always subject to any conditions that might undermine the ties that held the poly-ethnic state together. The onset of global turbulence late in the twentieth century has given rise to such conditions and, consequently, the identity of American citizens has been called into question. More accurately, there are more than a few signs that a multiplicity of American identities is evolving, as more recent waves of immigrants emphasize and exacerbate their cultural differences and resist being fully drawn into the melting pot.[13]

Stated differently, the idea of American society as a cohesive system with respect to which its citizens share a close identity has begun to fragment, with the result that their self-environment orientations have been further splintered to the extent that the salient collectivities to which they are responsive have multiplied. The implications of this splintering for the practices of citizenship in the United States are considerable. It means that the contents of American nationalism are likely to become increasingly obscure and decreasingly subject to mobilization by the country's leaders. Unable to experience a sense of collective self-determination, ever more imbued with the notion of individual non-discrimination, and increasingly inclined to retreat to a localism fostered by the complexities and uncertainties of a turbulent globalism,[14] the diverse groups comprising the state seem bound to evolve multiple identities and loyalties to the state. Therefore, the country is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a multi-cultural regime. Increasingly, it is a collectivity of citizens rather than a community of nationals. The idea of nationalism as a form of political identity simply does not apply to a poly-ethnic society in a period when ethnic differences are highlighted rather than melded into a more encompassing whole.

In addition to the long-term historical sources of the country's present and surging incoherence, there are a number of more immediate stimuli conducive to disarray. Some of these can be traced to developments at the macro level. For all its vaunted power and resource advantages, the United States has in some ways been more affected by the onset of global turbulence than any country in the world today. Yes, a whole paradigm and way of life collapsed virtually overnight in the Soviet Union; and yes, South Africa

swiftly reversed its modern course; and yes, many Third World countries have replaced managed economies with some form of free enterprise system;[15] but none of these situations ever seemed essentially stable and impervious to profound systemic transformation. But the mother of superpowers, that colossus of the North and beacon of the free world, did appear to have achieved a pre-eminent position among nations in which a cherished history, a coherent society, a dynamic economy and an effective (if ungainly) polity justified expectations of enduring and successful pre-eminence. None of these expectations still command attention. The US has come apart more than any other society because it was so tightly knit together compared to many other countries. Put in terms of the foregoing typology of citizens, where the US used to consist predominantly of citizens with democratic self-environment orientations, such a predominance no longer obtains and, instead, there has been a mushrooming of huge pockets of self-centred, altruistic and apathetic (both passive and alienated) persons who appear to have abandoned, or at least lost touch with, the impulse to maintain a workable balance between orientations towards themselves and towards the larger American community. As one commentator puts it, the US 'no longer resembles a nation-state, but rather a multicultural regime' (Kurth, 1992: 32), an observation that is amply supported by recent census data.[16]

It is crucial to emphasize that a number of factors can be cited to explain the rapidity and depth of this 'decline' (if that is the right label), that it is not just a matter of lessening industrial productivity and innovation (although it is that too), that it is as much a social and political deterioration as it is an economic slump. Indeed, while some years of renewed prosperity would doubtless ameliorate the steepness of the downward slope, the trend line will probably continue in the same direction until such time as the full impact of a melting pot system having been replaced by a multi-cultural regime (if that is the right label) is appreciated, absorbed and becomes the foundation of habitual patterns.

The advent of a multi-cultural regime enormously complicates the tasks of the country's leaders. It is difficult to stimulate and maintain a delicate balance between the large political structure called the United States and the involvement of citizens in local and cultural communities when the former becomes increasingly incoherent and the latter become increasingly appealing. For most

of the twentieth century, the leadership did manage to keep this balance in place through patriotic symbols and reaffirmations of loyalty (Bodnar, 1992), but more recently a series of major deceptions (noted later) at the highest levels have upended the balance. More accurately, the failures of national leadership plus the advent of a multi-cultural regime founded on multiple loyalties have substantially weakened the viscosity of the country's 'civic glue'.

This is another way of saying that the socio-political dimensions of the American decline derive in good part from an erosion of trust, and of beliefs in the viability of long-standing institutions. Beginning perhaps with the Vietnam war and followed quickly by the Watergate and Iran-contra scandals (to mention only the more conspicuous of the incidents where events turned out to be different than the country's leadership had claimed them to be), numerous Americans have lost confidence in the integrity of politicians and the fundamental rules of the political game. Their habitual commitments to systemic procedures have thus given way to habitual doubts. The sense of malaise for which President Jimmy Carter got condemned in 1978 has since become pervasive and widely acknowledged. Indeed, even the one sequence of events which appeared to have reversed the spread of malaise and to have fostered a revival of national consensus and systemic loyalties—Operation Desert Storm against Iraq—at the time of this writing seems likely to become the latest episode of official deception at the very top of government.

Nor is the undermining of the public's confidence in American politics and politicians due only to subsequent revelations about the nature of international crises. Not only was the Watergate scandal exclusively a domestic episode, but there is persuasive evidence that the more recent discrepancy between George Bush's pledge not to support new taxes ('Read my lips', he said) and his subsequent support of new taxes was a watershed in the surge of public cynicism about government and politicians. In the earlier crises, the role of the president was never entirely clear, either because events were extraordinarily complex and obviously stemmed from a variety of sources, or because cover-ups were practised that destroyed the paper trail and the chains of responsibility. But in the Bush case, the issue was simple, the voice clear, and the chain of responsibility unmistakable. Bush said he would not raise taxes, and then he did exactly that. What appears to have angered people

was not so much that taxes were raised as that 'Bush had lied to them, breaking not a routine promise but a sacred compact.... If so strong a commitment by the President of United States cannot be trusted, many people seem to think, then no politician or his word is good' (Schmalz, 1992: 1). Indeed, the appearance of deception was so blatant that its consequences reverberated across the political spectrum. As one pollster put it, 'Now I'm finding that it's cost him more than anything else and hurt politicians in general. The promise was as close as a politician can come to putting his imprint in Grauman's Chinese Theater. The voters took it as a blood oath. How can a politician take a blood oath again?' (Hart, 1992: 16).

Of course, the unmooring of American citizenship has also been hastened by the collapse of the Cold War and the underpinnings of unity induced by the threats of a hostile Soviet Union. A sense of enemy deprivation has set in and the void has not been filled by a leadership that articulates a compelling vision of either a 'New World Order' or a renewed American system. People appreciate that a moment of extraordinary opportunity is at hand, but they are confused as to how to seize it. To be sure, their analytic skills have been enlarged, but they have not been well served with respect to the provision of normative goals towards which the skills ought to be applied. Neither the party system nor media columns nor legislative chambers echo with creative debate over how to seize the opportunity and redirect national energies.[17]

Time and space considerations prevent an enumeration of the many other reasons that could be cited to explain the steepening decline of the United States as a coherent community. Suffice it to state that at all levels of American life there has been a fragmentation of the core values around which collective efforts might be directed. Little wonder that older Americans are apparently much more alienated and much readier to run risks for the sake of change than the younger strata of their fellow citizens (Rosenbaum, 1992: A9). Having known what it was like when the core values were more securely in place, the older generations are especially restless and, accordingly, concerned about the preservation of democratic self-environment orientations. And little wonder too, that the US Navy has undertaken a 'core values' programme designed to upgrade its personnel. As the chief of naval education and training explained, the programme stemmed from the Navy's

conviction that 'society at large is not giving us a value-oriented person', that it is getting more and more recruits with 'skewed values' because of 'the family and what it isn't, the schools and what they aren't, the church and who is not attending' (Rohter, 1992: 1).

But not all those who are experiencing the unmooring of American citizenship have retreated into passivity and anomie. For many, the orientation towards country-wide values has been replaced by a dedication to subsystem values, to particular issue-based or ethnic communities that serve as the societal dimension of their self-environment orientations. Such persons still maintain an internal–external balance between their own and community interests, but now their orientations amount to a democratic citizenship in the service of a truncated segment of the historic system. The Hispanic, Muslim, Afro-American, Korean-American, and a host of other subsystems have thus become the foci of terminal loyalties, and the divisions among them have been reinforced by the evolution of mass media networks that infuse structure and coherence into what were previously disparate groups. In Los Angeles, for example, one can find a newspaper, a television channel and a radio station in all these sub-communities, each offering news and understanding in the native language and thereby furthering the isolation from each other and from the country as a whole. It is in this sense that the country is less a nation-state and more a multi-cultural regime, and the consequences of this difference were readily observable during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. This polarization of sub-cultures, in other words, has emasculated the United States as a melting pot and heightened the tendencies toward self-centred citizenship. The Los Angeles riots were an extreme instance of the self-centred pattern and as such they also point to the fragility of democratic self-environment orientations in America today.

The fragmentation of American society, moreover, is not confined to the recent surge in ethnicity. The current scene has also witnessed a mushrooming of religious communities. With the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, substantial numbers of South, Southeast, and East Asians formed communities in all parts of the United States. Consequently, as one analyst observes, '"We the people" are not only Christian and Jewish, but Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu. What will this mean to our current national identity

crisis?' (Eck, 1992: M5). The answer seems obvious. The advent of a multi-religious America grafted onto a multi-cultural America seems bound to reduce further the country-wide ties that bind. Some Buddhist and Hindu temples display the American flag along with their spiritual symbols (though none of the US's 1,000 mosques fly the flag in its prayer rooms), but the road to ever greater pluralism is marked by proliferating paths that lead in diverse directions, which are likely to make all the more difficult efforts to overcome the tendencies toward self-centred citizenship and thereby renew the country-wide community around which the practices of democratic citizenship are organized.

Even as the failures of socializing processes and the strong tendencies towards self-centred citizenship have reinforced sub-groupism in American politics, so have the dynamics of fragmentation also been stimulated by the mushrooming of altruistic citizenship. Most notably, the advent of the environmental movement has led many people to redefine their own interests by attaching higher priority to the well-being of the world as an ecological system. Where self-centred citizens have narrowed their concept of the society to their most salient sub-groups, altruistic citizens have broadened the concept to encompass all of humankind. In so doing—in focusing on planetary concerns such as the ozone layer, the tropical rain forests and endangered species—altruistic citizens tend to opt out of responsibility for the welfare of the country as a whole. To be sure, as evidenced by 'the tens of millions [who] have begun to modify their styles of consumption and activity to accord with what they judge to be the requirements of planetary health' (Bellah et al., 1991: 14), altruistic citizens stand out as persons who believe that micro actions can have significant macro consequences. But the macro outcomes to which they seek to contribute conspicuously lack a societal context. They argue for 'thinking globally and acting locally' as if their national citizenship was irrelevant. As a result,

> There is a void in awareness, a gap in our thinking at the crucial point, the middle range between the local and the global level. Planetary environmental degradation is rarely understood as connected with human poverty and hunger. Why is it that it is easier to think about the whole planetary ecosphere than to understand the social effects of our everyday relationships within

> household, economy, and polity? Environmentalists sometimes forget that human culture is itself, as Cicero put it, a 'second nature', whose true aim is not to exploit the rest of nature but to cultivate it, raising the potentials emergent in humanity toward harmonious completion (Bellah et al., 1991: 14–15).

To appreciate fully how the emergence of huge pockets of self-centred, altruistic and apathetic citizens in the United States underlies an attrition in the ranks of democratic citizens, it is useful to stress that the skill revolution has enhanced these fragmenting tendencies. None of the self-environment orientations preclude Americans from applying their expanding capacities to confront complexity, trace scenarios, frame alternatives, or otherwise analyze the course of events. Indeed, it can be convincingly argued (Yankelovich, 1990–91: 78) that the skill revolution 'means that the judgment of the general public can, under some conditions, be equal or superior in quality to the judgment of experts and elites who possess far more information, education, and ability to articulate their views'.

The consequences of the skill revolution are perhaps most evident among altruistic citizens whose membership in social movements has expanded their horizons on a worldwide scale and thus impelled them to grasp the complexities of global turbulence. Although they do poorly in connecting their ecological visions to 'the middle range between the local and global level', the readiness of altruistic citizens to explain and trace the detrimental effects of environmental degradation has certainly been intensified by their growing skills. Discerning links between the forces of nature and the dynamics of human consumption is no simple matter, but environmentally-conscious citizens do not shrink from the task and often evidence a keen understanding of what the linkages involve.

Likewise, alienated citizens have demonstrated a capacity for recognizing their declining societal commitments and of then acting to ameliorate them. Consider, for example, the extraordinary initial reactions to the aborted 1992 presidential bid of Ross Perot. Since he appears to have appealed to the disgruntled who had lost confidence in the party system and its mainstream politicians, the reaction to Perot's discussion of a possible candidacy on a television talk show serves as a crude measure of how the skill revolution has enlarged the analytic and action potentials of those who have

joined the ranks of the alienated. In the first three weeks after his first appearances on a talk show, he received 1.1 million calls from citizens proferring support (Applebome, 1992: 14). After his appearance on a second show, he received more than 500,000 calls that same night (Spector, 1992: A6). These figures are hardly trivial and they only hint at the large extent to which the ranks of his previously alienated supporters swelled during the five months from Perot's announced availability and his quitting the race.

The reaction to a Perot candidacy might also be interpreted as a revival of democratic citizenship, as a stirring among the alienated that could lead them out of apathy and back to a positive balance in their self-environment orientations. The 19 per cent of the national vote Perot received on election day could be viewed as a measure of this revival, albeit his sudden withdrawal from the presidential race for several months may well have served as a further stimulus to alienation, proof either that no political leader's word can be trusted or that not even a wealthy maverick can overcome the perceived ills of the political system.

Towards a Reformulation of Democratic Citizenship

None of the foregoing observations are intended to suggest that democratic citizenship is no longer practised in the United States. Large segments of the public have apparently turned to other forms of citizenship with the advent of a multi-cultural regime buffeted by the onset of global turbulence, but there remain numerous citizens who sustain self-environment orientations which attach equal value to themselves and to American society. While their ranks may have thinned somewhat, and while they may be confused by the loss of their historic moorings, they too have been beneficiaries of the skill revolution. Considerable evidence could be amassed to demonstrate that they are sensitive to the challenges posed by the complexities of a post-industrial order,[18] that they are more tolerant of other sub-groups in the larger community (Lewin, 1992), and that they are prepared, even eager, to find and support new mechanisms and policies through which macro adjustments to a changing world can be made.

So the problem is not so much the erosion of democratic practices and the advent of new forms of citizenship as it is one of redefining democratic self-environment orientations in a way so as to constrain, renew and expand the commitments on which such orientations are founded. If appropriate redefinitions can be evolved, further movement towards apathetic, alienated, altruistic and self-centred orientations can be arrested and the crisis of leadership brought to an end. Put more specifically, the problem is to reconceptualize the societal component of self-environment orientations so that high priority can be attached to the well-being of the multi-cultural regime as a whole system. If it is the case that the whole system is no longer a coherent society and state—and there is little reason to doubt that global turbulence has brought about such a change—this means that the old values supportive of state sovereignty and patriotism have to give way to new civic identities which accord value to the multi-cultural regime as a whole system that protects and sustains the well-being of all those who fall within its purview.

This is not the place to attempt a new formulation of democratic self-environment orientations, much less to analyze the tough question of how a new perspective might be put in place. Plainly, enormous obstacles need to be surmounted if the processes of socialization and the conduct of leaders are to fashion new civic attitudes. It is possible, however, to suggest some themes that the efforts at reformulation might pursue. One obvious theme involves reflection on sovereignty, territoriality, political autonomy and any other concepts that imply and/or define civic duties. With governments weakened and authority being transferred to sub-national and transnational entities, these concepts no longer command the same loyalties and obligations they once did. Zealous patriots can still be found at any gathering, but their number is shrinking as state economies become increasingly globalized, as the meaning of society-wide symbols and rituals become increasingly ambiguous, and as geographic borders become increasingly porous. Thus, new entities that can serve as the foci of community concerns need to be pondered and explored. Such entities would have to be ordered on other than fixed boundaries, allowing citizens the fluidity to move in and out of their jurisdictions as their sub-national and transnational commitments change. Instead of being 'imagined communities' that differentiate between insiders and outsiders (Anderson,

1983), these entities would have to be organized as open communities, as systems which derive their strength through inclusivity rather than exclusivity.

A second theme worthy of further development is that of identity—those aspects of life in an ever more complex and interdependent world that define who one is politically. Just as the boundaries of new macro entities need to be specified, in other words, so do the boundaries of the person. And again the stress should be on fluidity, on enabling people to move freely among roles at the sub-system, system and international levels without having to regard them as mutually exclusive, while at the same time providing a meaningful sense of belonging.

Last, thought needs to be given to reformulating the core obligations of citizens in the newly defined entities which accord them flexible identities. For macro institutions to enrich the social order and function to the benefit of their micro participants, obviously the core obligations of the latter need to be clarified. Most notably perhaps, the core obligation that has been at the centre of the state system—that of sacrifice—needs to be replaced with a sense of responsibility, a readiness to contribute personal resources in such a way as to enhance the donating individual as well as the receiving community. Sacrifice implies placing the environment ahead of the self, whereas responsibility treats these two components of citizenship as equally valid and compelling. As one astute observer puts it,

> An ethic of responsibility means one is answerable, accountable to another, for something; one is liable to be called to account. One is also a being, capable of fulfilling an obligation or trust; reliable; trustworthy. This presumes, indeed requires, a particular construction of what Charles Taylor calls 'the modern identity', one constituted in and through the notion of self-responsible freedom. Softening the demands of the iron grip of sovereignty = sacrifice does not mean so loosening the bonds of reason the self flies off in all directions and can find no good reason to prefer this to that and can hear in such notions as 'responsibility' only a dour and crabby moralism (Elshtain, 1991: 561).

The notion of responsibility as a core value around which both democratic citizenship and multi-cultural regimes can be organized has also been given voice by Vaclav Havel. In his letters from prison he comments,

> The problem of human identity remains at the center of my thinking about human affairs...as you must have noticed from my letters, the importance of the notion of human responsibility has grown in my meditations. It has begun to appear with increasing clarity, as that fundamental point from which all identity grows and by which it stands or falls; it is the foundation, the root, the center of gravity, the constructional principle or axis of identity, something like the 'idea' that determines its degree and type. It is the mortar binding it together, and when the moral dries out, identity too begins irreversibily to crumble and fall apart. (That is why I wrote you that the secret of man is the secret of his responsibility.) (Havel, 1989: 145.)

Notes

1. The premises of this strategy are set forth in Olson (1990).
2. An early enquiry into these dynamics can be found in Rosenau (1992a).
3. A cogent account of the many consequences that may follow when citizens are deprived of their political moorings can be found in Weber (1992). It is noteworthy, moreover, that the sense of disarray is global in scope, that 'the first international study of major depression reveals a steady rise in the disorder worldwide', so much so that 'in some countries the likelihood that people born after 1965 will suffer a major depression—not just sadness, but a paralyzing listlessness, dejection and self-depreciation, as well as an overwhelming sense of hopelessness—at some point in life is more than three times greater than for their grandparents' generation' (Goleman, 1992: 13).
4. For analyses that affirm the growing impact of individuals at the micro level on world affairs at the macro level, see Rosenau (1990, Chapter 7; 1992c).
5. I use the notion of 'society' in the generic sense of the macro collectivity in the environment of individuals which they regard as most salient and with which they see themselves as primarily identified. Perhaps more often than not, this refers to national societies or the societies of states, but under conditions of global turbulence, as will be seen, the prime foci of collective identities are undergoing substantial revision.
6. It should be noted that each set of orientations is an ideal type. As is evident in Figure 8.1, the varying forms of citizenship represent extremes on continua. In fact, of course, people tend to combine their self and societal concerns and are thus located at various points along each continuum. It is only for analytic purposes that the focus here is on the ideal types formed by the extremes.
7. For lengthy discussions of the shifting meaning of territory and the notions of sovereignty that attach to it, see Rosenau (1992d; 1992e) and O'Brien (1992).
8. For a discussion of other recent leaders who have resisted the lures of sub-groupism, see Rosenau (1993).

9. Woutat (1992: 1), quoting Gerald Hirshberg, former Buick design chief who is now vice president of Nizzan Design International.
10. Woutat (1992: A7); again the quoted words were expressed by Gerald Hirshberg.
11. A cogent analysis of the emerging global role of social movements can be found in Walker (1988).
12. The conception of world politics as having bifurcated into two separate and distinctive (although interactive) worlds is presented in Rosenau (1990).
13. For intensive probings of considerable data supportive of this point, see Alba (1990) and Citrin et al. (1992). Notwithstanding the central tendency away from a melting pot system, however, there are some indications that assimilation and the ideas that sustain it continue to be appealing (Suro, 1992).
14. For extensive analyses of the close interactive links between mushrooming degrees of localism and globalism, see Giddens (1991) and Mlinar (1992).
15. For a cogent account of these changes, see Biersteker (1992).
16. The 1990 Census, for example, revealed that the US presently has the largest foreign-born population in its history: 19.7 million persons, or 7.9 per cent of the population, were foreign-born; and nearly 32 million persons said they spoke a language other than English at home, while 40 per cent of those reported they did not speak English very well (Vobejda, 1992).
17. For a compelling analysis of how poorly the American leadership community has articulated society's values and how these might be creatively preserved and enhanced, see Glendon (1991).
18. See the extensive data and conclusions presented in Inglehart (1990).

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9

Nationalism and Citizenship: The Crisis of Authority and Solidarity in Latin America (Brazil)

Elisa P. Reis

The search for universals and particulars has always contributed to a sort of ambiguity within the social sciences. The value attributed to generalizations and to law-like statements, on the one hand, and the need to formulate meaningful propositions about real social phenomena on the other, lend a distinctive tension to the scientific investigation of socio-cultural factors. The issue has long been addressed at the metatheoretical level from the perspective of differing paradigms that endow different emphases on generality and particularity. But the tension still persists because general processes and particular experiences remain at the core of any scientific effort to deal with the historical world.

This chapter examines this constitutive tension between history and theory while discussing the citizenship issue in contemporary Latin America in general and Brazil in particular. Starting from the notion of citizenship as 'politicized social identity', the first section explores the close interactions that exist between patterns of nation-building and models of citizenship. I have resorted to the historical–comparative theoretical tradition to suggest that variable patterns of citizenship correspond to particular articulations of authority and solidarity.

Drawing from this previous theoretical discussion, the democratization challenge now being experienced in nations formerly governed by modernizing dictatorships is analyzed. I have argued that historical patterns of political incorporation, on the one hand, and current trends to rearticulate market and authority, on the other, influence the scope and meaning of social solidarity and therefore affect prospects for democratic citizenship. Along these lines, I indicate that current patterns of social inequality constitute a serious challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Latin America.

Finally, the chapter summarizes the discussion and suggests that a historical perspective may enhance our theoretical understanding of the interactions between economic, social and political variables as they inform the life chances of citizens and nations.

The Theoretical Perspective

While it is true that in the contemporary world authority structures tend to move towards higher levels of integration and, at the same time, national solidarity is breaking down into more restrictive units, the nation-state still constitutes the basic form of articulation of authority and solidarity. Born out of the modern ideological amalgamation of nation and state, the nation-state has acquired some sort of naturalness, some presumed universality which, even if presently questioned, still lends meaning to a vast array of political projects around the globe.

The fact that all over the world we are currently witnessing concrete events and are attuned to intellectual reflections which contribute to the conceptual split between nation and state should make us more aware of our own historicity as well. That is to say, the very recognition of the contingency of the nation-state as a product of societal engineering should help make us equally aware of the social forces that today call into question the conjunction between nation and state.

Actually, the concept of nation-state acquires its explanatory power precisely when we fully recognize that it refers to historical phenomena and not to timeless universal social realities. If we trace the historical roots of the concept in modern Western Europe and then follow its impact in other regions of the world, we thereby maximize the concept's potentialities, without falling captive to

the ethno-centric bias that often jeopardizes the analysis of historical or cultural events and processes.

It is my contention that re-thinking the nation-state as a historical reality should help us devise more satisfactory conceptual strategies for framing today's socio-political dilemmas. With that in mind, I start from the idea that the consolidation of nation-states involved two distinctive, though closely related, processes: (*a*) the bureaucratization of public authority, or state-building, and (*b*) the legal recognition of the basic rights of the members of a political community, or nation-building (Bendix, 1964; Tilly, 1975). While nation and state had existed long before, their merging can be traced back to the late eighteenth century as an offspring of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution (Grillo, 1980; Gellner, 1983).

So successful was the fusion of authority and solidarity that even the most rigorous analytical efforts to distinguish the two components of the nation-state tend nevertheless to conflate them. I would argue that what is most characteristic of the nation-state is precisely this tight reciprocity between nation and state, which goes so far as to preclude sharp conceptual differentiation between them. Thus, despite Weber's insistence on differentiating authority and solidarity, he intermingles these two dimensions when defining both 'nation' and 'state'. His influential definition of 'state' incorporates aspects that belong to the realm of 'nation' insofar as it deems monopoly over violence to be legitimate, a notion which entails motivated obedience, compliance and commitment—in short, aspects pertaining to solidarity. 'A compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a "state" insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence in the enforcement of its order' (Weber, 1968: 54).

Similarly, when defining 'nation', Weber cannot avoid bringing the state in:

> In so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation', it is apparently located in the field of politics. One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which normally tends to produce a state of its own (Weber, 1946: 176).

Mauss's often quoted definition of nation reveals this same conflation with state:

> We understand by nation, a society integrated in material and moral terms, with a stable and permanent central power, fixed frontiers, and a relatively moral, mental and cultural unity among the inhabitants who consciously joint the state and its laws (Mauss, 1969: 584, translated from the original by the author).

In fact, this intermeshing of 'nationality' and 'statehood' attests to the ideological character of nation-building, to its constant actualization of the state's legitimacy. That is indeed the meaning behind Renan's definition of nation: *le plebiscite de tous le jours* ('A plebiscite of every day') (Renan, as quoted by Dumont, 1970: 34). Even if, as has been correctly observed, Renan firmly argued for the natural precedence of the nation (Birnbaum, 1992), it is the nation that provides the state with its justification. As a constructed reality, the modern nation-state permits the ideological reconciliation of bureaucratic domination and social solidarity, for, quoting Max Weber once again: 'The concept [of nation] belongs to the sphere of values.... [It] undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups' (Weber, 1946: 172).

From this, it follows that 'citizenship'—the status of those who belong to a modern nation-state—corresponds to a politicized social identity that emerges from the actual political, economic and cultural characteristics peculiar to one society. These peculiarities make it possible to understand that different models of citizenship may regulate the rights and obligations pertaining to the members of a nation-state. Differences between nation-states involve, apart from variations in degree, substantive discrepancies regarding the particular ways in which authority and solidarity relate to each other in both normative and positive terms.

As a historical reality, the nation-state is actively recreated through a process that knits together power domination and interest representation. It is a process that allows for change and continuity, dynamically mixing long-standing shared values and beliefs with innovative elements. Furthermore, the intrinsic reciprocity between state and nation mentioned earlier does not necessarily imply symmetrical development: the consolidation of authority may be more or less out of step with the incorporation of the state's subject into the political arena. And variation along these lines has decisive consequences for the scope and meaning of citizenship.

The tendency to think of citizenship as a universal pattern derives from the false idea that the nation-state is a ready-made, natural form of integrating authority and solidarity. Being aware of the historical character of the nation-state also means being aware that the content of citizenship expresses the double imprint of its historical origins and of the changing nature of the social interests in dispute. However, accounting for historical processes is not the same as denying the possibility of identifying regularities and patterns. A refusal to convert ethno-centric patterns into universal, immutable principles does not preclude generalizations. Despite the contingent elements of every nation-state, it is reasonable to group them into alternative models, thereby enhancing our understanding of significant differences across contemporary political orders, of their corresponding ideological representations and also of their definitions of what it means to be a citizen.

Along the lines suggested here, I would like to explore Dumont's suggestion concerning the paradox of modern nations in order to contrast the liberal and authoritarian ideologies of nation- and state-building. In his words, the modern nation constitutes the normal form of representation of a global society in an individualistic universe (Dumont, 1970). It thus follows that not only political values but also basic societal values in general are embedded in 'nationality'. The nation as a social representation emerges concomitantly with the substitution of an egalitarian vision of society for the old hierarchical perception of the universe.

In this context, Dumont argues, the nation constitutes at the same time a collection of individuals and a collective individual. He goes on to indicate that societies have to find some way of resolving this striking paradox: 'At the least, the two conceptions must be ranked so that one prevails over the other: either the human individuals composing the nation, or the nation as a whole, will bear the main stress' (Dumont, 1970: 33).

While Dumont illustrates the two possible solutions to the paradox, referring to the origins of the nation-state in France and Germany, he does not fully explore either the theoretical or empirical consequences of one or the other solution. I would like to suggest that the predominance of the collective individual or of the collection of individuals reflects alternative patterns of interaction between authority and solidarity, and therefore fosters different models of nation-state as well as different patterns of citizenship.

Thus, the ideological predominance of the collective individual favours authority vis-à-vis solidarity, and consequently confers upon the state a patronage role over society.

Under such circumstances, what Marx in *The German Ideology* saw as an underdeveloped form of state—a form which he expected to gradually evolve towards the liberal forms already established in varying degrees in England, France and the United States—may actually constitute a distinctive political strategy for building the nation-state (Marx, 1972). In other words, I am suggesting that granting priority either to solidarity or to authority as resources in ideologies of nation-building may have long-lasting consequences for the definition of citizenship.

One could certainly attribute opting for the collective individual in solving the nation paradox to intrinsic cultural characteristics of particular societies. Yet, to fully account for the historical, dynamic nature of the nation-state, one has to account both for change as well as for the active recreation of a cultural continuity. If we take the cultural dimension as a given, we then run too high a risk of interpreting typical historical alternatives of the nation-state as expressions of natural inclinations, when these instead express the results of competitive interests. In turn, by using the variable articulation of solidarity and authority as an analytical resource, we can account for political, economic and ideological components of the nation-state.

Simplifying the argument, I would say that one can approach the processes of state- and nation-building that have taken place in Latin America since the nineteenth century as processes that, while emulating the Western European pattern, have acquired distinctive characteristics reflecting both domestic and international circumstances. Despite the many peculiarities to be found, one can point to basic commonalities among Latin American societies, which find expression in their respective nation- and state-building processes. Thus, the most distinctive aspect to be remembered here is the fact that 'stateness', or the consolidation of public authority structures, has gone much beyond nation-building processes.

No matter if the state has been 'captured' by powerful oligarchies, blurring the boundaries between public and private. The crucial aspect here is that authority resources have gained precedence over solidarity resources in order to advance the oligarchies' interests. It is possible to identify the historical factors that favoured

this path, such as the colonial inheritance of strong bureaucratic structures and the low degree of integration of social structures comprising native Indian and European migrants, and, in many cases, African slaves. Yet, be that as it may, the concrete actors who, then as now, shape the nation-state have made actual choices, shaped authority and solidarity structures, decided on formats of citizenship, and thus made history.

Historically, the process of nation-state building in Latin America has granted precedence to authority over solidarity. This means that the typically enforced model of citizenship endowed the state with the role of guardian of society. The nation became primarily the collective individual, not a collection of individuals. Hierarchy prevailed over competition among equal citizens. No wonder the expansion of citizenship in Latin America has usually been tied to populist endeavours: populism allowed for the incorporation of new social sectors into the political arena without forsaking the tutelary role of authority, thus precluding affirmation of a nation model tuned to egalitarian individualism.

The history of Latin America's many modernizing dictatorships illustrates well what has been said. While greatly contributing to the expansion of statehood, these dictatorships also contributed to advancing nationhood through their conscious efforts to organize solidarity. Nevertheless, the adopted pattern of nation-building did not favour forms of citizenship conducive to the affirmation of autonomous citizens. And while many argue today that there is no such thing as an autonomous citizen under the nation-state, I would suggest that it does make a significant difference whether the definition of citizenship rights follows an individualistic or a hierarchical pattern. Ideologies of nation-building that place priority on the collective individual tend to rank citizens, thereby leaving room for the state to wield greater discretionary power.

What has in fact characterized Latin American societies until recently is the fact that their citizens have had a differentiated perception of their rights and of their relation to public authority. Thus, better-off sectors have tended to see their citizenship rights as autonomous from the state and have in practice frequently resorted to some sort of 'colonization' of the state in order to secure their interests. In turn, those worse off within the social structure have tended to perceive authority as a benevolent entity that

generously grants favours/rights to provide for the helpless citizen (Reis, 1990).

The many populist experiments that took place in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, etc., attest to such a dual pattern of citizenship: those at the top relate to the state as their instrument for advancing private interests, while those at the bottom see public authority as a father figure that looks after the deprived. In any case, the centrality of authority resources and their precedence over solidarity initiatives —be these communitary or societary (Weber 1968)—has informed the definition of nation-state among Latin American societies.

Now, the current crisis of the state as the operator of collective identities is affecting societies everywhere, but the meaning of the crisis and alternative solutions will necessarily vary according to the prevailing model of nation-state. Within societies characterized by long-standing liberal–democratic models of citizenship, the crisis of the nation-state derives not only from governability problems and fiscal deficits, but also from citizens' reactions to what they consider excessive regulation. In short, citizens in the so-called mature democracies lay claim to more solidarity and less authority. The nation-state solution to the problem of the social order is rapidly losing its ideological function of legitimation because citizens increasingly question the interference of public authority, which they perceive as less efficient and/or more oppressive than solidarity initiatives.

In turn, the crisis of the nation-state in societies that have historically accorded preference to authority over solidarity displays peculiarities that have not been adequately identified. In any case, indications are that very different answers will have to be found in order to cope with the unprecedented crisis of the nation-state. In concentrating on Latin American societies emerging from failed modernizing dictatorships known as bureaucratic–authoritarianism (O'Donnell, 1973), one wonders to what extent the consolidation of democracy will depend upon innovative solutions to the recurring problems of articulating authority and solidarity traditionally dealt with by the old nation-state.

In the following section, I concentrate the discussion on the Brazilian case, assuming it to be typical of Latin America's historical preference for authority over solidarity resources throughout the modernization process that characterized the region until recently. I will focus on the historically consolidated nation-state and then

explore the implications that past legacies and current dilemmas may have as far as institutionalizing more democratic patterns of citizenship are concerned.

The Brazilian Case

Although Brazilian political models, developmental strategies and planned initiatives have varied significantly, state-led capitalism was a constant parameter until very recently. From the thirties onwards, authority resources were massively mobilized to promote the market. Certainly the state, which championed the market, was also a source of social solidarity, taking upon itself the responsibility of promoting the national community of interests. In any case, along the lines discussed earlier, what is important here is that the specific ways in which authority enforced social solidarity had decisive implications for the political order. Political incorporation and adopted models of citizenship were enmeshed with the state's political economy.

Between 1930 and 1945, Brazil's pattern of political incorporation clearly followed a corporatist model in which the state channelled the urban masses into the political arena under its close guidance. The idea of politics as a space for interest competition was explicitly rejected in official discourse. Instead, solidarity was made dependent upon the organic inter-dependence of the various social sectors integrating the 'national body'. This option made the state a dual guardian: both of the economy and of the political market. Moreover, under the adopted model, the only possible solution to the nation paradox discussed in the previous section would have been to accord preference to the collective individual.

While the state was to perform a leading economic role in laying the necessary groundwork for private investments, it was also to supply social benefits to the newly incorporated masses. The strategy for incorporating the masses originally relied on some formal mechanisms and informal bargains that hindered unrestricted growth of the political arena. The adopted pattern of citizenship was anchored in a labour market kept under tight state control (Werneck Vianna, 1976; Santos and Dos, 1979). That is to say, citizenship meant entitlement to basic social rights distributed through official labour unions. The worker's position in the labour

market informed both his political identity and his access to social benefits.

Conversely, those outside the union structure did not belong to the political community. This kind of arrangement left out what was then a large contingent of rural labourers, who remained subordinated to the private power of landowners. Thus, early expansion of citizenship in Brazil ignored the agrarian world. Meanwhile, the rhythm and scope of citizenship expansion in urban areas kept close pace with the dynamics of the economy. The more the formal sector of the economy expanded, the more the number of citizens/union members grew. The central authority came to play two roles which, after all, were one and the same: promoting economic growth and expanding the provision of social welfare.

The corporatist base mentioned here deeply affected modern Brazil's political evolution. Long after the downfall of Vargas's modernizing dictatorship in 1945, the corporatist structure of representation persisted. For decades, massive structural changes afforded significant social mobility in Brazil without too much competition for social positions among social segments. Between the end of the Second World War and 1979, GDP rates averaged 7.4 per cent yearly. A growing economy encouraged widespread optimism about the future, notwithstanding eventual class disputes, temporary adversities in the international market, or any other customary market tensions.

Within this context, while the state developed critical abilities to promote economic growth, it did not develop its capacities to negotiate divergent interests, thereby engendering a historical deficit in democratic skills. Instead of developing a pluralist tradition, the state stressed the precedence of common national objectives over the particular interests of classes and groups, consistent with the corporatist view of society (Schmitter, 1971; Stepan, 1978; Schwartzman, 1982).

As long as the economy was expanding, social harmony derived mainly from an implicit, generalized belief that everyone could expect to benefit from the nation's growth. Furthermore, the idea was that the lot of the poor could be improved without any cost to those better off. Economic prosperity, coupled with state paternalism, would reconcile society to itself. The assumption was that the social fabric could be preserved, provided the state could count

on an expanding economic base upon which to fashion proto-citizenship out of patrimonial or neo-patrimonial ties.

Although inequality rates remained high, and perhaps even grew, the perception of potential upward mobility afforded some sort of base for solidarity upon which to tie people together. The creation of new structures, institutions and opportunities suggested a non-zero sum distribution of economic benefits. The general assumption was that the state could ideally offer every citizen a partnership in the expanding national wealth. The notion of politics as the dispute of competing social interests did not really override a sort of state-led inherent belief according to which democracy, growth and social harmony were one and the same. As was the case in most of Latin America, state populism became Brazil's political solution for harmonizing economic, political and social goals.

Even under military dictatorship (1964–1985), when populism no longer reigned, a kind of state paternalism remained a key ingredient in the effort to legitimize the government. Thus, while the adopted growth pattern favoured income concentration, the state took it upon itself to expand the welfare system to sectors of the population not yet incorporated into the political market. Particularly important in this context was the effort to extend basic social rights to the rural masses (Reis, 1987).

While both the large increase in the number of 'welfare consumers' among the lower sectors as well as the diversified supply of benefits offered to the middle classes may have responded in part to the acute legitimation problems facing the military regime, the solutions then found spawned new problems for the future.

The prolonged economic crisis plaguing Brazil since the early eighties was a decisive element in undermining developmental consensus and government legitimacy. While the military never actually managed to attain widespread legitimation, as long as some optimism persisted with regard to their economic performance, the opposition was impotent to challenge the status quo. Conversely, once the economic outlook began growing steadily bleaker, both the dictatorial regime and the old developmentalism that pre-dated the military government lost their credibility.

With the return to civilian government, the effort to consolidate a democratic order is dependent upon the widespread acceptance of some new formulae for articulating market, authority and solidarity. Since the old corporatist ideology lost ground, the effective

chance to institutionalize democracy poses the urgent need to redefine the boundaries of the political community. Under these circumstances, the evolution of social inequalities, on the one hand, and the prospects confronting the economy, on the other, acquire critical importance.

While no one denies that at the proper political level democracy has made real progress in Brazil, everyone likewise knows that the consolidation of such accomplishments will be tightly linked to social and economic facts. A massive effort to promote legal and institutional changes has taken place since the army stepped down in 1985, but the chances that the political community will come to forge a new social identity—that is to say, an altered conception of citizenship—will remain subordinated to the old problem of articulating economic growth and social distribution.

In Brazil, as elsewhere in Latin America, the persistent problem of incorporating into the political arena the masses that have remained second or third class citizens, despite significant modernization, will be largely dependent upon finding some solution to the acute socio-economic marginality experienced by a large majority of the population. The crisis of the state-led growth model is actually twofold: one crisis is reflected in declining and even negative economic growth rates, and the other in the failure of the state to provide citizenship goods—be these public services, welfare benefits or symbolic partnership in the national community.

If it is obvious that prolonged economic crisis necessarily hampers public sector performance, what is involved here is a much more all-encompassing crisis. The economic recession that has plagued the Brazilian economy for about a decade is also a recession of the state-building process. In other words, beyond the boundaries of economic production, the state as a political actor has seen its capacity to mobilize authority resources significantly reduced. Its monopoly over the means of violence has been openly broken, its legal claim to fiscal extraction simply denied and its credibility called into question by the masses, which turn away from the public sphere, seeking protection and security in some alternative private network.

Indications of the crisis of public authority come in the form of higher and higher levels of violence, particularly visible in major cities but also observed elsewhere; private use of public means of violence by the police sector; widespread tax evasion among

entrepreneurial sectors; the large number of legal suits questioning the fiscal competence of the state; and rampant government corruption.

Moreover, beset by runaway inflation, the state pursues stabilization policies that aggravate the recession, bringing with it more unemployment and declining fiscal resources for fighting poverty. The social integration role historically played by public authority is also de-legitimized by the privatizing ideology of the day. At the same time, inflation and recession make it hard for alternative sources of integration, such as unions or other voluntary associations, to provide for the articulation of social solidarity on a wider basis. In this context, poverty rates grew in the last decade while inequality levels reached record figures, placing Brazil as the most unequal society in the world (United Nations, 1990; Valle e Silva, 1991; Camargo and Giambiagi, 1991).

The picture emerging from the tragic social situation which characterizes today's Brazil suggests that opportunities to expand the basis of social solidarity, and therefore to provide firm grounds for a solid democratic order, are not readily forthcoming. The perverse combination of inflation and recession erodes the basis for social solidarity and threatens to realize Polanyi's negative utopia of a pure market situation, which would destroy the social fabric (Polanyi, 1957).

Under such circumstances, the notion of 'amoral familism', which Banfield invoked to describe the retreat of solidarity experienced by a Southern Italian village in the fifties, deserves renewed attention (Banfield, 1958). In my analysis, the erosion of traditional solidarity networks, coupled with acute deprivation and scarce economic opportunities, tended to restrict solidarity to the narrow limits of the close family. Beyond the family network there was no morality. Mutatis mutandis from a macro perspective, generalized amoral familism means a reduced public realm. Wider societal manifestations would thus be restricted to sudden or intermittent mass manifestations involving leisure activities, dramatic events or mob initiatives. And here the postmodern use of the concept of 'tribe' might perhaps play an expressive role. In any case, we would still need a more precise concept to describe these evanescent, collective initiatives which lack any stable solidarity or authority bases.

Be that as it may, the problem of consolidating democracy in Brazil reveals in dramatic tones the dilemmas confronted by other societies emerging from authoritarian attempts at capitalist modernization. How can a democratic social order be established in societies that already have a deeply rooted market base, and yet have not assured solid social integration of large sectors of their population? In my perception, it is only in a very restricted sense that one may refer to postmodernity in such contexts. To be more precise, one should instead employ expressions like 'incomplete modernization', 'social apartheid', or 'savage capitalism'.

The incompleteness of modernization means that some crucial notions, like that of basic human rights, have not become part of the collective consciousness. Therefore, trivial elements of citizenship which today appear as too limited in mature democracies do not find expression among late modernizing countries, which are tragically becoming precociously postmodern as they cease to strive for universal rights. The notion of 'social apartheid' stresses, in turn, the highly unequal distribution patterns prevailing in such contexts and calls attention to the acute political legitimacy problems that threaten such blantantly unjust societies. Finally, the idea of 'savage capitalism' refers to a situation where the pending collapse of the state and the generalized low degree of social solidarity leave market forces free from any societal control, therefore further debilitating solidarity.

From the foregoing analysis one may conclude that Brazil's or any other contemporary democratizing project cannot abandon the goal of incorporating socially marginal sectors because the universalization of citizenship rights remains a *sine qua non* to the enforcement of wider solidarity. Market societies that tolerate excessive socio-economic inequalities will remain prone to authoritarianism, since eventually there might be no alternative resource other than violence for enforcing order. Short of a shared notion of common rights, prerogatives and duties, it seems difficult to establish legitimate authority in highly complex and differentiated societies (Elias, 1972).

Where the notion of universal citizenship does not have solid foundations, any alternative attempt at securing democracy is likely to breed new despotisms. Even affirming the right to be different and to stimulate specificity requires that we start from the common ground of universality. That naturally poses the problem of demarcating

the space of citizenship, and here again we face the problem of the nation-state. While there is no doubt that the modern conjunction of nation and state is in crisis, no alternative to it would seem to be visible on the horizon.

Notwithstanding the claim that the state is losing its centrality (Tilly, 1992), it is still very much within the territory of the nation-state that citizenship is conceived of. Problems afflicting foreign migrants in Western Europe, armed conflicts in Eastern Europe, or current political negotiations between Blacks and Whites in South Africa are to some extent dramatic illustrations of the centrality of the nation-state as a political–ideological solution for merging identity, solidarity and authority concerns.

Furthermore, even where we do observe actual attempts at coordinating higher levels of social integration, the political formulae employed are very similar to the traditional nation-state model. In that sense, the European Community stands for an expanded nation-state. Regardless of the innovative aspects of such an initiative towards higher social integration, these are firmly grounded in the modern solution for merging solidarity and authority. And the recurring problems of adjusting 'national' and 'supranational' concerns in current European politics result from predictable conflicts among competing claims to authority and solidarity.

To conclude this section, let me recall that the current challenges facing the nation-state will be particularly acute in the former modernizing dictatorships now striving to affirm democracy. Their traditional dependence upon authority resources only makes the ongoing dilemmas of democracy more dramatic. How can market, authority and solidarity interactions be rearticulated at the same time as partnership in the political community is granted to those who thus far have remained marginally integrated at best? The very claim that the state has to return some critical initiatives to society in order to revitalize democracy must be placed into historical context. Otherwise, it may further aggravate existing market inequalities, with disastrous social and political consequences.

Short of both political initiatives that compensate for excessive social inequalities as well as poverty alleviation policies, there seems to be no bright future for democracy in these societies emerging from modernizing dictatorships. Moreover, in Latin America as in many other Third World societies, relinquishing the claim to universal rights may constitute a disastrous short-cut to

modernity. This brings us to the controversial territory of paths and sequences in societal dynamics, addressed in the concluding section.

Towards a Solution: Multiple Paths

Third World societies are easily caught in a trap when discussing problems of modernization and postmodernity, particularly because they seem to oscillate between the Scylla of Western-centred notions of historical processes and the Charybdis of auto-centric notions. In the first case, they tend to become prisoners of mechanical evolutionist views; while in the second, they lean towards particularistic descriptions and/or self-indulgent identification of cultural essences. The legitimate space of a historically-oriented sociological theory lies at neither of these extremes. It is instead located within the territory of social patterns, regularities and trends informed by historical processes, but distinctive from these. Within these parameters, a historical sociology can contribute to illuminating long-term processes of change and, based upon these, to formulating research questions about current societal alternatives.

Being historically informed means accounting for the records of the past as expressions of concrete social choices moulded by the physical, social and symbolic environment. While a historical sociology may place priority either on the actors' choices or on the actions' contexts, it permits the investigation of complex chains of interactions linking together groups and societies that differ greatly from each other and that, while inter-dependent, preserve their specificities.

Thus, for example, if the nation-state appears as a historical invention of modern Western Europe, the world's evolution towards a collection of nation-states does not mean that all of these have repeated the original model. There are significant variations among nation-states, some of which derive precisely from the fact that certain societies have not followed the European model. The identification of distinctive patterns of citizenship linked to basic models of nation-state becomes possible when we renounce both mechanical conceptions of history as well as the search for the singularity of one experience. In other words, I am suggesting that the possibility of a theoretically-oriented historical sociology remains very much alive, and needless to say, I trust it to be worth the effort (see, for example, Rigen, 1987; De Swaan, 1988; Kizer and Hechter, 1991).

Along the same lines, I would like to turn now to the decline of the state as an operator of collective identities. The full significance of such a major societal shift can not be appreciated if we do not take into account that the impact of such a change has to be significantly different across developed and underdeveloped societies, or across Eastern and Western Europe for that matter. The assumption that we are reaching the end of history is one of the illusions of the present. The crisis of the state that we all experience today will vary according to our historical legacies. And the projects for overcoming such crisis will be doomed to failure if they do not take into account the peculiarities of typical paths to modernity.

Thus, for example, if we look only at the present, the crisis of the state-led development model in Brazil, or in other Latin American countries, seems very similar to the one experienced by former communist societies. Around the world, the state entrepreneur seems to be capitulating because of the state's visible inefficiencies and the alleged comparative superiority of private market initiatives. However, despite the many similarities currently observed between decadent state capitalism in the Third World and bankrupt state socialism in former communist countries, the historical path of the nation-state in each context introduces critical differences, which have crucial consequences for their respective political projects.

Though this is not the place to discuss the current problems of former Second World societies, let me point out that their problems in creating a market are profoundly different from the Latin American dilemma of finding ways to domesticate long-established market structures so that the latter's destructive impact upon national communities can be reduced. In former communist societies, social solidarity resources have been used to curb the state, and the pains of creating a market are being felt in a much more egalitarian context. The impact of the market on social distribution remains to be seen, but it will be largely determined by the new state structures.

Everywhere, the ideological fusion of authority and solidarity in the nation-state, which has for about two centuries seized social imagination, seems about to lose its naturalness. What logically comes into question then is not only the state but the nation as well. The crisis of public authority is simultaneously a crisis of

existing forms of solidarity, and thus of collective identities. It seems inevitable that any attempts to overcome the crisis will have to re-open the old question of the relationships between economic growth, social distribution and political power. The less stable a political order, the more these relationships will be open to dispute. And regardless of the degree of political stability, the solutions found will be influenced not only by current stocks of collectivization and solidarity, but also by historical records.

If the nation-state, as the ideology of the modern Western World expanded to the rest of the globe, has shown signs of exhaustion, alternative forms for regulating complex societies are not close at hand. All over, the state seems to be in crisis, and yet attempts to identify solutions have not forsaken the basics of stateness. Thus, neither the supranational movement of the European Community nor the primordial fragmentation of the former Soviet Union or former Yugoslavia have turned their backs on statism. To the contrary, while in the first case the attempt has been to create a common state that co-ordinates authority and solidarity beyond the restricted limits of the traditional national states, in the second case one witnesses a desperate effort to make the contours of the restricted nation coincide with the state.

In conclusion, I would recall that the paths of different nation-states have made each one of them increasingly more dependent upon the others, so that the crises we are now experiencing are simultaneously particular and global. Responses to such crises must take into consideration historically consolidated, specific patterns and, at the same time, the predicaments faced by societies following divergent paths and sequences. In an ever more inter-connected world, the danger of translating one type of crisis into another may have disastrous consequences, depriving the concrete actors of their history and, *par cause*, of their self-identity. In turn, fully immersed in its singularity, a society will not be able to identify what is fundamental and what is accidental.

It is my contention that a historically-oriented sociological theory may, through comparative effort, contribute to framing the dilemmas between the particular and the universal—so acute in this *fin de siecle*—in more satisfactory terms. Modest as this might be, it is by formulating questions, not mechanically answering them, that historical sociology remains faithful to its past theoretical accomplishments

and rejects present calls for its forced retirement (Badie, 1992) under the argument that the time has come for 'real' theory.

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10

Citizenship and National Identity in Latin America: The Persisting Salience of Race and Ethnicity

Azril Bacal

Introduction

An attempt is made in this chapter to critically appraise the debate on citizenship and national identity in Latin America. The modern discussion of these issues continues to be largely informed by a preoccupation with the so-called national and Indian questions.[1] These questions, in turn, have often been formulated in terms of race, nation and ethnicity, being approached with a simultaneous concern for multi-culturalism and socio-political equality.[2]

Citizenship and nation are modern concepts linked in their current usage with the French Revolution. This historical event of the late 1700s triggered the liberal revolutions and the process of political modernization in Europe. In the words of Therborn (1995: 6), 'The French Revolution put the nation and the citizen as the new basis of the state'. The effects of these European changes, as also the American Revolution, became visible in Latin America in the early nineteenth century.

An initial distinction can be established between these two notions. Citizenship refers to the legal and political relations between the

state and its citizens, reflecting also the secularization implied by modernity. The concept of nation originally implied the more communalistic sense of people (volk) and the subjective or emotion-laden dimension of the national-state (nationhood). This more psychological aspect, which is both collective and individual, is made particularly evident in the compound concept of *national identity*. One could imaginatively refer to a 'nationalized identity', namely, a personal identity impregnated with 'national' content and meaning. The term 'nationality' connotes, in contrast, the more bureaucratic character of collective identification, reflected for instance in passport and census categories.

The concepts of race, nation and ethnicity are not mutually exclusive categories,[3] and yet have been differently employed and preferred at different periods in time. Race constitutes the oldest and most pervasive criterion of social differentiation and stratification since the Spanish conquest of Latin America. The modern debate on nation, nationality and citizenship begins with the political emancipation and subsequent creation of the republican national-states from about the early 1800s. Finally, the concept of ethnicity has increasingly been used in Latin America since roughly the mid-sixties following similar theoretical developments in the United States and Europe.

As the informed reader knows, the year 1992 is a convenient historical watershed from which to appraise the colonial heritage of Latin America (see Stein and Stein, 1970). This heritage denotes the consequences, 500 years later, of armed invasion, military conquest, political domination, territorial annexation, enforced serfdom of the defeated native population, and compulsory immigration of enslaved African people. It is this particular history which links the colonial past and the republican present of Latin America.

Most of the existing national-states in this region could still largely be characterized in the nineties by conditions of widespread poverty, inequality, gross violations of human rights, dependency, lack of democracy, ethnocide, racial prejudices and ethnic discrimination (Bacal, 1991b). These persisting structural barriers contextualize the debate concerning citizenship and national identity in Latin America.

If this characterization holds true, it means that Latin America continues to have a political crisis due to a combination of historical

and contemporary features. Consequently, the issues of citizenship and national identity must be considered in the light of the aforementioned political crisis. This crisis implies, first, that large segments of the national populations are dissatisfied with their access to and exercise of their civil rights; and second, that many members of the main racial, national and ethnic minority groups in Latin America today define their personal and collective identities in contrast, and often in opposition, to the official or dominant national identity.

The claim is made, based on substantial historical data and scholarly interpretation, that the pre-supposed crisis of citizenship and national identity in Latin America still owes much to the racist legacy of the colonial period. This kind of colonial racism was later transferred and modernized in the liberal republican states.

Many unresolved problems concerning citizenship and national identity in Latin America cannot properly be understood if, first, one does not pay due attention to the pervasiveness of racism and, second, if one remains confined within the conceptual, legal and political constraints of the national-state paradigm.

Historical Backdrop

The last 500 years of Latin American history roughly include three historical stages which extend from the times when the native civilizations were destroyed to the subsequent construction of the new social order in Latin America. These stages are known as: Conquest (1500s), Colonial (1600–1800) and Republican (1800s–1990s).

The Spaniards encountered upon their arrival to the New World a great number and variety of indigenous societies and cultures. By the end of the seventeenth century, there were literally hardly any natives left alive in the Antilles—that spot where Amerindians were first 'discovered' by the uninvited European invaders. When the Caribs and 'Awaracs' vanished from the face of the earth, they were replaced by Black slaves brought from their African homelands in order to work in the newly created sugar plantations.[4]

In other parts of Latin America, Amerindians similarly experienced a dramatic decrease in their population[5] due to a variety of factors, such as the armed aggression and destructiveness of the conquerors, the virtually devastating lack of immunity among the

indigenous people to European diseases, and the harsher working conditions imposed by their conquerors (later turned patrons).

Cultural destruction which originated with the Spanish colonial conquest continues even today in Latin America:

> Almost five centuries have gone by since the Castillian ships arrived to the Antilles and the process of destruction of the indigenous cultures has not yet ended. Some have survived in the jungle regions where Europeans did not dare to penetrate until recently; others, the most developed from the Western perspective, have survived in a dependent manner, barely maintaining themselves in syncretic forms, in other words, adaptive to the conditions imposed by the conqueror. The first ones have their days counted; the Amazonic jungle is no longer capable of protecting them, after revealing itself as a source of tremendous richness now made open to exploitation by the available technology.[6] The destiny of the second ones remains in question, even though the prognosis on them is not favourable either (Sotelo, 1985: 655).

Ethnocide refers to the intentional and unintentional destruction of minority cultures by political upholders of the dominant culture. This cultural destruction is implemented through legislation, religious indoctrination, media, and school textbooks and curricula. Thus, ethnocide differs from the more natural and slower tempo of acculturation[7] in the history of inter-ethnic relations.

While the modern discussion concerning citizenship and national identity began in the nineteenth century with the new republican national-states, in Latin America the terms and paradigms of this debate have largely been influenced by many previous external events and arguments traceable to the 1500s. The intellectual debate in the sixteenth century over the nature of Amerindian people was formulated in theological terms.[8] Among the main themes discussed, the question raised was whether the natives had a soul, that is, whether Amerindians were fully human.

Then, as now, transnational profit motives and interests tended to be covered up and rationalized. Moral pretense, deception and rhetoric continue to be elements present in the colonial ventures of all times. The colonized have, however, managed to enlist

occasional sympathetic allies willing to represent their views and interests based on moral and humanistic grounds.

The *Golden* and the *Black Legends* ideologically defined the two extreme poles in the argument on the human and social status of Amerindians throughout the sixteenth century. The Golden Legend placed emphasis on the European civilizational mission, regarding Amerindians as an inferior race with primitive cultures. The Black Legend, historically associated with Fray Bartolome de las Casas, bitterly criticized the maltreatment of Amerindians by Spaniards.[9]

> The ongoing process of conquest was stopped in the winter of 1550–51 by order of the king, in waiting for the result of a debate by two learned men at the university of Salamanca. The argument dealt with the question of whether Indians should be considered fully human or not. In the latter case, they could be subdued and enslaved (Wedin, 1992: 44).[10]

The view favourable to the Indians lost the argument in the end. And then the process of colonial conquest was resumed and completed. The real agenda had actually more to do with the concrete manpower requirements of the conquerors, which led them, in turn, to practically enslave the Amerindian population.[11]

This debate reflected, to some extent, the tensions between the evangelization project of the Church and the economic greed of the conquerors.[12] The Spanish Crown managed to profit from these two partially competing parties. Instrumental in that respect was the viceroyalty—the colonial government—representing the interests of the Crown in its political rule and public administration of the Latin American colonial states.

While income, status and power defined the two states of the feudal Iberian social structure, racial attributes, such as colour, physiognomy or phenotype and 'purity of blood' acquired primacy in determining membership in the elite or in the vassal categories of the Ibero-American colonial societies (Stein and Stein, 1970). The foundations of the social inequality which today characterizes Latin America rest upon this racist feature of the Spanish colonial regime.

The initial colonial racial stratification concentrated wealth, honour and political rights on the Spaniards and their Creole heirs. Peninsulares and Criollos constituted the ruling class and the social

(ethnocratic) elite in Latin American colonial society. Both these groups basically shared the same national and cultural identity, namely, Hispanic and European, throughout most of the sixteenth century. During this period, Amerind phenotype[13] correlated with poverty, low status and powerlessness.

Amerindians were defined as tax-paying subjects[14] under the direct protection of the Spanish Crown. They were nevertheless virtually treated as feudal serfs by the conquerors. In short, they were defined and treated as second class subjects with undifferentiated national and cultural identities.

The colonial era, roughly between the 1600s and the 1800s, institutionalized the racial policies of the Crown, reinforcing the social differentiation and ranking of the colonial subjects on the basis of clearly marked racial features. In the words of Wedin (1992: 96), 'The official conceptual apparatus implied two societies: The Society of Spaniards ("Republica de Espanoles") and the Society of Indians ("Republica de Indios")'.

Later on, the Blacks, when imported from Africa to meet the lack of Amerindian manpower, were ascribed slave status in colonial society. They were, consequently, also denied their humanness and their different national and cultural identities as such. They were considered and treated as any other private property items, owned by their colonial masters for all matters, in life and death.

Extensive racial miscegenation and cultural syncretism nevertheless took place in colonial Latin America, a process which is known in literature as *mestizage* (see, Morner, 1967; Wedin, 1992).

> It took only a few decades of interracial contact in the New World for the problem of the mestizo, mulatto and zambo[15] to become evident. Uncontrolled miscegenation complicated the creation of a two-class society where easily recognized phenotype differentiated legal and social status (Stein and Stein, 1970: 63).

Whites relied on racism and discrimination in order to keep the 'coloured people' down, namely, the Amerindians, the Blacks, and the mixed bloods (*castas*) or castes. This racist colonial heritage permeates much of Latin American national-states of the post-colonial era (see, among others, Freyer, 1959; Stein and Stein, 1970; Mariategui, 1971; Bacal, 1982; Fernandes Retamar, 1989;

Graham, 1990). As in other parts of the world, racism also works in Latin America as an ideological justification for the persistence of social inequality (Wallerstein, 1988). There occurred an increasing social differentiation and an emerging cleavage between Americans and Europeans within the colonial elite. Stein and Stein trace this development to several factors, such as:

> The depression of the seventeenth century, restriction of overseas trade, the near-collapse of metropolitan control, the infrequency of ships sailing, all seem to have shifted social and political power from metropolis to periphery to the colonial hacendado, mineowner, merchant (Stein and Stein, 1970: 66–67).

The already established racist criterion of 'purity of blood' was now shifted and used by the 'Peninsulares' to discriminate against the 'Americanos'. The latter were considered to be inferior due to their imputed racially mixed background.

An early or proto-nationalism was the response of the Criollos to their differential treatment by the Europeans, similar in kind to that experienced by the North American colonists against the British Crown—an incipient nationalism, an ill-defined sense of greater right to rule in America than that enjoyed by European-born administrators and merchants (Stein and Stein, 1970).

This antagonism between Criollos and Peninsulares for social status and control of wealth eventually also became a power struggle leading to the liberal, anti-colonial and emancipatory movements which resulted in the formation of nineteenth century republics.

One of the main historical consequences of the Wars of Emancipation against the Spanish colonial empire in the early 1800s was the political and military victory of the *libertadores*. This event also marks the economic and political foundations of the liberal national-states in Latin America, and the modern concern in the region with the issues of citizenship, nation-building and national identity.

Race, Nation and Ethnicity

As stated earlier, Latin American arguments on the 'national question' and 'Indian question' have been formulated in terms of

imported Eurocentric concepts. Therefore, it is necessary to present a critical account of the concepts of race, nation and ethnicity as a background to our discussion (see, Bacal, 1991a).

As a term in social science literature, the notion of 'race' preceded that of 'nation' and 'ethnicity'. It was Linnaeus, the famous Swedish natural scientist, who first defined race in the eighteenth century on the basis of colour, skull shape, hair and other physical traits. One may thus regard Linnaeus' work in that regard as the origin of physical anthropology. However, this natural science view of race was extrapolated from its intended anatomical, physiological and comparative academic use to its ideological application in 'racist theories' since the last century (Kuper, 1975).

It is important to keep in mind that genotypical and phenotypical differences per se do not 'naturally' correspond to existing social and political differences. Through the *cultural definition of race* (see, Stavenhagen, 1986) in the context of inter-ethnic relations, noticeable but otherwise irrelevant biological features historically acquire social meaning and political significance.

Kuper adopted Van den Berghe's definition of 'racism' as the ideological use of the concept of race:

> Any set of beliefs that organic, genetically-transmitted differences (whether real or imagined), between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races (Kuper, 1975: 14).

Moreover, according to Van den Berghe, three conditions must be simultaneously present to constitute evidence of racism: 'The use of physical criteria, the beliefs that cultural, moral or intellectual differences correspond to the physical differences, and social actions (of a discriminatory nature) based on those beliefs' (Van den Berghe, 1967: 9).

Based on this definition, one has sufficient grounds to assert that racism permeates the prevailing criteria for citizenship and national identity in the history of Latin American societies. This assertion is all the more applicable in those countries that contain large numbers of ethno-indigenous groups, such as in the Andean region, Central America and Mexico.

Racist 'theories', particularly in the form known as 'scientific racism', have been academically influential in various 'applied scientific fields' such as in early 'differential psychology', 'racial hygiene' and 'eugenics'. Perhaps the oldest and most pervasive form of racial 'explanation' within the Western ideological tradition corresponds to 'social Darwinism' and similar evolutionary views.

These views have been classified by Barrera (1979: 174–82) as 'biological deficiency theories', and have been ideologically used as an attempt to 'explain' inferior intelligence and other moral or behavioural attributes based on racial differences. Sorokin (1928: 195–308) referred to such views as 'bio-organismic' and 'anthropo-racial' in his classical typology of social science theories.

In short, the so-called 'scientific racism' historically was meant to justify the view that non-White racial collectivities occupy their present inferior socio-economic and political status owing to their assumed genetic (racial) deficiencies.

It is my contention that social Darwinism (evolutionism) has ideologically permeated much of the theoretical development of the Western social sciences. Furthermore, social Darwinism and Eurocentrism go hand-in-hand, whether the theoretical discussion of 'race' refers to the 'racial situation' in the metropolis or in the colonies. We are still confronted by the persisting and more subtle forms of racist theorising, such as 'socio-cultural deficiency theories' (Barrera, 1979) or the recent development in the social sciences known as 'sociobiology'.

Bell (1975) and Barrera (1979) list the works of Gobineau, Chamberlain, Wagner, Treitschke, Le Bon, Rosenberg and Madison Grant, among the best known authors of the 1800s and early 1900s, who used the term race for racist purposes. These writers claimed the 'supremacy' of the 'Aryan race over other races'.

However, as earlier stated, the use of the term race has declined in contemporary social sciences. The atrocities associated with the Nazi-racism of this century account for the discreditation and disrepute of this term as a scientific concept. Consequently, a linguistic shift towards the term 'ethnicity' has replaced 'race' as a social science concept, noticeable after the Second World War (see, Shibutani et al., 1965; Gordon, 1978; Rex, 1982, 1986; Stavenhagen, 1984; Bacal, 1991a; Oommen, 1994a).

From yet another angle, Mullard (1988) argues that the term racism should be replaced by the concept of ethnicism. This author is in line with a recent culturalist trend of analysis which attempts

to account for what is regarded as a new form of racism or 'new racism' developing nowadays in Europe. 'Ethnicism in essence represents an exchange of a largely racially determined set of ideas and beliefs (biological determinism) for a largely ethnically determined set of ideas and beliefs (cultural determinism) to justify specific practices and protect specific interests' (Mullard, 1988: 23).

It is not difficult to understand the post-War negative reaction to the use of the concept 'race', as the latter was used to justify genocide in the forties. According to Kuper (1975), UNESCO's campaigns against racial discrimination, within the context of the United Nations' actions to combat racism, may have been a determining force affecting the terminological change from 'race' to 'ethnicity'.

This linguistic process also took place in Latin America, soon after it did in the United States and Europe where that shift had originated. In my view, it was Stavenhagen (1984, 1986, 1987) who influenced most of this theoretical development in Latin America.

Pointing to the persisting global appeal of racist theories and prejudices in popular culture, the nineties brought back into the open a renewed international upsurge of neo-racist, neo-Nazi and White nativistic mobilization in the contemporary scene. Racist arguments and mobilizations are also present nowadays in Latin American public opinion.

When for instance, in the latest presidential campaign in Peru, the final contest took place between two main candidates, one being a 'Criollo' and the other a 'Nisei', racist arguments were readily used in the national debate. For some 'patriotic' Peruvians, it was inconceivable that a Japanese could be elected as the Peruvian president, as indeed happened. Alberto Fujimori, a Peruvian, born in Peru out of Japanese immigrant parents, won the elections against Mario Vargas Llosa, many of whose followers argued that the latter was a 'more Peruvian' candidate. Political analysts claim that the 'ethnic vote' by the majority of non-White Peruvians played a decisive role in that electoral result, as it still does in other crucial areas of social and political life.

As I see it, contemporary racism remains an ideological/political response to a highly ranked and conflictive inter-ethnic situation. Some members of Latin American ruling circles who claim European credentials feel threatened nowadays by the encroachment of the indigenous and Mestizo majority populations. The latter are

often pejoratively referred to as 'Cholos' or 'Indios' in racist jargon. As with their European peers, the ruling Latin American elites attempt to preserve their privileged position in racial societies still largely ruled by White and 'whitened' ethnocracies.

Nevertheless, the debate on whether to use or not to use the terms 'race' and 'racism' persists nowadays in the social sciences, as indicated by Stavenhagen (1987). Some people in popular political culture and in academia still prefer to use race and other more traditional terms such as nation and 'people' rather than ethnicity, the implied danger being the sweeping of the virtual ugliness of racism under the conceptual carpet of ethnicity.

Some scholars, however, use the concept race in their work in a non-racist and even anti-racist way. For instance, Chance (1978), in a well-known ethno-historical study of Oaxaca, Mexico, used the term 'social race', to distinguish it from the biological connotation inherent in the racist use of the term race.

Chance tried to underline with the concept of 'social race' the strong correlation which still prevails between phenotype and social stratification, both North and South of the Rio Grande. Similarly, Barrera (1979) used the concepts of race and class in developing a 'theory of racial inequality' to explain the social situation of Mexican Americans in the American Southwest.

More recently, Rex (1982, 1986), aware of the persistence of racism in our times, distinguished between 'benign' and 'malign' forms of ethnicity. The latter referred to 'race relations situations' characterized by their asymmetry, exploitation, discrimination, oppression and conflict.

To summarize, in spite of the relative disrepute of the concept of 'race' in contemporary social sciences, its ideological use for racist and anti-racist purposes still persists, both in public opinion and scholarly debate. Furthermore, the existing structure of inter-ethnic relations in Latin America continues to racially discriminate Amerindians, Blacks and other oppressed minorities. As shown earlier, phenotype still correlates with status and life chances in the Latin America of the nineties.

Nation, Ethnicity and Class

In Marxist literature, the 'national question' roughly corresponds to the effects of the domination of an oppressed by an oppressor

nationality. This debate is focused, on the one hand, on the relationship between national oppression and class exploitation (implying the view that the modern national-states are class bound), and on the conditions of national self-determination, on the other.[16] Marxist thought has greatly influenced the Latin American debate throughout the twentieth century, as illustrated here.[17]

In the past, it was theoretically assumed in Marxist circles that workers' national interests corresponded to the internationalist socialist revolution rather than to 'bourgeois nationalism'. And yet, the vast majority of workers did participate under nationalist banners in both World Wars. Nationalist solidarity intensely persists in the face of class exploitation, and the extent of White workers' racism against their 'alien' class comrades is still evident. Historical evidence points to the fact that racist, nationalist and ethnocentric feelings and prejudices are more difficult to overcome than anticipated by orthodox Marxist writers. Finally, as shown by the current events in Eastern Europe, the traditional Marxist approach to racial, national and ethnic questions has proven to be theoretically weak and inadequate.

Oommen reminds the reader that some authors have used the term nation to denote class, for instance Disraeli (1926) in his famous dictum on the 'two nations' which co-existed at the time of Victorian England:

> Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by different breeding, are fed by different food; are ordered by different manners and are not governed by the same laws, the rich and the poor (as quoted in Oommen, 1994b: 26–46).

Further, Oommen mentions the reference of Marx (1977: 144) to the division of the French nation into two nations—'the nation of owners and the nation of workers'. At any rate, this discussion illustrates the theoretical confusion to which we have referred earlier in our discussion.

Among the classical sociologists, Weber and Marx preferred to use the concept of nationality rather than race or ethnicity. Morner (1990), the well-known Swedish historian and Latino-Americanist,

reminds us that these two authors were the intellectual heirs of nineteenth century European nationalism, who consequently disregarded ethnic groups within the emerging modern national-states as vestiges from the past and obstacles to nation-building and progress.

The ethnicity paradigm became salient in academic debates after the Second World War, and has become increasingly so since the seventies.[18] According to Stavenhagen (1986), the concept ethnicity itself and related terms such as 'ethnie' have been recently produced in the context of Western social sciences. In Stavenhagen's view, these terms are used to address situations characterized by ranked racial/cultural stratification.

As earlier stated, the term ethnicity has become established in recent times as one of the most important concepts in the social sciences. It has also permeated public opinion debate. News charged with ethnic content are daily reported by the world media. According to Rex (1986), one of the most influential European authors on this subject, it is due to its attributed adverse and conflictual traits that the ethnic question has nowadays become a public issue and an acknowledged contemporary social problem.

In my view, ethnicity results from 'inter-ethnic relations' whenever two different groups or societies come in contact with each other and establish various modes of spatial, political-economic, cultural and social relations. As a historical phenomenon it is closely linked to migratory, conquest and coercive processes, nowadays taking place within and between the boundaries of national-states.

Often, inter-ethnic relations originate in the aftermath of military and political conquests, establishing thereafter a 'dominance–dominated' type of social relation between the conqueror and the vanquished ethnic groups. Then it often follows that the ethnicity of the subdued group becomes salient and objectionable, as contrasted with the 'normalcy' (a-ethnicity) or claimed 'superiority' of the elite and its 'higher' (mainstream) or official culture and language.

Typically, conquest and coercive processes entail attempts at legitimation by means of 'justificatory' ideologies to 'explain' the derived ranked social relations and structures. The victor's perspective assumes its inherited superiority, whether in terms of race

or culture, deceptively proclaiming a civilizing and/or religious salvation function.

The claim could be introduced here that most current ethnic problems and conflicts in the world historically result from the asymmetrical nature of inter-ethnic relations. Such unequal social relations commonly entail economic exploitation, political domination, social discrimination, cultural prejudice and psychological oppression, which are exerted by a privileged and dominant ethnocratic elite over one or more subordinate ethnic minority groups.

Ethnicity implies structural (material) and cultural (subjective) features. Structural ethnicity refers to the relative location of an ethnic group in relation to all other social groups in the stratification system, resulting in ethnic stratification. This ranked sociohistorical formation based on ethnic criteria holds a determining influence in the distribution of life burdens and privileges among the various ethnic segments of the national population. As a major social–structural dimension, ethnicity significantly affects international, intra-national, inter-group and inter-personal relations, and last but not least, the psychological developmental process known as ethnic identity.

In its cultural, social–psychological and psychological sense, ethnicity refers to a feeling of belonging to a group whose members share some phenotypical, cultural, linguistic, religious and national features, or a combination of some or all of these features. This psychological state of being has been characterized in literature as a consciousness of kind (Shibutani et al., 1965; Rex, 1986), which is closely related to the notion of ethnic identity.

Inter-ethnic relations have developed historically, blending colonial, racial, cultural and class dimensions under complex circumstances which vary in their degree of oppression and ethnic discrimination.

In some important respects, worth pondering about, ethnies could be regarded as 'micro-nations' and nations as 'macro-ethnies', territoriality and not size of minority population being a theoretically significant factor according to Oommen (1994b) to differentiate between ethnie and nation.

Ethnicity, as a social condition, lies somewhere in between family or primary group experience and participating as citizens in society at large. Inter-ethnic relations constitute the context for both external/ascriptive ethnic identification 'by others' ('ethnotypes') as well as for the personal process of acquiring or developing an

ethnic identity. Margarita Melville (1983: 273), a Chicana sociologist, made a very important point, by asserting that 'a shift in ethnic identity can occasion a shift in the type of interethnic relations, as well as the reverse'.

Finally, while the ethnicity paradigm and the notion of ethnic identity have displaced the acculturation paradigm in anthropology, the focus in sociology has changed from a concern with immigration and marginality to the recognition of ethnicity as a major structural dimension and cleavage of contemporary societies.

An untackled theoretical problem, however, consists of the realization that the terms race, nation and ethnicity are not, analytically speaking, mutually exclusive concepts. For Bell (1975: 155), the notion of race as 'common blood' was a predominant theme in the popular and academic cultures of nineteenth century Europe, alongside two other major sociological concepts, namely, nation and class. In the language of the early social sciences, the notions of 'race' and 'nation' were used to illustrate cases of what Ferdinand Tonnies designated as 'Gemeinschaft' (communal) type of social relations in contrast to the 'Gesellschaft' (contractual) type of social relations.

The terms race and nation designated, at that early stage of theorizing, a people (a 'volk') who shared a belief in their common descent, 'blood', language, culture and territory. Thus, a 'communalistic bond' might be assumed to exist as a theoretical nexus between the concepts of race, nation and ('primordial') ethnicity.[19]

In modern discussions on these subjects, there exists a combination of Gemeinschaft (communalistic) and Gesellschaft (instrumental) views. The former tends to be emotionally charged in terms like folk, blood, language and territory, appealing to feelings of 'nationhood' and 'national loyalty'; while the latter tends to be phrased in terms like 'national interest' and 'national development'. Both lines of argument can, have and continue to be ideologically manipulated from various quarters, whether governmental or insurgent, to mobilize public opinion concerning issues of citizenship and national identity.

Resisting Homogenization and Oppression

Many Latin American governments foster a nationalist ideology in the name of national integration. In that homogenizing nationalist

perspective, the associated ethnic policies are meant to assimilate, marginalize and even 'eliminate' ethnic minorities in their midsts. This elimination is mostly ethnocidal, but at times it has been documented as genocide.

Cultural policies and the structural mistreatment of national, ethnic and indigenous minorities continue to be an international controversial issue. For that reason, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights created the Subcommission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities after the Second World War.

It is only in very recent times that the rights of minorities have been acknowledged by international legislation on human rights. Meanwhile, the quest for ethnic/national self-determination remains a lively and troublesome issue (see, Stavenhagen, 1986; Hettne, 1987).

Different kinds of social minorities are defined by the various hegemonic criteria of social differentiation and ranking in society alluding to various sources of social oppression. Racial, national and ethnic minority groups historically correspond to the particular or the combined nature of racial, national and ethnic oppression. When collectively mobilized against oppressive conditions, these minorities constitute social movements which are, likewise, typically oriented towards different kinds of political and cultural goals.

Racial minorities are culturally marked by ascribed racial criteria, such as phenotype and the 'colour line', which most often disregard the multi-culturalism of the subjugated population. For instance, Amerindians had and continue to have different cultures, languages and religions. African slaves came from various geographical regions, originally also having different cultures, languages and religions. However, their heirs have in time become assimilated into the dominant cultures due to a historical combination of ethnocide and acculturation.[20]

Existing racial minorities owe their historical origins in Latin America to the establishment of colonial relations. These caste-like social relations placed Amerindian serfs and African slaves at the bottom of the social pyramid. Racial minorities thus include both subdued indigenous and subordinated immigrant groups.

The collective claims of racial minorities are usually formulated in terms of civil rights, and equal opportunities in employment, education, housing, health and the like. Their struggle places

emphasis on the attainment of equal citizenship status, without seeking a separate national, cultural or linguistic identity.

National minorities, whether different or not in racial attributes, refer to groups who share mythical origins, a common culture, language and most likely the same religion. Accordingly, they make cultural, linguistic and religious demands. Also, commonly, these minorities occupy certain regions considered to be their national homelands. The sacralization of their national soil often evokes intense patriotic feelings prone to be politically manipulated. The latter might result in territorial claims, which are made on the basis of ancestral and/or mythical collective rights. Territorial demands vary from regional autonomy to claims for partition and separate statehood.

When national minorities seek regional autonomy, their claims are often phrased in terms of equal civil rights—equivalent to those of the dominant nationality—and separate national, cultural and/or linguistic identities. At times, national minorities attempt to change the political and legal nature of the state, namely, from a national state to a bi-national or multi-national state, with parallel demands made for the official recognition of their cultures and languages. If, however, partition is the preferred option, national minorities seek to assert their own distinct national, cultural, religious and/or linguistic identities through separate statehood.

Ethnic minorities or ethnies are similar to national minorities, but typically smaller in size, often but not necessarily geographically dispersed and generally make no territorial claims. One could meaningfully come to regard ethnies as micro-nations and nations as macro-ethnies as noted earlier. However, ethnies have been often regarded as relics from the pre-modern past, while the concept of nation strongly connotes modernity.

On certain occasions, racial and ethnic minorities may transform into national minorities, and then mobilize to struggle for regional autonomy or national secession. Such transformations occur irrespective of the indigenous or immigrant nature of these social minorities, which reveals the socio-cultural and political construction of racial, national and ethnic differences. The cases of the Chicano claims on 'Aztlan' (the American Southwest), the advocacy of an Afro-American nation in the deep South and the 'Aymarista' national claim in Bolivia illustrate the above contention.

Stavenhagen (1986) mentions that in the mid-eighties there were about 5,000 distinct ethnic groups in the world which were incorporated into 160-odd national-states. Given the existing ethnic group/national-state global ratio, it would be impossible to apply to all of these groups the dictum imputed to Napoleon: 'To each nation a state, in each state one nation'. In Europe alone, and this is before the recent political fragmentation (which continues to take place) in Eastern Europe, there were more than 20 national minorities demanding the right to separate statehood (Stavenhagen, 1984).

The historical fact is that there are very few cases when nation and state correspond. Most countries continue to be multi-national and pluri-cultural in their ethnic composition. Moreover, most nation-states constitute heterogeneous societies, whose inter-ethnic structures are characterized by their differential access to positions of wealth, power and privilege in society.

Ethnic and nationalist mobilizations are nowadays some of the main vehicles by which to express socio-economic, cultural and political claims and grievances in contemporary society, both from above and below, by the ethno-centric and the subordinated/oppressed groups. Therefore, I am inclined to distinguish between regressive and prospective forms of ethno-politics.

Regressive forms of ethno-political orientations are often manifested as nationalist chauvinism, enhanced racism and ethnic discrimination, which might be differentially formulated by the elites and by the White and Creole working and middle classes. Ethno and nationalist mobilization is regarded as prospective when articulated with a long-range project of democratization and social equality.

The process of democratization also entails the power to define and redefine. One of the most important centripetal processes now taking place overall is known as the 'globalization' of the world-system, a situation which is also reflected in the international development of the social sciences.

The diminishing currency of the notions of 'race' and 'tribe' may be used to illustrate the process of globalization of the social sciences in our times. These concepts historically designated, in colonial ideology, the native peoples conquered by Europeans. This was the aftermath of the 'discovery', invasion and annexation of the colonial world—denotive territories in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania.

The European conquest of Latin America, a political and military event, marks the historical beginning of the Spanish viceroyalty and the colonial economy (see, Mariategui, 1971). It also marks the beginning of the cultural construction of the new colonial social order built on various racial/racist criteria and myths such as the 'purity of blood'.[21]

Spaniards were thus able to impose their own cultural definitions on the vanquished Amerindian 'tribes' and on the enslaved African 'race'. The social consequences of the racist definitions of race and tribe became real enough through the practice of genocide, ethnocide, serfdom and slavery. These were all sinister features present in the colonial 'civilizing project' of Latin America.

The Right to Self-definition

The earlier discussion introduces one important line of argument in the following discussion: who has the right and the power to define? According to Kuper (1975), racist groups have been historically influential in defining the arena of theoretical confrontation and in their advocacy of the prevailing views on race.

On the one hand, the colonial notions of race and tribe continue to be reflected today in the social structure, national legislation, culture, ideology, language and social practices of the existing Latin American national-states. Racial ideology constitutes today an important element of the colonial heritage, which still permeates and constricts the criteria used to define and regulate differential citizenship status for different segments of the national populations. And by the same token, official national identity remains biased in favour of the dominant Eurocentric elites of the Latin American countries. But, for a short time, Paraguay constituted a notable historical exception to the overall pattern of ethnic relations in Latin America (see, Wedin, 1992).

On the other hand, the concepts of tribe and race have increasingly lost much of their academic appeal. These concepts have recently been turned upside down to characterize and condemn the likes of Afrikaaners and other racially exploitative groups and societies. This sort of linguistic mirror has begun to erode the deceptive use of the terms tribe and race, bringing about their virtual demise in the contemporary vocabulary of the social sciences.

In a different light, the current ethno-mobilization of national and indigenous minorities signals one of the most significant centrifugal processes nowadays erupting in the world-system of national-states—the contemporary claim of indigenous groups to nationhood and ethno-development (see, Bacal, 1990b).

Both developments, namely, the integrative and disjunctive social processes, are taking place simultaneously in Latin America.[22] This contradictory, confusing and dynamic regional state of affairs is being passionately discussed now in the realms of politics and social sciences. It still remains a most difficult task to reconcile the 'United Latin American' projects advocated by Bolvar, Martim Che Guevara and their contemporary Creole and Mestizo heirs, with the 'Indianista' ethno-national projects in the Andean, Amazonic and Central American regions (AIDESEP, 1992). The criteria for citizenship and national identity are clearly at odds in these two projects.

Some radical Aymara and other Amerindian intellectuals have come to reject Latin America as the term which properly characterizes their indigenous historical, cultural and social reality (see, Cardenas et al., 1990). This linguistic contention is not fully devoid of valid theoretical and empirical considerations. 'Latin' as an adjective connotes the Spanish/Portuguese languages and the Catholic religion which repressed and replaced their own language, culture and religion. Shortly stated, Amerindians increasingly refuse to identify themselves as 'Latin'.

Besides being a historical accident and a misnomer,[23] the term 'America' reflects the oppressive effects of the European invasion. The Spanish Conquistadors disrupted the everyday lives of the Amerindian people, their society, economy and culture, pushing them into a situation of social destitution, economic exploitation, political subordination, cultural deprivation and personal humiliation (see, Mariategui, 1971). For Kothari, 'The worst result of the colonial experience was the destruction of self-regard and sense of dignity of those living under the conditions of ethnic domination. The restoration of that self-regard and dignity for minority group members has become a paramount task' (Kothari, 1974: 73).

In short, why should any oppressed racial, national or ethnic minorities in Latin America take the Eurocentric national-state projects and views seriously at all, were it not for their continuing oppression and their permanent need to resist and rebel against it. This background might help the reader to better understand the historical frustration and anger of the Amerindian people that lies

behind their current protest and ethno-mobilization, dramatically illustrated in the Chiapas indigenous upheaval in Mexico in January of 1994.

In this age of political pragmatism, the leadership and intelligentsia of the organizations of indigenous people have begun to designate themselves as members of nations, thereby rejecting their ascribed definition as tribes. In a contemporary world-system constituted by national-states, it is expedient for a state to acquire credentials as a 'nation'.

Amerindian nations are now trying to enlist support from the international community and academia in order to legitimize their national, territorial and cultural–linguistic demands. These demands constitute a partial attempt to achieve equal citizenship and national identity status with the ethnocratic European and Creole elites.

The recent political mobilization of Amerindians and other oppressed minority groups has enabled them to begin their long journey to counteract racist views; and thus to reclaim their right to redefine who they are, to be different in some regards and yet equal in a commonly shared humanhood—equal as citizens, equal in their cultural and linguistic rights, and equal with respect to their national identities.

To conclude, the ideologically coloured concept of race prevailed in Latin America from the time of European colonial conquest, around the 1500s, to the Second World War.[24] Racism as an ideology, however, continues to permeate both colonial and republican societies and cultures to this day.

The liberal concepts of nation and state initiated their conjoint ideological career in Latin America since the early 1800s with the Wars of Emancipation. They persist nowadays in formulations like 'national integration' and 'national development'. This imported concept of nation-state is historically linked with the modernity paradigm, and is therefore associated with assimilationist/ethnocidal views on racial and ethnic relations. The latter are not too different from orthodox versions of class analysis in their common wrong expectancy, assuming that modernization would extinguish racial/ethnic minorities as relics of the past.

Among the most comprehensive contemporary accounts of the development of the national consciousness in Latin America, I

found the works by Nalewajko (1985) and Barre (1989) quite suggestive. However, they single out Renan and the Latin European connection (France, Spain and Italy), neglecting the Anglo-Saxon sources of influence in the Latin American debate, present, as previously mentioned, in the works of Miranda (see, Sahlín, 1990) in Venezuela and of Marti in Cuba (see, De Onis, 1954).

On the other hand, what is particularly interesting in the works of Hobsbawm (1990) and Therborn (1992) is their comparative account of the various global versions of citizenship and national identity influencing Latin America. While the French Revolution fostered the simultaneous discussion of 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity', the Anglo-Saxon influences placed more weight on the liberal and individualistic notions of civil rights in the nineteenth century.

The influences of the communist, socialist, falangist, fascist and national–socialist versions of the national-state also had a necessary echo in Latin America throughout the twentieth century, and was reflected in the discourse of the governments, of the political parties and the intelligentsia.

Finally, since the seventies, the concept of ethnicity has become influential in Latin American social sciences and public debate, few years after it emerged in the United States and Europe (see, Bourricaud, 1975; Stavenhagen, 1984; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1986; Alvarsson and Horna, 1990; Bacal, 1991a). The situation of theoretical confusion present in the Latin American debate also mirrors to some extent the prevailing paradigmatic crisis of the sociology of racial and ethnic relations on a global scale. However, while the Latin American debate on the themes of citizenship and national identity does not significantly differ from similar discussions elsewhere, one could nevertheless distinguish certain particular regional features, which are briefly discussed hereafter.

The Regional Debate in Latin America

In addition to their adherence to a particular Western academic paradigm, such as functionalism, Marxism, modernism, postmodernism, neo-Marxism, post-postmodernism and other theoretical shifts, one may tentatively classify Latin American social scientists

and intellectuals dealing with this subject matter as having one of the following theoretical orientations: *Hispanistas*, *Indigenistas*, *Mesticistas*, *Indianistas* and *Multiculturalistas*.

These orientations reflect the various ideological stances which exist towards the current racial, national and ethnic groups in Latin America, their assumed social relations, and last but not least, the terms and concepts in which those views are formulated.

In that respect, the first three orientations, namely, *Hispanistas*, *Indigenistas* and *Mesticistas*, phrase their discussion in terms of the concepts of race, nation and civilization, while *Indianistas* and *Multiculturalistas* formulate their arguments within the 'ethnicity' paradigm in their different approaches to development, citizenship, nationhood and the proposed political nature of the future Latin American state.

The main constituent groups of the Latin American population may today roughly be described as follows: The Iberian/European (namely, the Spaniards and Portuguese) and their 'Criollo' (Creole) heirs; the so-called 'Amerindian' indigenous population; and the Mestizos. The process of *mestizage* results from the mixture of the two aforementioned ethnic poles, and it can historically be traced to the year 1492 when the European colonial invasion and conquest started.

One should also include in the racial/cultural mix of the Latin American population the presence of the heirs to African slaves (see, Dzidzienyo and Casal, 1971) and Chinese coolies. The latter were brought and sold by European traders in Latin American slave markets in response to the drastic reduction of native manpower, to the expansion of the colonial and republican economies, and to the corresponding demand for this sort of unfree and dehumanized labour. Since the mid-1800s and throughout the 1900s, there has also taken place a process of massive immigration from Europe, Japan, the Middle East and other regions of the world to Latin America.

Shortly stated, *Hispanistas*[25] continue to hail the Spanish/European 'civilizing and spiritual mission' in Latin America, implying an assumed racial, cultural, spiritual and civilizational superiority of Europeans. In that way, they continue to ideologically, 'morally' or psychologically justify their privileged citizenship and national identity status over and above the other subordinated racial nationalities and the various racially mixed groups, such as Mulattos and

Zambos. The views of the *Hispanistas* basically coincide in their ethno-centric colonial (Spanish) and republican (Creole) versions of a national-state project.

Contrariwise, *Indigenistas*[26] of different persuasions protested 'on behalf' of the indigenous people against the exploitative and oppressive mistreatment of Amerindians, both under the Spanish viceroyalty and the Creole ethnocratic republics. In the latter part of the 1800s, when the imported liberal Latin American state regimes were already well advanced, some humanists and literati reactively praised the virtues of the 'Indian Race' and of the advanced Inka civilization. By the same token, *Indigenistas* blamed the greediness and cruelty of the Sapniards and Criollos. They romantically reconstructed their view of a republican national-state project on the basis of a glorified pre-Hispanic indigenous race and civilization.

Mesticistas are those who range from viewing the Mestizo as the 'Copper Race', the emerging promising race of the future, to those who simply acknowledge the new realities brought about by 500 years of biological miscegenation and cultural syncretism. Some *Mesticistas* prefer to euphemistically formulate their views in terms of the 'meeting of races and cultures', as if historical invasion and conquest had not actually occurred.

Moreover, many of the ethnocidal policies pursued by national governments in Latin America during the last two centuries have alternatively manipulated *Indigenista* and *Mesticista* banners. *Mesticistas*, in short, have continued to advocate a single, biologically mixed and syncretic monocultural national-state project. In this sort of modernizing project, the Spanish language remains the dominant and official language for all legal, educational and practical purposes. The work of Morner (1967) on the race mixture in the history of Latin America remains a classic in this field.

Indianistas advocate 'Indian Power' and include in their fold organized Amerindians who increasingly speak 'for themselves' and their intellectual and academic allies. *Indianistas* branched out from the *Indigenista* movement, influenced to a large extent by the Black, Chicano and Native American ethnic liberation movements of the late sixties and seventies. This branching out also corresponded with the ascent of the 'ethnicity' paradigm in Latin America.

The concepts of ethnic identity became central for organizing purposes and were accompanied by a critique of mainstream

assimilationist ideology as ethnocidal. Ethno-development became the alternative proposal of *Indianistas* to what they regarded as a modernization process masked as 'national development' projects by the ethnocratic regimes. Increasing organization of ethno-indigenous groups in Latin America enabled them to raise demands on bi-lingual/bi-cultural education, equal political rights as citizens and territorial claims as elements of their struggle for recognition as nations.

A very important polemic continues to take place in Latin America between *Indianistas* and Marxists. An excellent summary of the competing outlooks, placing emphasis on the ethnic or class factors respectively in the analysis of Amerindian people is found in the debate between Stefano Varese (1982) and Hector Diaz-Polanco (1982).

Multiculturalistas also phrase their theoretical proposals in terms of the 'ethnicity paradigm', while their political project concerning citizenship and national status is formulated in terms of the need for a multi-national state, which is also multi-lingual, multi-cultural and democratic, as the basis for national reconstruction in Latin America.

In this interstitial and ambiguous territory being now explored in Latin America, one finds some convergence between academic and grassroots indigenous aims. This convergence of views between scholars and grassroots movements might be promising in the long-run for the development of multi-national states in the region.

1992 had different meanings for the above perspectives. The *Hispanistas* got the idea from the Spanish government of Felipe Gonzales to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America by Columbus. *Mesticistas*, eclectically discussed the 'meeting of cultures', while 'new' *Indigenistas* and *Indianistas* appeared to have joined ranks in their international campaign entitled '500 Years of Oppression and Resistance'.

Multiculturalistas, like Barre (1989) and Wedin (1992), while acknowledging the rightful protest and claims of the Amerindian population, also postulated in their multi-national/ethnic state project the inclusion of the new demographic realities of Latin American societies. The latter include a great majority of Mestizo population, Blacks, Chinese, Japanese and recent European immigrants.

In relation to the current situation in Latin America, the French scholar Barre (1989) asserts that the notion of the national-state (*Estado Nacional*) was a conceptual import which originated and developed in Europe, particularly in Latin Europe (France, Spain and Italy). Barre traces the modern, voluntaristic, liberal and political idea of nation to the French revolutionaries of the eighteenth century.

Such views were later adopted by the 'libertadores' of the Americas like Bolivar and San Martin. These 'national projects' did not take into account the specificities of the various Latin American countries, and more importantly, they actually excluded the indigenous and Afro-American populations from the process of 'national construction' and development.

At the end of her very provocative discussion, Barre wrote:

> The ethno-national question, in dealing with the relation between different ethnic groups within the same national society, suggests another problem of great importance which is in turn linked to the power and power relations between the various groups—the elaboration of a national project that acknowledges the different conceptions of development corresponding to the various existing cultural groups. That constitutes another field, an immense field, whose challenge lies in the conciliation of different values to elaborate a national project that could be based, why not?, in a new idea of nation (Barre, 1989: 143).

Wedin (1992) has written on the need to acknowledge and correct the damage and injustice done through the centuries to the Amerindian people, and also to realize that Latin American societies have changed in time as have their demographic (racial/ethnic) compositions. Wedin suggests that in addition to the suffering of the Indian population, life circumstances have also become harder and the suffering greater for many others, among them the great numbers of Mestizos, Blacks and even White poor people, who nowadays together constitute a vast 'underclass'.

The urgent need to re-examine the prevailing model of national-state in Latin America has recently been raised by various authors. The notion of multi-national states, with equal citizenship rights and equal national (cultural) identity status for all the segments of their constituent populations is proposed as a viable alternative.

Notes

1. Known in the Spanish language as *el problema del Indio*, it revolves around the question of 'how to integrate "Indians" in "national life"' (see, Mariategui, 1971; Bacal, 1984; Sotelo, 1985; Nalewajko, 1985; among others).
2. The reader may refer to other recent works where the stated viewpoint and concerns of the present author are discussed at some length (see, Bacal, 1990a and b, 1991). Attention should also be paid to Rex (1986) who warned us that those who plea for multi-culturalism while disregarding political rights might in fact advocate 'de facto differential incorporation' like in the apartheid system of South Africa.
3. Race, nation and (primordial) ethnicity pertain to the realm of 'communalistic' concepts.
4. The Caribbean Sea is named after the Carib Indians. They have been described as 'valiant and war like' by some authors, and 'cannibal' or anthropophagus by others (like Columbus and Shakespeare). Caliban was Shakespeare's anagram for cannibal. The Arawac Indians, inhabitants of the Greater Antilles, were characterized by Columbus as 'peaceful, meek, and even timorous and cowardly' (quoted from Fernandez Retamar, 1989: 6).
5. In the case of Peru, the estimated population in the Inka Empire, in the 1530s, ranges from 32 million, gradually diminishing to 16 million and then to 3 million. By 1590, the Amerindian population had been reduced, depending on the source we refer to, by 95 per cent or 50 per cent. The real figures are difficult to obtain due to the propaganda war that took place in Spain in the mid-1500s between two parties, one of them regarding the Amerindians as full human beings who should be left in peace, and the other claiming that they were less than human and therefore potential slaves (Wedin, 1992).
6. The present writer deals with this situation in terms of a presumed dilemma: ethnocide or ethno-development (Bacal, 1990a).
7. Many cases of ethnocide and some cases of genocide in Latin America are properly documented.
8. The discussion took place within the conceptual apparatus developed by Aristotle, which established the criteria for humanness (Wedin, 1992).
9. While acknowledging the 'normal' damage inherent to the Spanish colonial conquest, many authors object to the particular cruelty ascribed to Spaniards by the Black Legend. One could readily dismiss the notion implied by British, French, Dutch and Belgian propaganda against the Spaniards that their own colonial enterprise was more 'humane' (see, for instance, Fernandez Retamar, 1989; Wedin, 1992).
10. Translated by the author.
11. Early 'indigenismo' refers to the defense of the Amerindian people and their cultures by non-Amerindians. Of academic and political interest are the 'action-research' projects proposed by Bartolome de las Casas in the 1530s, to 'prove the capacity (of Amerindians) to live as Christian Spaniards' (Wedin, 1992: 69–77). This viewpoint was eventually 'proven' by the Jesuit missions in Paraguay and Quiroga's communitarian projects in Michoacan, Mexico.

This viewpoint was at odds with the one advocated by the European conquerors, which clearly corresponded to their economic and political interests.

12. The Church itself had its share of earthly greed, as revealed by the immense landholdings under its property throughout the colonial period.
13. As mentioned earlier, this racial distinction was socially discriminatory and culturally reductionist, in the sense that Amerinds constitute in reality a plurality of highly differentiated ethnic groups and cultures.
14. Known in Spanish as *El tributo del Indio*.
15. The mixed bloods or 'castas' were initially marginal and occupied interstitial positions in colonial society. Mestizos refer to the mix of White with Amerindian, Mulatto to the mix of White and Black, and Zambo to the mix of Black and Indian (mostly women). In 1700, the 'castas' were about 6 per cent, the White or near-White the same, Indian and Negro dependents and the rest (88 per cent). However, the special conditions of economic development in the New World facilitated the functional incorporation of the 'castas' in colonial society and economy (Stein and Stein, 1970).
16. For a provocative view on the Marxist debate on the national question, refer to a work of the Chicano historian Juan Gomez-Quinones (1982), entitled *Critique on the National Question, Self-determination and Nationalism*. This author contrasts the reductionist bias of economic determinist views with historical/dialectic interpretations of particular cases of nationalist consciousness and conditions for self-determination.
17. One of the most important and creative contributions to the Marxist debate on 'the national question' in Latin America was that of Mariategui (1971). A more recent articulation of the Marxist discussion of 'the minorities question' in the Americas is the thematic issue of the journal *Latin American Perspectives* (Spring 1982). Other important contemporary Chicano and Latin American sources on this debate are Pozas and de Pozas (1971), Barrera (1979), Diaz-Polanco (1982), Flores (1984), Lumbreras (1988), Fernandez Retamar (1989), Manrique (1992) and Montoya (1992).
18. This discussion is based on a thorough review of the literature on ethnicity in the social sciences by the present author (see, Bacal, 1991a).
19. For a commentary on the distinction between and on the complementarity of the primordial, the contextual or situational and the instrumental sides of ethnicity, refer to Bacal (1991a).
20. Historically, the latter processes are not one-way streets. The Castellian Spanish ('Castellano') spoken in Mexico and Peru is impregnated with the native languages. Afro-Caribbean rhythms clearly reveal their original cultural roots. Catholic saints may stand for Amerindian deities or be invoked in Macumba and other such mixed religious rituals. In other words, syncretism appears to be the rule rather than the exception.
21. It seems plausible that Spanish racism, which was directed during the Middle Ages towards the Jews, 'Marranos', Muslims and Moriscos, was later reoriented and applied in the racial distinctions and regulations established in the viceroyalties of Latin America. Based on the Franciscan Friar Alphonso de Spina's influential book, *Frotalitium Fidei* ('Fortress of the faith') in 1460, the notion of 'hereditary Jewishness' (*mala sangre* or 'bad blood') rapidly

spread in Spanish Catholic popular culture. In the words of Flannery, himself a priest:

> We witness here the birth of Spanish racism, which in due course grew into a veritable obsession concerning 'limpieza de sangre' (purity of blood), in other words, freedom from the taint of Jewish blood transmitted by Marranos. Even religious orders succumbed to the mania. Judaism was no longer solely a theological problem but an ethnic as well (Flannery, 1965: 137).

22. Consider, for instance, the *Tratado de Libre Comercio* ('The Free Trade Treaty') between the United States, Canada and Mexico; the *pacto Andino* ('Andean Pact'), also called the 'Cartagena Pact', for Andean countries; 'Mercosur' between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay; and the Central American Common Market.
23. The term America as a neologism was created by Martin Waldseemuller in 1507 to honour Americo Vespucci in the mistaken belief that he had 'discovered America'. When this German geographer realized his error, it was too late to do anything about it (Wedin, 1992). The term 'America' stuck and became reified in linguistic praxis for at least the next 500 years, till date.
24. The seminal works of Morner (1967, 1990), Stein and Stein (1970), Graham (1990) and Wedin (1992), among *latinoamericanistas*, could be used to illustrate the documented discussion on race and race relations in the history of Latin America.
25. In the case of Peru, some of the best known exponents of the *Hispanista* view are Victor Andres Belaunde (1945, 1968) and Jose de la Riva Aguero (1960) with a Catholic, conservative approach. The latter had strong sympathies for the rightist and national–socialist movements of the thirties and forties in Europe.
26. Comprehensive reviews of 'indigenismo' are found in the works of Marzal (1981) on the history of *Indigenista* anthropology in Peru and Mexico, and in Sotelo (1985).

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